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CHAIRMAN ALISTER McALISTER:

This is the Finance and

0
Insurance committee of the Assembly conducting an interim
study on real property financing and various problems in
connection therewith.
our first scheduled testimony today will come from
various persons associated with the California Savings and
Loan League.

0

MR. BERNARD J. MIKELL:

Mr. Chairman, my name is

Bernard J. Mikell, Jr., and I represent the california Savings
and Loan League.

0

I would like to simply introduce Mr. McKenna

and Dr. Pratt and make a few comments about their credentials
and then let them take over.
Mr. McKenna received his education at Providence College
and his J. D. at Yale University.

He is presently in practice

in Los Angeles with the firm of McKenna and Fitting.

Among

his many qualifications he was Deputy Administrator under the
HHFA, the predecessor of HUD under the Roosevelt Administration
and was number two man in the Eisenhower administration.

He

has also been General Counsel for the Committee on Government
Operations of the

u. s.

House of Representatives and was

Litigation Counsel for the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board and

and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.

He

also worked with the government of Brazil in setting up their
housing structure, housing finance structure, and he is
presently counsel for the California Savings and Loan League.
Dr. Richard Pratt is presently Professor of Finance
at the University of Utah.

He is a Public Interest Director

on the Federal Horne Loan Bank in Seattle.

In 1970, he was

appointed by the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board in Washington
to represent the public interest.

He is a member of the

National Advisory Commission of the Federal Horne Loan Mortgage
corporation and he was a consultant to the Federal Horne Loan
Bank Board on the Hunt Commission which was the commission
which was to study and make recommendations on restructuring
the United States horne financing system and he has also been
a consultant to the Agency for International Development on
Housing Problems in Developing countries.
MR. WILLIAM MCKENNA:

Mr. chairman and members of the

committee, or. Pratt has prepared a basic reference paper which
I hope has been distributed to the members and which is available here.

I will talk in general terms from the point of view

of housing and, hopefully, Dr. Pratt will get more specific and
talk in detail as to the particular provisions which are
contained within the notice of the committee, that is, specifically
charges and interest rates, and fees called premiums or prepayment charges, the due-on-clause and late charges, but I
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0
wanted to talk first from the viewpoint of housing because

0

really all of these instruments, no matter how much we
clarify them and no matter how much we reduce the charges to
borrowers or the interest rates, it all serves no purpose

0

unless they get some money and this is really our problem
here today.

This is what we are struggling with, how do we

get the money on the most economical basis possible, on the
most practical basis possible or the basis which serves the
needs of the people of the State of california who are selling
houses, buying houses, who need shelter.

That really is

where I would like to address myself because that is the
overall problem.

Unless we accomplish that, we have

accomplished nothing by changing the terms of instruments

D

that do not produce money.
I have seen and ·I have been told there have been
continuous references here to the comparative situation in
New York State and the state of California.

We really, in

the housing picture, have had to confront that situation since
the close of the Second World War.

Always it was New York

that had the marvelous low interest rates, the prohibitions
against exorbitant provisions in the loan instruments.

We, in

California, in all of that period up until the recent years
were a capital-short state.

New York had money coming out of

its ears but New York's money carne here, it built our houses,
we satisfied the needs of our people.

-3-

We built housing for

them and in New York the shortage of housing got worse and
worse and people lived in more and more dilapidated structures.
They could not put money in housing, so all of these beautiful instruments and these beautiful statutes that they devised
only hurt the people of New York.

We got the money from

New York here in california and we built the housing here
and that is the situation really that I would like to see
reconstructed so that we get the money here, that we have
the money to get the real estate business going again, that
we can start the construction business going again, that we
put the people to work who really need the work on construction, on house- building for their livelihood, that we give
the real estate agents a lively real estate market, that has
to be our objective and the argument over these provisions
of the trust deeds must be subordinate to the major thrust,
our major preface.

And, of course, today particularly we

have a very distressing situation.

Hopefully, the last thirty

days it seems that it is ameliorating some but it has been
very bad.

The cash flow available for housing in the thrift

institutions of the State of California in September was about
3% of what it was in January.
to September.

It had dropped 97% from January

This is the situation we have to confront.

The

savings--or the cash flow available for housing through the
financial intermediaries in the State of California in
September was about 20% of the payment down and the payment
-4-

off on mortgage loans alone.

0

The rest of it went to the

meeting of the negative deposit flow.
We have to construct.

This is the situation.

We must get money flowing into the

housing picture again and we must get it on a basis which

0

serves the needs of the people, not a

lO~fo

interest rate.

You

cannot really finance homes for the ordinary person over a 30year period at a

10~

rate.

that is our basic effort.

we have got to get it down and
This is what we are struggling with

now and I would like to put the emphasis on starting the
money flow again into housing so that we really have a
viable housing business--real estate

busin~ss

and home con-

struction, but we start with a background that all of the
commodities in the world for which everybody can compete, its
money. The sharpest people in the world want money.
biggest corporations in the world want money.

The

The Arabs

want it for their oil, the European countries want it to buy
oil and we are competing with them.

That is our job.

We

compete with everybody in the world except, perhaps, some
nuns and nice people like that that have sense to remove themselves from this competition but even the number of them is
reduced.

Almost everybody wants money and we have gotto get

it for housing and that is the problem and we cannot really
take our minds away from it.
Now, how does that relate to what we are talking about
here?

Well, I believe that we were talking--you had some

talks yesterday by way of example on the late charge provisions.
What harm does it do if we let somebody stay a month or two
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late in his payments.

Well, back in the '30s when we first

started in the direct reduction loan, the long-term amortized
loan,one of the first requirements of the federal government,
in addition to direct reduction on its loan payments, was
that there be an opportunity to prepay the loan but then at
that time the federal government mandated a very onerous
provision for late charges.

Today, it is a little different.

We do not really, I hope, need quite the provisions that the
federal government required in earlier years and which
still permits but let me give you an example of what happens
when one person fails'to pay, make his loan payment on time
and remember now it is not always the unsophisticated working
man who fails to make his payment.

Very often it is the

calculating borrower, the professional borrower, the man who
sees some other use for his money and if in terms of a one
late payment on a substantial loan, that loan is rendered
unsalable for a year to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.

If it is a $40,000 loan that means $40,000 is removed

from the flow of funds available for housing in the state
of California because one borrower failed to make his payment.
Now, I say it is likely to be the sophisticated borrower who
does not make his payment.

The reason is that normally if it

is a working man, an ordinary person, if he telephones the
institution and says "I cannot make it." Then there is no payment, no late payment charge.

The late payment is not imposed

when somebody has a real reason for not being able to make it.
It is normally the person who has a calculated reason for
not making it, who is faced with the charge and the harm done
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0
by him is that the entire unpaid principal balance of that
loan is rendered unsalable to a New York purchaser, an out-of-

0
state purchaser and those funds do not came into the housing
flow of the State of California and this is a basic problem
in what we talked about--the impact of failing to make a

0
payment on a loan.

If, in fact, we are going to keep the

cost of financing of homes to the people of California at 70%

0

of the prime rate because the average yield in the portfolio
of the thrift institutions in this state is 7.6% and the prime
is still above 10% and if we are talking about keeping the
mortgage rate in the State of california substantially under

0
the rate for triple A bonds by AT&T or the big borrowers of the
county, then really we must give to the people whose job it
is to get this money the means of getting it and when you put.
it in that way they are no more able to get this money than
they are able to show to the people who are the potential
sources of the money that they have paper that merits the
purchase or that they can pay what they have to pay to attract
the deposit and this means in direct relationship to the
yield on the portfolio and to the degree that loan payments
are late or prepayment charges, whatever it is.

When we start

talking in terms of such things as the due-on-sale clause,
let us again reflect on what the impact of that is.

We have

constructed since 1933 a basic 30-year mortgage instrument,
what we call a direct reduction loan instrument with, so far
as the federal system is concerned, no subsequent payment any
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l arger than any earlier payment.

This is the requirement and

this is the result of the reforms of the hundred days of the
Roosevelt administration.

The direct reduction, amortized

loan payment with no subsequent payment greater than any
previous payment.
Put yourself in the position of a young family which
wants to buy a horne.

That family is ab l e to budget the maxi-

mum that is ever going to be required for the ownership of
that horne during the period that it occupies the horne.
is the important thing.

This

You are able to plan from the start

on what it is going to cost you, X taxes, we cannot cover taxes,
we cannot cover insurance but for the interest on the loan,
for the reduction of principal of the monthly payment on the
loan, by federal regulation, no subsequent payment can be
greater over that 30-year period than any earlier payment so
that the young family is able to say

11

This is all it is ever

going to cost this family to occupy this horne."

Now, we change

it a bit, we say, "We are going to extend that.

Not only are

you going to be able to occupy this horne with no subsequent
payment greater than any earlier payment but you are going to
be able to sell that loan to the next purchaser."

Immediately

instead of having a loan with an average life of 8 or 10 years,
the full contract period of 30 years becomes a possibility or
something in between.

Accordingly, the nitial interest rate to

that borrower must go up to reflect not

just what the inflation

index is going to be but it must give a safe margin to the
-8-

0
lender.

0

It means that the initial cost of the loan to that

horne borrower must be very substantially greater than it would
be if all you were giving him is a loan for the period that
he occupies the house.

0

Maybe you want to do that but the cost

is going to be much higher and, in fact, what you are doing is
not saving the horne owner of California any money, what you are
doing is transferring the cost from the present owner of that
home to the subsequent borrower.

You are putting the burden

on the subsequent borrower into the housing market or the
fellow who wants to sell his horne because you make the mortgage
instrument, you fix the mortgage instrument at that flat rate
and somebody who comes in has to pay more to balance it out
because there is no fat there.

The average yield in the

thrift institutions of the state is 7.6% or thereabouts·, the
margin for all of its overhead, all of its reserve allocations
is not much more than 1%.

There is no fat there.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Why should somebody just because
they borrowed money in 1960 pay less interest over a 30-year
loan than I, if I borrowed money in 1969?
MR. McKENNA:
Chairman.

I think your point is well taken, Mr.

But if we go back again to the history of it, that

is the only place we find the answer.

In 1933, the federal

government had to buy all of the mortgages in the country and
it had to buy it because these were short-term loans which
suddenly matured and there was the obligation of repaying them.
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From that, we went to the opposite extreme, which was (belt
fades out) that in fact no sub {belt once again fails to
record) raise the interest rate in response to the market so
there is a limit there on how much that can be done with it .
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: over a period of time and with many
loans, of course, ultimately you are going to be reducing the
rate too, with a variable rate?
MR. McKENNA: If, in fact, the federal government has
fiscal responsibility but I do not think any of us would be
willing to bet his own money on that right now.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: There are those of us, over the
past generation or so we have seen inflation, but historically
there has been no more inflation than deflation and you may
well see a time when interest rates go down again.
MR. MCKENNA: I think also if we were on the variable
interest rate system there would be much greater public
pressure to resist inflation, so I think you are right.

If

we had a variable interest rate mortgage, we would, in fact,
eliminate many of these problems and we do not need prepayment
charges and we do not need a due-on-sale clause if, in fact,
we have a variable rate mortgage.
ASSEMBLYMAN BOB CLINE:

Let me ask you relative to this

latter point that you make concerning variable interest rates.
Do you foresee in the instruments which you predict the variable
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0
principal payment along with the variable interest rate, in

0

other words, the principal payment moving inversely to the
interest?
MR. McKENNA: Yes, I think that is all the federal

0

associations could do now, Mr. Cline, but the problem is that
the principal payment, the principal reduction is such a tiny
amount of the initial monthly payment that there is not much
to reduce there but I agree with the principle of it.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Let us say you

had a variable

interest rate loan and the interest rate went up and the total

0

payment remained constant.

Is it your answer to my question,

that the total payment would remain constant and the amount of
the reduction of the principal will decline?
MR. McKENNA:

0

Well, yes, but the problem would be

this, if we have a 30-year maximum it may be that the principal reduction becomes a negative fact of trying to crowd it
into a fixed monthly payment.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE:

So, in other words, what you are

saying is you want total leeway then to vary the total amount
of the payment.
MR. McKENNA: Well, obviously we would all like to keep
that payment at a level amount.

This is important to a young

family.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Do you envision with a variable interest
rate loan, the increasing of total payment as interest rates
rise?
-11-

MR. McKENNA:

In some instances, yes, if we are going to

have a true variable interest

rate loan.

I think we should

resist it and minimize it but we may have to do it if we are
going to keep to a 30-year maximum, have the present loan-tovalue ratios, and have the surge of interest rates that we have
seen from time-to-time in the last few years.

I do not like

it but I think it will have to be.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: So, you are saying it will go beyond
the 30 years?
MR. McKENNA: I should think your original loan should
not be made for more than 30 years but that if we have a choice
of increasing the monthly payment or extending the loan beyond
30 years, we should be allowed to extend it beyond thirty
years rather than to increase the monthly payments.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You think politically that is salable
on a national level?
MR. McKENNA: Not at the moment.

This is a very emotional

issue in washington.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: I would say not in the foreseeable
future.
MR. McKENNA: Well, but the net result is that we are
excluding new entrance to the housing market by the present
structure and we have to face that.

A lot of the problem is

due to the cost of constructing the home and the surge in real
estate values, but the fact is that when you start talking in

- 12-

terms of 10 and 11% interest rates you do preclude a very

0

hefty percentage of the respective horne owners from owning a
horne and you have got to get that rate down.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: National l y, what percentage of the

0

savings and loan lending goes into single family dwellings
as opposed to non-single family dwellings?
MR. McKENNA: I would only hazard a guess.
the tax requirement, for tax eligibility is
certain of that.

7~~

I think
but I am not

It certainly is more than two-thirds.

ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: My final question--concerning the
due-on-sale clause--there have been a number of borrowers who
in order to attempt to pass on to a subsequent buyer the loan,
rather than have the payment due, enter into a land contract
and then the homeowner then maintains the obligation as his
and the new owner pays to the original borrower the amount to
cover the principal and interest.

I understand that the industry

has not legally challenged this and I wonder what plans you
have in that regard to challenge the legality of a land sale
contract?
MR. McKENNA: This really is not so much a practice now
as an anticipated practice.

The State Supreme Court about a

month ago in the Lassen Savings case said that the due-on
clause could not be exercised by a lender when the transfer
was a transfer by a land sale contract rather than by a conveyance.
Now, I think in my own mind this is a difference in words only.
-13-

That is what the supreme court held, so we anticipate and I
think everybody anticipates that there will be a greater use
of both sales contracts and of subordinate financing, of
secondary financing if, in fact, the bare inference from the
opinion is this would also so hold when there is heavy secondary
financing.

Now, this leads to the probability that in order

to preserve the existing low-yield loan there will be wrap-around
seconds at much higher rates and seconds normally have
balloon payments before too long so I think really that this
is going to send us in

the direction of unsound financing,

but all of that remains to be seen yet.

I think this opinion

is largely being analyzed from the viewpoint of its impact
on all financing, Mr. Cline.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you.

You may proceed.

MR. MCKENNA: Returning to the variable interest rate
loan, under the laws of california the state-chartered lenders,
in contrast with the federal, can also have short-term rollover notes, something in the nature of a 3 or 5 year loan with
a balloon payment at the end which also will permit the lender
at the end of that period or some other lender to refinance at
the then current interest rate.

These are developments that

I think we are going to have because of the surge of inflation, the uncertainty of interest rates and also because of
the erosion of the provisions which make the long-term fixed
interest loan, has made it a viable instrument.
-14-

0

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:
0

You are saying that if you cannot

have a due-on-sale clause and so in effect take advantage
of the opportunity to loan money out at the higher interest
rate being developed over a period of years that then you would

0

have a series of short-term loans that would continually be
becoming due over a period of several years so that you would
continually refurbish your portfolio.
MR. McKENNA: This is a real possibility.

There is no

way around the necessity of paying current rates for your
money--current short-term rates for your money.

Otherwise,

0
we have the s±tuation we have had in the summer and early
fall of this year and still have which is a very unpleasant
situation, so we must be able to pay a higher rate for our
savings in order to have an adequate flow of funds into housing.
If we have an average yield in our portfolio as it is now of
about 7.6%, new loans have to be outrageously high in order
to have any perceptible influence on the
the average.

average~

to lift

On the other hand, if the average yield on the

portfolio went with the money market then new lending could
be at a dramatically lesser rate.

This is the.problem we have

and the ways of achieving a solution are the variable interest
rate loan, the short term roll-over loan and in the past, to a
lesser degree, a due-on-sale clause which meant that instead
of having a 30-year contract life to the loan, we would have
a shorter actual life of perhaps eight years so that in
-15-

every eight year period we would have rolled over our
portfolio.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Are not these other methods like
the short term loan and the variable interest rate actually
more equitable than the catch-as-catch-can system that is
developed under the due-on-sale and prepayment penalties
and this type of thing? I mean, this is kind of helter-skelter:
if you sell,then there is a new loan issued to the new buyer
and so you get higher interest rates but somebody else keeps
their horne for 30 years, 40 years, and this does not happen
and these other systems that you are talking about or at
least if accepted over a period of time would apply to nearly
everybody.
MR. McKENNA:

I think I agree with your proposition,

but let me point this out, that the borrower now, or hopefully
will have an option.

If he likes the variable interest rate

loan then he could pick that.

If he prefers the short-term

roll-over note, he could pick that.

Now, we should also like

to give him the form of loan that we have been using the past
quarter century as an option, but this is not going to be a
viable option, if we take away the provisions for a due-on-sale,
the prepayment charges and these factors except with an
exorbitant interest rate.

I can understand a young family

wanting to be able to budget for the time it occupies that
house, the total monthly cost to it.
proposition.
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This is an understandable

0

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: With a person who chose that
option of knowing exactly what he was going to pay over a
period of time you would want the due-on-sale clause but if

0

a person had a variable interest rate or a short-term loan
then you would not want •••
MR. McKENNA: That would be my personal feeling.

0

would not justify a due-on-sale clause with a variable interest
rate loan or a short-term roll-over note.

I think what we have

talked about is the essence of the problem.

0

I

for what we call the nonoptional lender.

There is a need

Basically, in this

state a savings and loan association cannot put its money
anyplace, except to provide shelter for the average person.
The reason for this is because you must develop these skills
in the competitive money market among people who cannot use
them except to get money to the homeowner.

They are competing

and our people are competing with the financial giants of
the world and with everybody who wants money.
average homeowner cannot

Since the

do this, we develop these skills

and we develop the resources in the financial intermediary
money market--the nonoptional lender, the savings and loan
association--and say, "Develop your skills, get competitive,
but the product of your skills, the money that you get flowing
must go only to home lending."

This is the only way that we

can make the horne financing market competitive with the Arabs,
with the countries of Europe or with General Motors.
-17-

We must

do it this way for these people and these experts in the
savings and loan structure, whose expertise must be limited,
in order to give them a chance of winning in this battle for
money and to have them develop competitive instruments.

They

must have the means of competing with the others who want
money.

When we limit them to a 30-year loan with a fixed

interest rate and no due-on-sale clause, the task is impossible.

We will not get the money, and that is why I use

New York as an example.

When I was Deputy Administrator in

•s4 it was perfectly clear to me that New York had all of
these beautiful protective devices for borrowers and they
were not building houses, nor sheltering their people.
in California, were.

We,

We were getting the money from New York

and we were putting it into california home construction.

This

is what I would like to see start again, and this is the
overpowering need.

We should not talk in terms of these

isolated provisions of trust deeds, but how do you put roofs
over the people of the State.

Hopefully, Dr. Pratt can help

us relate these two.
DR. RICHARD T. PRATT:

Let me say initially that it is

a great pleasure to speak to this group.

California has long

had the national reputation of being the leader in both
providing housing and housing finance and I think that you
have a record that you can truly be proud of.

I hope that

the deliberations that your group will undertake
the continued record of such success.

-18-

will restore

In following up on what Bill has had to say, I thought

0

we might get into some of the aspects of the mortgage loan
and its viability as an economic instrument.

I would, of

course, like you to interrupt at any time, some of the points

0

will be fairly technical, but I think they will lay a solid
groundwork on how each of the aspects of the instrument works.
If we take a look at the mortgage loan, which Bill has mentioned,

0

we are really seeing sort of two difficulties that are facing
us at this time.

First is the overriding economic problem of

borrowing short and lending long which I intend to address

0

myself to in a few moments.

Second is the current interest

rate in the mortgage instrument, itself, and the various
provisions of it, such as late charges, the prepayment charge,
and so on.
First, I would like to say that these two things are
very much interrelated.

I think Bill has laid the groundwork.

The mortgage is a financial instrument.

It must compete with

other financial instruments and it is a very large part of
America's capital markets.

The new funds raised through mort-

gage lending may be as much as three or four times the total
new corporate borrowing in any year.
biggest capital market.

This is the country's

We need to make every effort to

insure that the instrument operating in that capital market
is as efficient as possible.

I think we need to be certain

that no state isolates itself from this national market.

I

will give you figures which show the growing importance and
dependence of california on other states in this system.
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Something which I think needs to be clearly established
is the fact that our mortgage lending system has operated
with great efficiency.

If we look at the last ten years

and look at the record of savings and loan associations
their net profit is something like 70 cents a year per $100
of mortgage loan.

This is total compensation for facing

massive interest rate risks.

Anyone of us looking at what

has happened to the economy in the past few years have to
say that a person who undertakes to borrow short and lend
for thirty years in these markets is really taking a rather
substantial market position.

He receives about 70 cents a

year for every $100 of mortgages that he serves.

The total

cost of obtaining funds, servicing loans, attracting funds
through savings accounts, lending, providing a return to the
owners of savings and loan associations or providing for
reserves in the case of mutual institutions amounts to no
more than 2% per year of the mortgage balances outstanding.
Another important point is this secondary mortgage
market.

The state of california and the western United States,

in general, depend very heavily on this market.
explain briefly, what it is.
mortgage loans by an

~riginal

Let me

This is the origination of
lender, a savings and loan, a

mortgage banker or others, and the sale of these loans on
either local or national markets.
quite striking.

The figures are really

If we take a look at california and the
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0

western United states, of the estimated 3.8 million single-family
loans in this part of the country, approximately 1.4 million
or about 36% of the total have been supplied by funds outside

0

of this geographic region.

More than 1/3 of the mortgage

credit for single-family lending is coming from outside the
region.
What is the importance of these facts? Purchasers in
this secondary market, whether they be federal agencies or
other private financial institutions accept certain provisions

0

in the mortgage.

They anticipate being able to depend upon

certain aspects of the contract.

If this contract is modified

or made less competitive as a financial instrument, it

0

becomes an unattractive investment for lenders, for federal
agencies, or perhaps precludes their purchasing of California
mortgages, 36% of such funds coming from outside the area.

0

Any action which would impair the salability of California's
mortgages is simply denying mortgage credit to the home buyers
of california.

0

It is likely that this is going to be a more

and more important source of funds.

At the present time,

what new mortgage lending there is, is coming mainly from
federal agencies operating through the secondary market.

This

would be the Fanny Mae and the Ginny Mae programs, and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's purchase of mortgages.

Thus, this secondary market and the fact that we have

a national instrument are factors which should be kept in mind
as we discuss the mortgage.
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I would like to reinforce a point Bill made.

Legal

prohibition that precludes something like the due-on-sale
clause or a late

charge, in fact, reduce the lender's option.

They reduce the borrower's option.
assess the cost where they occur.

Many of these provisions
Should a person who is

punctual in his mortgage payments have to pay the burden or
"carry on his back" the person who is not punctual and is
inept in making his payments?

Quite often these clauses

assess direct user charges, as we do away with these clauses,
these charges must be lumped into the interest rate.

We

are not charging individuals for a cost which they do not
incur upon the system and for which they are not responsible.
It seems a less equitable system than that which we presently
have.
Let me refer now to the operational setting of a
savings and loan association, and establish a base of efficiency of operation.

one of the real functions, I think,

that mortgage lenders and savings and loan associations
especially perform is this process of intermediation or
assembly funds and dispersing them in the mortgage market.
They do this essentially by borrowing short and lending long.
The sources of funds for these associations are few.
first is the passbook savings, which is, of

course~

The
withdrawable

immediately and is subject to interest rate pressures of all
types.

An interest rate must be paid which will obtain those

funds.

The second is certificate of deposit which, while
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0

somewhat longer, is still relatively of short duration-normally under 4 years.

The certificate of deposit advances

from the Federal Horne Loan Bank and have an average dura-

0

tion of up to five years.

However, the average maturity

of these across the country is presently eight months.
On the other side, the mortgage lender offers loans

0

for an average of 25 to 27 years.

Now, we have talked about

and will continue to talk about some options for this type of
lending, such as the variable interest rate for the short-

0

term note.

A very valuable service that the savings and

loan association is performing is its financial expertise.
It can go to the typical homeowner and say, "Look, there is

0

financial risk in the market.

Interest rates have changed.

We are willing to bear that risk, keep it from you, and
provide you with a loan where you can count on the payment
being a certain amount as long as you have tenure in this
house.

You will know what portion of your monthly payment is

for principal and interest."
The price which the savings and loan has charged has
been a very modest fee based on the figures, which I just
gave you, to assume this interest rate risk.

If we wish to

shift it to the borrower, we have to ask the question:
Is this really a very good thing to do, if he is able as the
professional manager to bear that risk? As bng as the longterm fixed interest rate mortgage has the appropriate tools
associated with it, it allows such long-term fixed rate
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lending.

Look what happens, though, when we artifically

extend the maturity of those loans or do such things as
eliminate the due-on-sale.

If we look at the 1965 portfolio

of the Eleventh Federal Horne Loan Bank District, which
covers California, Nevada and Airzona, they were earning an
average of $6.37 per year per $100 of mortgages held.

Of

course, this figure continues as long as any portion of that
portfolio is on the books, thus we see that the figures from

1965 to 1973 for the portfolio held in 1965 remain at $6o37.
The second line shows what has happened to the average cost of
funds for these associations.

When they made the loans

in 1965, which is our benchmark year, the average cost of
funds, plus their 1.2% operating costs amounted to $5.93.

1973, this figure had risen to $6.93.

By

While there was a

dollar increase, there is no increased return on the portfolio.
The cost or the profitability of holding that mortgage goes
from a positive 44%, 44 cents per $100

in 1965 to a minus

56 cents in 1973.
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN KNOX:

May I ask a question.

Is

it correct that as the payments come in they are re-lending
the money at the higher rate?
DR. PRATT: That is correct.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Thus, is it not correct to point out
that the re-lending of money does ameliorate the situation?
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DR. PRATT: Yes.

0

It is the volume and active market

with these instruments which have allowed the savings and
loan association to remain in business and make a profit.

You

are pointing out the importance of the due-on-sale clause.

0

A substantial source of funds is the early repayment of the
loan.

This source is the result of the due-on-sale clause.

It is this "rolling 11 of the portfolio, which has allowed

0

California associ.ations to continue to operate.

But the

opposite side of the picture shows that as we slow down this
ability, we force the mortgages to stay on the books and this

0

becomes untenable.

It just becomes untenable.

No matter

what your volume is, if you lose a little bit on each loan,
you do not make it up.

0

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:
this roll-over loan works.

I am not certain I understand how
In other words, somebody would take

a loan for five years or same other time period and the
institution would agree, in advance to re-lend the money at the
market rate?
DR. PRATT: I intend to discuss this.
The point is that since World War II these interest
rates have continually moved upward on each loan.

As it

stays on the books it has become an unprofitable entity.

Thus,

it is a fact that these loans are paid off and partly paid
off as a result of the due-on-sale clause or other aspects
of the contract and the clause has maintained the viability of
the instrument.

For instance, let me refer back to the
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secondary market for just a moment.

on the average, when

secondary market transactions are made, it is assumed that
the mortgage will have a 12-year life.
some early pay-offs.

This obviously assumes

If you eliminate the due-on-sale clause

or if you do things to discourage such pay-offs, the 12-year
life is not going to exist.
I do not think we need to say much about the interest
rate.

There has been freedom of contract as to the level of

this interest rate.

Evidence shows that states which have

restrict i ve usury laws do not have mortgage lending.

There

was an excel l ent article in the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Review

in the last couple of months which you might find

useful, if you are interested.
There are two types of closing costs and origination
fees.
First are those which represent the hard costs to the
lender of putting a loan on the books.

It seems appropriate

that these be charged at the time that the loan is closed.
They are costs associated with the origination of the mortgage loan.

It seems to be a better time and place to charge

them rather than spreading them over the life of the loan.
Second

are those associated with origination fees and

discount points.

This is the market freedom.

Even though there

are loan disclosure requirements, such as the actual loan
interest percentage rate, both the lender and borrower do
have

options.

For some borrowers, the lender may prefer a

lower contract interest rate with more initial points.
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For

others, the opposite may be true.

0

This is a matter which

can now be negotiated between the borrower and the lender.
We also get into same difficulties in the secondary
market if there is interference with the origination of fees.

0

As you know, HUD has set arbitrary levels at which FHA loans
should be made.

When these arbit·r ary levels are not the same

as the market, the price of the mortgage changes in the

0

secondary market.

We have seen FHA mortgages carrying as much

as 8 points of discount at various times to make them viable
in this national secondary market.

I would think that no

state would want to consider any sort of legislation which
might at some time preclude the marketing of their mortgages
in such a market.
Prepayment charge&

Why do prepayment charges exist

and what role do they fill?
Let us look back at this interest rate risk for just
a moment, if we might.

When interest rates are rising the

mortgage lender has no right to call the loan, nor has he the
right normally to accelerate the interest rate on the loan.
He must live with that portfolio.

When interest rates fall,

the borrower has every right to prepay and to re-finance at
the lower interest rate, which would be to his advantage.
For example, a 25-year, $10,000 loan has a 9%
interest rate.

If the loan is paid off at the end of year 5

and if a prepayment charge is used, following the federal
formula, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has said that prepayment charges may not exceed 6 months' interest on the amount
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prepaid, less 20% of the original balance of the loan.
Thus, we have a loan balance at the end of year 5 of $9,327.
We have a prepayment charge of $330, based on the formula,
which I mentioned.

If the borrower prepays at that time, the

loan has cost him 9.53%.

In other words, that is the effect

of the prepayment charge.

How low would rates have to be

before he would be better off, that is, have a lower monthly
payment, if he re-financed?

Rates would only have to drop from

9% to 8.66% to make it advantageous for him to pay off the
previous loan, pay the prepayment charge and negotiate a new
loan.

So, on the rising interest rate side where a borrower

in 1965 may have gotten a loan at 6 3/4% and today rates
are

10~,

nearly a 400 basis point increase, the lender has

had no recourse whatsoever.

He has to live with this and

has been willing to do so.

If interest rates were to fall

we can see from this fairly typical example that they need
fall only 34 basis points before the borrower would find it
advantageous to re-finance.

So this is a modest, a very modest,

sharing of the interest rate risk.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Have you built into this re-financing
rate new origination fees?
DR. PRATT: The 8.66% would have to be the effective
rate, which would be a combination of the contract rate and
the new origination fees.
rate were

8~,

For instance, if the new contract

you could have about one point or a little

more and it would make it the 8.66, so the 8.66 is an effective
rate and it would be a balance of the origination contract rates.
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CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

0

Dr. Pratt .

When interest rates

are rising, the borrower does not really have any incentive
to sell or re-finance.

Why have prepayment charges under

those circumstances?

0

DR. PRATT:

In that case, we would probably say that

the prepayment charge was a matter of negotiation between
borrower and lender at the time that it was originated, and

0

if both parties freely understand its operation, I would see
no reason to preclude it.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Of course, things like that are
never freely negotiated.

Isn't that a bit of a legalistic

myth to say that any of this is freely negotiated?
DR. PRATT: I think that there are two aspects.

The

negotiation of individual borrowers of single family house may
be limited, however, acting as a system I think the negotiation
works rather thoroughly.

You may have noticed in the paper

yesterday that mortgage interest rates have already dropped
in some instances.
competition.

The system has been amazingly sensitive to

I think we would have to conclude that given

the fact that economic changes have been rapid, readjustments
have been made rather rapidly and rates have come down at
the first sign of decrease in demand or any increase in supply
of funds.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: No, it does not and you can only
get so much blood out of a turnip.
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DR. PRATT:

I think from a pure economic rationale

your point has some validity.
MR. McKENNA:

If, in fact, the increase in interest

rates were such as we experienced from perhaps the end of the
Korean war or until 1965, then there was a need for the
prepayment clause because the interest rate rise was so modest
that the loss of income during the replacement of the loan
may have cost the institutions that much.

But we are talking

today in a totally different ball park and when we have this
surging interest rate then obviously from an economic point of
view the prepayment is not needed by the lender and there
is not much economic justification for it.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I do not know why you fellows do
not use the historic argument on prepayment.
from the early

English lenders.

It dates back

Now, of course, we have a

more mecuric situation, but nevertheless I think that it
at least has some validity.

However, on a rising market, I

see no justification for it at all.
MR. McKENNA: Well, it certainly is not a rapidly rising
market.

I might go back a bit into the history of it.

The

Bank Board in 1934-35 for the first time required that
mortgage loans must have a prepayment privilege, which provided that the borrower must have the right to prepay.

At

that time, the Bank Board put in exactly the same formula
which is present today.

Maybe they should be reconsidering

what the national formula should be? For example, if you are
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0

buying

0

a bond from a major corporation and it wants to

call that bond, it has to pay a premium, which is a prepayment
charge on that is a competitive instrument.

Now they are the

borrower, the big corporation, if there is a public market

0

for that bond can go and buy it at the current rate in the
public market.

I really cannot say that if we are going

to have this continuing surge of interest rates that we should

0

have the present prepayment charges in there.

I think that

probably the Bank Board will consider a national change if we
are going to have a repetition of this.

0

ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Is it customary within the industry
now to eliminate a prepayment penalty when the refinancing is
done with the same institution?
MR. MIKELL: In California, yes, that is true.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: That applies to federal and state
institutions?
DR. PRATT: Yes, as a matter of tradition it would be
true for essentially all lenders.

You will find wide varia-

tions in the way individual lenders apply this.

Many lenders,

in fact, would be very careful and very unlikely to charge
a prepayment penalty in a period of rising interest rates, but
it

o~viously

does vary a good deal from institution to institution.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I think that this is a point that
is a little troubling to some of us.

There seems to be

marked inconsistency at least between institutions and perhaps
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as between different borrowers.

We had a lady here yester-

day who told us her sad story about having to pay a prepayment penalty although she understood the same institution
waived the penalty for other people.

I think it was the

same institution that was going to carry the loan for the
next purchaser and, of course, I do not know all of the
facts on that, but the reported inconsistency as to the
troubling thing.
DR. PRATT: Yes, I have tried to establish sort of an
economic basis for it as a sharing of the interest rate risk.
I think that is a very valid use of this.

Certainly, I am

sure this committee will have mweigh other circumstances
associated with it.
The next section that we might take a look at is the
late charges.

I think the only comment that I would care to

make at this time is that the late charge really serves two
economic functions.

One, the late charge should clearly

cover the cost imposed by the individual who makes his payment late.

I would like to reinforce that some of those

costs may not be evident.

The point that Bill made earlier

that a history of late payments jeopardizes the sale of this
mortgage in secondary markets should not be overlooked.

That

is an extremely important point and it may mean that $30,000
or $40,000 or whatever of mortgage credit is simply not
available because this instrument became ineligible for the
sale on the secondary market.

Second, of course, simply the
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fact that payments are late, delays the cash flow to a
0

lending institution and that, by itself, reduces the amount
of funds which might be available.

Along with these direct

costs it certainly is in the borrower's interest to be

0

punctual in his payments.

I believe that the late charge

should reflect in increment to encourage him to be punctual.
This is something which certainly is in his long-run interest.
0

I do not think any of us would argue that we would like to
see a situation which encouraged delinquency.
The impounding of tax and insurance funds is essen-

0

tially not required in california any more, so I will not
comment on that.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: But on the late charge matter, has
the industry done any studies or

d~

they have any statistics

which might show us what their costs are because apparently
that is going to be the test in california now, it would
be good for us to know what the costs are of processing,
including the loss to you, of a late payment.
DR. PRATT:

I did not make a study for this presentation.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That is what the Supreme court of
the State has said and either it is going to be finally
decided through further litigation or the Legislature is
going to have to establish by legislative fiat what those
costs are.

It would be nice to make a rational decision

rather than just picking a figure out of the air.
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DR. PRATT: I think that as the litigation progresses,
we will have a better reference point as to what these costs
are in competing institutions.

This is a very active point

in litigation right now.
I would like to spend some time on what I think is
perhaps economically the most important element of the mort gage and that is the due-on-sale clause, which we discuss
beginning on page 18.* We take a look at the operation of this,
the consequences of its elimination and some of the substitutions that might occur.

I have presented for your perusal

at your pleasure the hypothetical effect of

the due-on-sale

clause, which is shown on page 19, which just compares a
loan--two loans which were closed at the end of December,
1974, at essentially then current interest rates.

we take

a look at the subsequent sale of this property at two later
points in time, assuming under one situation that no due-onsale clause operates and under the other situation that the
due-on-sale clause does operate.

As you can see at the

bottom of the page, the total payments received vary rather
substantially.

In fact, in this particular example the

lender would have had to charge approximately 1% higher rate
on the original loan to make up for the absence of the due-onsale clause.

That is, where this loan was a 6% loan, in the

absence of the due-on-sale clause to get the same total
economic return over the life of the loan it would have had
to be a 7% rateo

*

SEE EXHIBIT A
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In general, the due-on-sale clause, of course, operates

0

to shorten the maturity of these loans.

We have seen from

previous figures that this is absolutely essential.

Let

us examine or ask the question what happens if this due-on-

0

sale clause were to be eliminated? The first point we might
look at is how does this affect the borrower and is it always
to his advantage? This is generally considered that it will

0

be to the advantage of the borrower.

However, the advantage

may be slight or nonexistent under certain circumstances.
First, there has been a tremendous inflation in housing

0

prices which makes the existing mortgage, in many cases, rather
inadequate.

If you would glance at page 22 of the paper you

would get an indication of how the average price of a new

0

home sold in the western United States in 1967 has changed.
That home at that time sold for $26,100.
$37,200.

By 1973, it sold for

On the next page we get an indication of how the

original loan may prove quite inadequate as a financing
instrument for the person buying the home.
this example with you.
was $26,100.

Let me run through

The original cost of the house in 1967

A 75% loan at that time would have provided

financing of $19,575 and a monthly payment of $132.17
principal and interest.

for

By the end of 1973 the unpaid balance

on that loan would be $17,281.

Based on the price of his

house in 1973, it would require $27,900 to bring that back
up to a 75% loan, a level which the borrower might require at
the time of purchase.

A new loan on the $27,900 at
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8~~

which was the rate at that time, would be $244.66 per month.
The assumption of the existing loan provides only 54%,
I believe it is a 46% loan to value ratio.

In other words,

another $10,619 of financing must be found in addition to
the existing loan to bring it up to a 75% loan.
this financing likely to look like.
amount, $10,600.

What is

It is a rather substantial

It is unlikely that it is going to be a

long-term fully amortizing loan.

Much more likely it is going

to be a 5-year, 7-year loan with a balloon payment.

One of

the great reasons for going to the fully amortizing mortgage was to get away from the problems of balloon payments
and

r~financing,

assuming loans of this type brings us right

back into the era of large balloon payments.
I have made the kindest possible assumptions here
I think concerning keeping the loan on the books, if the
individual could get a 25-year second mortgage the highest
rate he could pay to keep his total monthly payment the same
as a new loan would be is only 9.46%.

As you are well aware,

second mortgages are not generally available at 9.46%, but in
many cases may be at nearly twice that level.
the other options.
a contract.

Well, what are

We might have a purchase money mortgage or

These are not very liquid investments.

It is

questionable whether we wish to encourage a proliferation of
these and have a large portion of the public holding contracts
or purchase money mortgages which, if they are to be sold on
the market, may require a discount of 40% to
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S~fo.

In a period

of rapid inflation such as we have had, it is very
questionable how often the borrower's interest may be

0

served by elimination of the due-on-sale clause.
Let us take a look at some of the possibilities from

0

the point of view of the lending institution.

I have

mentioned three possibilities that may occur.

One, the

association could absorb the losses.

Two, switching to

variable rate or short-term instruments.

Three, continuing

long-term lending but at a substantially higher contract
rate.

We have made the point before that associations are

rather efficient and operate on rather small margins.

0

point is made again fairly effectively on page 25.

This

Page 25

shows the average yield on the portfolio for each year from
1965 to 1973, the cost of funds, the amount available for

0

operating expenses and income, the actual average operating
expenses and the net margin on mortgages held.

You can see

that per $100 of mortgages held that margin was 40 cents
one year, 7 cents one year, minus 1 cent another year, the
average figure over the 1965 to 1973 average margin on
mortgages held over cost of funds and operating expenses
21 cents per $100 of mortgages held.

You just cannot

remove a clause like the due-on-sale clause that may make
essentially 1% difference in the interest rate over a 30-year
period when you have a margin that is 1/5 of 1% on your
lending.

The arithmetic does not work.

The savings and

loan association, the lender, cannot absorb that kind of
loss.

It must be passed on to other borrowers.

where the tax and subsidy comes in.

Here is

We tax new borrowers

who are trying to obtain homes at this time in the market
-37-

in order to provide a subsidy to someone who may have
purchased his home under a contract, we provide a subsidy
perhaps to someone who sold under a contract and is
essentially creating a wrap-around mortgage in which he
may have a rather high rate of return.

It seems like a

very questionable direction for public policy.
The variable interest rate mortgage we have discussed
previously.
risk problem.

It would effectively solve this interest rate
It would take care of it.

However, it does

reduce the option of the borrower and the lender.

I

would maintain that one of the very valuable services that
lenders have to sell is the assumption of this market
interest rate risk and that they can assume this risk more
cheaply than the average working man.
good product for them.

Therefore, it is a

It is one product that they should

have in their bag of tools, and to remove this from them
does a disservice to the borrower.

We should also note

that the variable interest rate mortgage does exactly
the same thing as the due-on-sale.

The only reason anyone

would object to the due-on-sale is that they now have to
pay current market rates for their mortgage, under a variable
interest rate mortgage they will also be paying current
rates so it does not maintain that subsidy that the elimination of the due-on-sale does.
same aspect.

It essentially provides the

The variable rate mortgage is a good tool.

is one we should have.

It is not a reason for eliminating

the due-on-sale clause.
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It

0
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE:

The question I asked earlier

was concerning the variable interest rate and the realistic
adoption of a variable interest rate.

certainly at a

national level, my understanding the answer to my question

0

was it would require changes in federal legislation in
order to do it.

It would not?

DR. PRATT: You were talking about the changes of

0

payment v. the change of maturity.

It might be interesting

to see that, Dr instance, on a 9%, 30-year loan of $10,000
you would have a payment of $80.46 per month.

0

In the first

year about $69 goes to reduce the principal, or an average
of about $5.72 per month so if interest rates went up only
~

of 1% you would immediately go to a perpetuity if you

were justrrying to adjust maturities with a change of
only ~ of 1%, the variable interest rate mortgage would
fail or else you would have negative amortization.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: I see something which looking at
the effect on the industry of realistic politics, either
at the national or the state level, the variable interest
rate in the rising market would meet with, I would guess,
widespread public disapproval.

Are you offering then or

is the industry in a position where attempting to put that
straw man up in order to maintain its due-on-sale clause?

DR. PRATT: I do not think it is a straw man.

I think

the figures we have presented show that operations just
could not if we have another economic period such as we have
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had.

If we have that sort of rising interest rate, without

the due-on-sale clause mortgage lending could not have taken
the form it has taken.

I do not know for sure what the

actual experienced alternative will be but it just could
not happen.

Maybe it will be the other option.

I will

mention of just having a higher initial rate but I doubt
that the public would be very pleased with a 12% or 13%
new rate today in order to cover the market risk of a 30-year
loan.

I do not know what the alternatives are but facing

25 and 30 year maturities with no chance of shortening them
in conditions of economic uncertainty such as we have, is
a very costly process.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: What about taking the opposite
approach towards the other extreme of developing a viable
source of long-term financing available to savings and loan
institutions?
DR. PRATT:

I think this is clearly something that

is important and is something that the industry has not
sat on, average maturities and so on of liabilities have
risen very rapidly.

The Federal Horne Loan Bank System

brought out a new credit policy in 1971, which allowed
long-term advances.

The introduction of the certificate

and the proliferation of certificates has helped.
more needs to be done.

A lot

We should remember that all long-

term lenders face this market risk and A, AA rated securit i es
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c

in the last two months have been out at about 10.5%,

0

for 20 or 25 years and even with 1~~ operating costs and
a margin for handling the funds we are looking at 11~~
mortgage rate when we have those new use sources.

0

ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Do you anticipate with the federal
government essentially being the largest single borrower in
the market place today, we see a shortening of the length

0

of term of federal debt •••
DR. PRATT: That has happened at the Treasury level,
however, it has not happened at the savings and loans source

0

of funds which is the consolidated obligations of the 12th
Federal Horne Loan Banks.

Their average two years ago, I

believe was. around 18 months.

0

At the present time and

through this period of very tight money the roll-overs have
maintained an average of 36 months.

While the federal debt

may have been shortening the federal Horne Loan Bank System
has been doing a good job of maintaining a balanced term
structure.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Do you consider that kind of rollover, a balanced term structure for the industry?
DR. PRATT: I think further development of long-term
sources of funds should be pursued very strongly.

However,

I do not think we should kid ourselves that there is 30-year
6% money around.

That is all I am saying.

Long-term money

in a period of economic uncertainty is very expensive money.
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ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: The question is better to direct
i t to the industry, do you feel that there is any viable
pressure at the federal level in order to achieve a change
in the techniques of financing mortgage money.
DR. PRATT: There is a good deal of work being done
at the present time in one area that is receiving a great
deal of attention--the mortgage bank security which will
allow the pooling of mortgages to be backed by securities,
either private or having some government association with
them.

I think this is a very promising source of funds and

one that is aggressively being pursued.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: What kind of total volume are you
looking at?
DR. PRATT: To make any dent in the mortgage market we
would be talking perhaps $10 billion a year.

It would be

a very large market and there obviously are some real
problems associated with bringing instruments of that size
into the capital market.
MR. McKENNA: We are giving a great deal of consideration and working a great deal on a possible proposal to you
people which is a development of the federal mortgage-backed
bond proposal.

It would be that we would be allowed to

fund an agency which you would create, directors would have
to be appointed, of course, by either the Governor or the
Legislature or both, but we would finance it, it would take
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our mortgages, it would issue tax-exempts on the basis of

0

them and the proceeds

~uld

be used through the savings and

loans to get housing going again in the State.
working intensely on that.

0

credit of the state.

We are

We would in no sense use the

It would explicitly say that the

obligations are not a moral obligation of the State.
would put up the money, we would put up the assets.

We
The

agency, the California agency and under the direction of
the State would get all of its financingftom us, whether or
not we can construct this in a way that you would find

0

appealing and within the interest of the State, we are
still wrestling with it.

on the question of whether or not

we are throwing up an impossibility or a ghost here on

0

variable interest rates, it could not be anymore different
than that than it is because we are working with tremendous
intensity on this.
vital tool.

We see it as a necessary tool, an absolutely

We have been in extensive discussions in Washing-

ton with this, with the whole Federal Home Loan Bank Beard,
in one session for three and a half hours with the chairman
of the House Banking, with the Secretary of the Treasury
personally and with the Secretary of HUD, trying to get
the federal government to create a more attractive atmosphere for variable interest rate loans.

There is no need

for legislation either in the state level or the federal
level.

On the federal level we have a very limiting regula-

tion, the Bank Board says, it is essential to chapge the
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regulation but we cannot do it without a blessing from
Congress, even though there is no necessity
action by congress.

for legal

This is a very difficult area.

We

need this tool to provide financing and there is resistance
but it is resistance that I believe is emotional.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You are saying, while we do not
need legislation, you are not going to do it without some
expression of approval from Congress.
MR. McKENNA: We do not say that.

We have this problem.

That is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That is the problem of regulation,
isn•t it, that you need the Home Loan Bank Board regulation
to be changed?
MR. McKENNA: our state chartered associations do not.
The regulations inhibit only the federal associations but
we are not permitted to compare notes and say that we are
going to do a part of our lending on variable interest rates.
We must compete with each other and as lawyers you would not
let the industry cross that line of deciding it is going to
do this in a certain percentage.

we need something in the

way of a mandate from some supervisor.

It is a highly competi-

tive industry and we do not do these things, we cannot get
together to do them and we cannot do them in the competitive
arena unless the other fellow does too.
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That is the dilemma.

ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You mean you cannot compete unless
you are regulated?
MR. McKENNA: They have to tell us that we have to do a
certain percentage in this form.

0

to that.

I t gets down pretty much

The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has got to tell the

industry, a percentage of your lending must be on this
basis, or we will not do it because our first objective is
intense competition, each with the other.

That is the

situation.
CHA I RMAN McALISTER: Dr. Pratt indicated there is a
serious problem with the variable interest rate if you apply
it in a manner in which you extend the maturity date; what
was it, how much of an interest rate increase did it require
before you weren'to••
DR. PRATT: One-half of one percent is all that could
be tolerated.

I agree that the variable rate is a vital

tool but it is not the answer to all questions.

The fixed

rate, fixed term mortgage is a very viable and vital tool
that must be preserved .

If you look at the equitable way of

distributing this interest rate risk I think the present
instrument has a good deal to commend itself.

Under the

due-on-sale, the individual purchasing a house is assured of a
single set payment for principal and interest essentially as
long as his tenure in the horne remains unchanged and S&Ls
and others have found that they can live with that.
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At the

time a sale takes place, I do not see that we should have an
implied warranty to either provide the old seller with a profit
from his financing or to provide the new purchaser with a
subsidized interest rate.

We are at that time again at an

arm's length transaction.

The due-on-sale has done a good job

of protecting the homeowner and his fixed payment while he
is in the house and at the same time bringing in an arm's
length transaction when his tenure in the home changes.

His

tenure in the home is never threatened by the change of
payment, he can budget it, he is protected from a great deal
of risk.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: The variable interest rate is at
least a partial approach at something like indexation, isn't
it?
DR. PRATT: Yes, it is.

The indexing problems, of

course, are very substantial.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Of course, it is only a partial
approach at it and at least in Brazil they apply it more or
less across the whole economy.

Let me clarify one thing.

A

one-half of a percent increase in the interest rate would
eliminate any reduction in the principal?
DR. PRATT: Approximately ~figures again.
30 yearso

We had a

Let me just run over those

$10,000 loan originated at 9% for

It gave us a payment of $80.46 per month.

My

quick calculation showed that the principal reduction during
the year, I

thin~,

was about $69
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or~.72

per month.

0
That is the first year, or $69 per year, 69/100 of 1% on a

0

$10,000 loan.

The first few years a loan amortizes, most of

the amortization takes place near the end of the loan so this
example, while on the first year would be quite characteristic

0

of the first several years.
MR. McKENNA: It would be helpful if you gentlemen would
give consideration to the possibility of our increasing the

0

term beyond 30 years in the event that is the alternative
from the variable interest rate to upping the payment.

I

think that if we were given, not necessarily the power to make

0

an initial loan for a period of more than 30 years but rather
when the interest rate goes up under a variable interest instrument that instead of what we are talking about here that with an
increase in the monthly payments that we be able to extend the
terms beyond 30 years, perhaps 40 years.

I think that would

be something that might serve the interest of the borrowers.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: However, Dr. Pratt is saying it
could end up that you would never pay off the loan.
MR. McKENNA: In many cases that would be true but even
that does not bother me so much if we have negative arnortization, if, in fact, we have an inflationary market and the value
of the house is going up.

Is that so terrible?

MR. McKENNA: I am talking like a way-out left person now
but I am not that much horrified by the prospect of negative
amortization.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Most of the people in the country are
in perpetual debt.

-

-

There is no question of that.
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MR. McKENNA: I think we have to, if we are going to have
this basic problem of rampantinflation I think we have to re-orient
our thinking and maybe get exacting concepts that we have not been
willing to accept before.
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD HAYDEN:

It is my understanding that

the variable interest rate is already in effect in california.
If it is correct, how many savings and loan institutions are
involved, and is it too early to indicate even preliminarily
how successful they have been or are at this particular time,
particularly in view of the economic situation?
MR. MIKELL: In California the california State chartered
associations has had this power for at least a decade that I
know of.

As has been pointed out, the federally chartered asso-

ciations cannot write variable rate notes at the present time.
There is a restriction upon both associations that a loan
cannot go longer than 30 years, so in practice, what has
been done and there are variable rate notes and they have been
written with varying degrees by different associations over the
years.

A loan will be written for 25 years and then the payment

remains constant, in answer to Mr. Cline's question, throughout
the loan.

The principal amortization is reduced.

This has

had good customer-borrower acceptance because he knows that his
payment may change but his payment remains constant and the due
date may go on a little longer to 26 or 27.
he does not really worry about.

It is something

At present, there is one shop

that has written nothing but variable rate notes on its residential
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loans for the last 12 years.

There is another shop that I

know even better that has written nothing but variable rate

0

notes for the last four years.

When the rate, the one that

I know better is the one down south and when the rate for the
past four years the rate has been raised twice and reduced

0

once.

When the rate is raised the borrower may pay off his

loan with no charge.

Out of 1,000 loans which were spot-

checked on the last rate increase, which happened about six
or eight months ago, three responses were received.
acceptance has been tremendous.

customer

The problem, of course, is

customer acceptance going into the loan and here is where
the problem comes.

Most borrowers, just as most of us here,

believe rates are going to go up so they say why should I
lock myself into paying a rate which goes up as the rate goes
up.

I want that 30-year fixed rate term.

That has been

the biggest problem with acceptance of variable rate notes.
one of the major associations, a billion dollar association,
one of the top fifteen in the country in california has
about $25,000,000 out in variable rate notes and it has been
extremely difficult first to sell those and then to maintain
them.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Are these variable rate notes the
kind that would result in an increased monthly payment?
MR. MIKELL: First of all there is a problem with the
standard to which this fluctuating rate is tied.

Secondly,

the problem is that the increase is rated differently than
the decrease.

As I understand it now, the lender must make

a reduction when that standard is tied to bank board borrowings

D
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and

variable things which are outside the scope of just

california.

When it drops one-tenth of 1% the lender must

drop the rate, but he cannot raise the rate until it goes
up 25/100 of 1%.

I am not sure if there is a prohibition

against increasing the actual payment but as we all know, the
Wisconsin experience

was utter disaster when they waited

too long and then tried to raise the rate

2~/o

and that was

a situation that occurred within the last year.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: This is an area of the law that
you think may need some checking into for possible legislation?
MR. MIKELL: Yes.

We are now dealing with your major

lenders in the State, residential lenders.
I

think to Mr. Knox'

In direct response

question, more than 95% of the savings

and loan assets are in residential mortgages--single family or
multiple and you are taking half the market approximately,
or 40% of the federal market which would be excluded from
anything you did.

What Mr. McKenna is saying is on a federal

level we would love to have a variable rate note, make all
of us do it, do not give the option to the borrower any more.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Do I understand though because of
the 30-year limitation on your loans that on these current
variable rate mortgages you are not increasing the maturity
date or extending the maturity date, you are increasing the
payment.
MR. MIKELL: No.

Generally when they write the variable

rate notes the maturity will be for 25 or 26 years.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Then you increase the maturity
beyond that.
-50-

~a~

MR. MIKELL: Yes.

0

It would mean a higher initial payment

because you are getting a 25-year loan amortized over 25 years
vice over 30.
MR. McKENNA: We do believe that the commissioner should

0

re-interpret the statute to permit the term to recommence
when the interest rates are adjusted and if it were so
interpreted, which we think is a good interpretation,
that problem would be ameliorated.

I think it would also

be better if you gentlemen would give consideration to
permitting the term to be extended to 40 years.
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: This cannot be done administratively?
ShouH it indeed need legislation which would make no doubt
to a commissioner that he had this particular authority.
MR. McKENNA: I think that this is almost an urgent
matter

because we do not know where the mortgage market is

going to go in the next several months, the next few years
and california should have the ability to be flexible in this
area.

It is almost an urgent legislative matter.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I wonder with all the concern over

debt and all the rising debt we ought to be increasing the
maturity dates for the maturity, the length of term that a
debt increment can last.

That may be inconsistent toward

variable rates too, but it does raise some difficult issues.
DR. PRATT: Let me inject my thoughts here and they may
be somewhat different than my colleagues.
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The variable rate

is an important tool which we need.

Second, if we are talking

about keeping the payment the same, it is one that provides
for minor adjustments, you can go to 400 years and it will not
help if you get substantial interest rate changes.

You

could not have started lending in 1965 and kept the maturity
the same under any circumstances and made the adjustments as
massive as we have had.

In keeping the payment the same is

a tool which provides a good solution to minor and modest
changes.

If you have major changes and you are going to use

the variable rate it will have to be associated with the
ability to change the payment.

I think it is one of the

tools and the consumer should still have the right to a fixed
rate, fixed term mortgage at the appropriate price.
MR. MIKELL: The Commissioner will be before you tomorrow.

You might address the question as to whether he has

the regulatory power to do that.

we do notthink so, we think

it needs legislation.
CHAIRMAN

McALIST~R:

Our next witness is Mr. stanley

Zimmerman of the Mortgage Refinance Company.
MR. STANLEY ZIMMERMAN: In order to try to shorten
what I would talk about which has primarily to do with the
report of the National commission of consumer Finance, I have
made some excerpts from it which I will not talk about but I
will just hand out to you . *
Read them at your leisure.

The whole report is available

but most of which it takes up is to do with the personal property
* See Exhibit B
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brokers and industrial loan companies.

0

I have tried to

express that part which has more meaning in the area in which
I am speaking.
I ~

0

s ~an ley

~e~~~~-S:__F_E~.?ll ~-f?.t_a.te b:r;oke.r

but I am primarily engaged in brokering necessitated borrower

·- -·-··- ·---------- - - - - --- -- ·-···--· -·--

loans.

These loans typically take the fo;nn_o.f_ s .e cond

mortgages, sometimes first mortgages and sometimes all inclusive

0

and they

are made at the lower of the market, or statutory

maximum rate.

When the market is in excess of the statutory

maximum rate they just are not made at all and then in times

0

like this necessitated borrowers do not get loans.
Among our ghetto population and our poorer people
credit is rationed.

That means that everything that is

available in credit is used.

All that legally is available

is used at some sort of a reasonable rate and after that they
go to wherever they might be able to find, many times in
the form of paying excess prices for the goods that they are
receiving beca· se of rate of interest, that they pay is regulated.
In the real estate loan field, those within the industry,
those that are in the savings and loan associations think
are very competitive.

they

We, that are not savings and loan

associations, think they are not competitive at all.

We

think that there is a form of oligopsony which is in
existence.

Oligopsony is where there is a very limited number

of buyers and that those buyers can inter-react with each other
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and control prices.

If you went shopping for a loan today or

in any market you would find the variation in terms and price
and most of the rates quoted by everybody are not the same.
Partly this oligopsony comes from the fact that the state
administrative agencies in approving new savings and loan
charters use the convenience and advantage rule in approving
new charters.

I feel that this is not the thing that should

be done and the National commission on consumer Finance assails
the convenience and advantage rule in issuing charters.
answer to lower rates is competition.

The

Competition means

free access of suppliers into the market and that the way to
do this is that anybody who has good character, reasonable
ability to conduct a business should be able to enter that
field.

Traditionally, in the savings

and loan and other

financial institutions the reason for the convenience and
advantage is given as the state of protective depositor.

I

feel that perhaps we should now start to organize nondeposit
building and loan associations.

savings and loans are an

out-growth of the old neighborhood building and loans where
everybody knew each other.

When you have a situation where

a savings and loan is really an instrument of a holding
company and stock is exchanged on the New York Stock Exchange
many of their activities are in relationship to what it
will do to their stock and not what it is doing to their
loans.

savings and loan associations are an important part

of the industry but if they were faced with a lot of competition
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0
from nonpublic deposit building and loan associations, I think
the rates would come down.

These building and loan associations

0
could be formed in local areas; they could be restricted as
to what type of public deposits they could take and I advocate
that they take no deposits unless they qualify under the rules

0
o£ the Federal Horne Loan Bank and have savings and loan
insurance.

Perhaps they could qualify under something

similar to the Reg. A

that the securities Exchange corn-

mission has the power pursuant to Rule 3B, which if you
(1) know the people that are involved,
disclosure,

(2) if you had a full

(3) if you are not relying upon any representa-

0
tions other than the representations that you have made the
personal inquiry into,
make that inquiry,

(4) that you have the ability to

(5) you are not putting all of

your assets into there, and (6) you know that this has some
risk factor, you should be entitled to make a deposit.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What you are really saying here is
that you simply want a publicly-held corporation to be exempt
from the usury limits of California because you can do that
now.

A corporation can be formed for the purpose of lending

money and you are limited to 10%.

or, if the commissioner

says that the offering is fair and just and equitable you can
sell stock to the public.
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes, but unless you formed it under an
11

S 11 type corporation which is very difficult to accumulate

reserves, you would not be able to see to attract funds
because you would have a double
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~axation

by the time you

pay dividends.

If you are in the form of what I call "a

building and loan," more the old te r m than the new one, the
payments that you make out to your depositors are tax deductible before you determine income tax.
in the form of a small

corporatio~

If you formed it

you are going to have a

double taxation and I think we have to look realistically
at this too.

It is likely that certai n types of tax incentives

to depositors are going to be passed by Congress or some
sort of form like that.

We have before congress now a proposal

that the first $500 of an individual's deposits or dividend
returns or interest should be tax exempt.

That

is going to create a disadvantage to a corporate structure
and an advantage to a deposit structure.
reason that I take theiDrm of saying

It is for that

let us be a deposit

structure so that, one, any advantages of the large institutions could accrue to the smaller ones and, secondly, that
the payment for the use of the money be prior to the determination of income which is taxable.
Gentlemen, that is generally what I want to say.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

This would be under the jurisdiction

of the Savings and Loan Commissioner?
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Have you suggested it?
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Yes, a new form or a separate form
of financial institution •••• a substantial operation •••
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MR. ZIMMERMAN:
end.

No, I do not really see it as closed

I see it as open end.

I see it even as a possibility

of growing into a full savings and loan association, but I
see more as a community effort, small to start with.
ASSEMBLYMAN ERNEST MOBLEY:

Just what is happening

in the areas of the PCA and Federal Land Bank.

Is this what

you are talking about?
MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, I am not.

First of all, I am not

familiar with a PCA.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Production credit Association, they
are all over the state.
MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, I see this as a way to start small
building and loan associations so that a mass of community
effort would create the competitive forces lower rate.

At

the same time to give the opportunity to those that are
successful to grow.

I think it is wrong to approve new

charters and to look into the administration of existing
financial institutions in order to protect their profitability.
I think that what you should be doing is increasing competition so that innovation would come about so that it would
cause better products and lower rates.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. Mobley.

Are not the PCA 1 S

agricultura l ?
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Yes, but they loan.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you, Mr. Zimmerman.
Mr. Charles P. Conner of the Escrow Institute.
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MR. TOM KONOVALOFF: Mr. Chairman, I am Tom Konovaloff
representing the Escrow Institute of california, and we
appreciate the committee's time and inviting us here today and
letting us talk about escrow.

With me is Mr. charles conner,

who is President of the Western Mutual Escrow Corporation, who
is a spokesman for the Institute and plans to talk in those
areas of escrow on home sales and loans.
MR. CHARLES CONNER:

Gentlemen.

The Escrow Institute

of California is a trade association of 72 licensed escrow
corporations that consider themselves in the independent
escrow business, not connected with any title company,
savings and loan, broker, or other tie.

The purpose of the

Escrow Institute, by its bylaws, shall be to improve the
escrow profession, foster better business relationships
between the members and to promote mutual benefits to its
members through mutual activities and legislative,
corporate, and operational matters and business development
and to counteract such influences that would not promote the
general welfare of the independent escrow agent .

There has

been quite a bit of discussion on escrow matters, and I think
the best mode to go into on this is to explain how escrows
operate in the State and be in a position to respond to any
inquiry that you might have.
There are several definitions of what an escrow is.
According to section 17003 of the state of california Financial
Code:
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" Es crow" means any transaction wherein one person,
for the purpos e o f effect i ng the sale, t r ansfer,
encumbering , or leasin g of rea l or personal proper ty
to another person , de l ivers any written instrument,
mo n ey, ev iden c e o f tit l e t o rea l or per son al proper ty ,
or other thing of va l ue to a third person to be held
by such third person until the happening of a speci fied event or the performance of a prescr i bed condition, when it is then to be delivered by such thi rd
person to a grant ee , grantor, prom i see, promisor,
obl igee , obligor , b ailee , bailor , or a ny agent o r
employee of any of the f ormer.

0

0

That is a very restrictive term.

Bas i ca l ly , what we

in the industry .c al l our_f?~~~-~=_0.~-- ~:-~ ~--~~r._~d -- t.o .p~i:_ ._ ~:t ...sll
together , serve as a central clearing house to receive funds

--------·

from

~he

_.._..

- - buyer,
----

-~·

__.... -

.........

-.

-· -

.

-

the broker, the lender, to receive the docu-

....

ments from the seller that wiJ 1 convey title or from the
parties to accomplish the desired results.
our function also is to examine the preliminary
title report, to determine that when all documents are
recorded the escrow instructions are met.

When all is

ready, we complete the escrow and give the parties what they
instructed us to give them.

-·

In the s_t_gte of California there are nine entities that
··--~- --·-·-·- · - ·-·---- -- -· . ·- -- -- ~-. --- --- ------ ·--- ____ ...... -- .- ·--- ... .
can practice escrows. They are attorneys, so long as they
-- ·-... ------- .. -- -·· ..
are not in the actual business or make a business of escrows.
Banks, state charter banks, federally chartered banks, savings
and loan associations that are state chartered, federally
chartered savings and l oan associations, title insurance
companies , title companies, real estate brokers handling their
own transactions and escrow companies licensed by the corporation Commissioner's office.

current regulutions ·that are
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imposed upon these entities, however, differ and they vary
quite a bit.

The corporation Commissioner's licensees are

licensed under the laws set forth under Section 17000
through 17654

of Division 6 of the Financial code and under

the rules found in Title 10 of the Administrative Code,
Chapter 9, and by special releases relative to interpretations of the Department of corporations.

These are good

rules, good laws, good regulations and serve as a basis for
the professional standards that are being sought by the
majority of the practioners in escrow in the State of
r

Californ~

The banks, of course, operate escrow departments and they
have indicated that in a letter dated October 9, 1970,
that the superintendent of Banks has not promulgated any
regulations relating to the escrow business of state banks
and trust companies and the Department of Savings and
Loan by letter dated October 14, 1970.

These might have

changed in the meantime. "In response to your letter of
october 7, please be advised that we have no statutes, rules
or regulations authorizing this department to control
escrow transactions and escrow holders."

The real estate

brokers are governed by one section in their laws that
pertain to escrow and that is Section 2950 and there is one
page in their regulations relating to escrows although
in their reference book, volume 9, there are many references
to escrow but not as it pertains to the actual conduct of
their licensees.

The regulations that are imposed upon the

licensees of the corporation commissioner's office are
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quite

0

complex.

My binder is about a half inch of pages that

a r e pertinent to the rules and regu lations imposed upon the
Corporation commissioner's licensees.
Qualifications--from the independent escrow operations

0

standpoint a licensee of the Department has to have a five
year experienced person at each location, stationed there
permanently and have to show financial responsibility, be
subjected to audits, both a CPA and their own internal audits ,
and the state audits.

They have to be licensee by the

corporation commissioner and bonded.
The duties of the escrow holder are extremely compl ex .
Most of you in this room know what the duties are but the
problem with the industry is that quite often the duties are
viewed upon as being very minor in nature but the professional
escrow officer must know real estate law, how to deal wit h a
usury situation, must know title insurance practices, lender's
practices, not only conventional but also FHA, VA, Cal Vet,
second trust deed lending, personal property laws, property
taxes and insurance, heal ordinances relative to property
inspections or local taxes, etc.
Now, historically, the escrow holder is to remain an
impartial third party to receive and follow all instructions,
to remain silent on items that are not his concern and to
retain the confidentiality of all parties of the transaction .
He cannot practice law.

He cannot give advice but must walk

the fine line of knowing wh en to r emain silent and when to
speak up.

He must know what his duties are and what they are

not.
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The prohibitions on practice of law are spelled out in
a State Bar Treaty that exists between the Escrow Institute
of california and the State Bar, as does the california
Banking Association and I believe several other entities.
The problems that face the public these days are
problems that we have recognized that exist within the industry
and have existed within the industry for many years.

First

off, there is a lack of uniformity as to standards between
the north and the southern california area. This is not
unique at all because even within Southern california
there is a lack of uniformity between cities and even within
my own company there are many differences in how we process
escrows in the various counties.
The lack of standards of expertise
single problem that faces the industry.

is the biggest
There are people

who operate escrows, that handle escrows as an employee of a
bank or a savings and loan title insurance company, or a
real estate broker or licensed escrow company that have anywhere from five to twenty years• experience.

Then, again, in

other entities a person might be an escrow clerk with
three months• experience and all of a sudden she is the escrow
officer and then that person is responsible for all of the ongoing daily activities of handling the escrows.

There are

no experience requirements in other entities other than the
ones licensed by the Department of corporations.

I think

that one of the major problems that faces the industry also
is that there appears to be many conflicts of interest.

Now,

there was one witness yesterday who indicated that she was

0

asked to go to a particular escrow company or a branch of a

0

real estate broker.

This is a trend that, be it good or

bad, the buyers and sellers do not have a free choice of
escrow on too many occasions.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE:

0

Are you prepared as an institute

to ask the State Legislature to set the standards, qualifications, or licensing?
MR. CONNER: I am sure the California Escrow Association

0

will speak to that later on.

As a matter of fact there was

an attempt on this part in 1971, to come up with an escrow
officer's licensing bill to try and establish some kind of
uniform guidelines as to a level of expertise.

But we, as

an escrow institute, are not in a position to promulgate
or even develop any legislative thinking along that line.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE:

You have no suggestions along that

line to make for legislative consideration?
MR. CONNER: I have some personal feelings about this.
I am not sure how it could happen but I think that somewhere
along the line an equalization of qualifications is an
essential ingredient to the production of the public down the
road.

It should be done now.

If it had been done now I think

that the public could have a greater degree of confidence if
they could go into any person

holding themselves out to

be an expert in the handling of escrows with the idea that
they would be afforded the high degree of competence that
they have a right to expect.
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ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: What I was getting at is that I want
to see less government regulation.

Yet, I want to see a

level of responsibility within your particular industry, self
regulation rather than an imposed regulation.
MR. CONNER: I think that is good too, and we have
attempted to do that in the California Escrow Association,
not the Escrow Institute.

I do not want to take Mr. Hurst's

speech away from him but they have a professional designations program that he will speak about later on and it is a
real severe attempt to do just this.

To increase the

level of professionalism by various methods, by imposing
testing on persons who are to receive the professional
designations from the California Association.

The only

problem with that is at this point it is not mandatory.
The State Bar has a method of controlling the expertise
their members have, that is to admit them to the Bar and if
they do not have the level of expertise they do not pass the
test and, therefore, they do not get admitted to the Bar. we
have not got thatcbut in the california Association to require
that.

A person just does not have to belong.

The other way

to do it is legislatively or by administrative remedies by each
one of the commissioners.

To say that this level of expertise

will be maintained by all of the people practicing escrow work.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Had there been sufficient violations
beyond what you would normally expect in differences of ability
that would warrant the _state

ev~n
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~onsi~ering

it.

MR. CONNER: I have to get into some specific case studies.
I am sure that there are cases on them.

I heard just a couple

of weeks ago from one source that there are many cases of
inequities in the handling of escrows.

Of course, there are

many case law items that would pertain to that.

I have got

some of them here.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: How widespread is it, in your
opinion?
MR. CONNER: I could try to find that information out
for you.

I do not have that information at my finger tips.

ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Thank you.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: The title of your organization
contains the word "institute." It connotes to me education
in some form. Is that what you try to do, educate the public?
MR. CONNER: The education is not only for our own members
and the professionalism in our own Institute but also assisting
the public in knowing more about escrows.

We have had several

publications, we have had several brochures that we have distributed, indicating what escrow is all about.

It is a common

feeling that throughout the entire membership of the Escrow
Institute that if we are able to serve the public in a better
manner this will meet the objectives of the members of the
organization.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Are members of your organization on
the staffs of the various real estate schools in the State?
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MR. CONNER: we have some teachers, some instructors, that
either are or have been.

They have been instructors or they are

now members, active members of the Escrow Institute.

I was an

instructor myself.
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Do they identify themselves as members
of the Escrow Institute?
MR. CONNER: Not necessarily.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: There are nine different categories
that, by law, may act as an escrow agent.

But your people, the

escrow, professional escrow companies are the only ones that
actually have standards that are set up in law, or regulation that
they much comply with?
MR. CONNER: Excessive standards, yet.

I am not saying

that the banks and savings and loans, and title companies do not
administer their escrow departments effectively.

I am saying

that the State has no rules or regulations, as it pertains to
the real estate brokers, as compared to the ones that are placed
upon us.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

Some of these other people,

in fact, ,would have considerable expertise and in a title
insurance company we should have a lot of expertise.
MR. CONNER: Absolutely.

No question about that.

The

anti-trust laws are dealing pretty effectively with
some of the restraint of trade tactics that used to prevail in
the industries where the savings and loan associai:ion would say
you can have their loans, if you take their peripheral services,
or ancillary services, such as insurance or escrow
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and

0

so on and so forth.

0

So that the tool s for allowing the

buyers and the sellers to have the right of free choice of
escrow are there.

In some cases the laws may not be administered

100 percent the way that we think they should be but that is an

0

on-going deal.

We think that everything that can be done

toward allowing the buyer to have the free choice of escrow
would be an effective way for allowing free enterprise and
the price levels to be met by the industry as required by the
consumer.

If there are any lock-ins of business this would tend

to detract from that free choice of escrow and also therefore

0

detract from the competitive spirit of the free enterprise
system.

I think that probably the other information I might

have here has already been covered to a certain extent but I

0

stand ready will and able to help in any way.

The Escrow

Institute wants to continue to assist wherever we can.

We do

not know how that might be, but we have many members who are very

0

well qualified as to dealing with all facets of escrow and
you can use the group or me as a consultant in any way, shape
or form.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: our next witness will be Mr. Donald
Hurst of the California Escrow Association.
DR. PAT HEWITT: I am Pat Hewitt and I am an

0

attorney and the legislative advocate for the california Escrow
Association.

I think if I could just clarify for a couple of

members of the committee who were here this morning, the

0

difference between this association and the association that
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0

you heard from prior to lunch.
stand the remarks that we make.

This might help you to under The Escrow Institute is essen-

tially an association comprised of management of some 72 independent escrow association.

By independent I mean they func -

tion independently of any other institutional setting.

On

the other hand, the California Escrow Association, whom I represent and of whi c h Mr. Hurst is President, is, as a matter of
fact, a statewide association of various types of people who work
in escrow, both employees and employers.
of the setting in which we function.

We do cross, in terms

We function in all five

settings that are regulated by State government.

The independent

escrow companies are regulated only by the language found in
the Corporations Code.

On the other hand, this association

operates in savings and loan institutions, where they are
regulated by that Commission: they operate in banks where they
are regulated by the Superintendent of Banking; they operate in
real estate offices where they come under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Real Estate and when they function in title
companies they are overseen by the Department of Insurance.
so, with that introduction, I think Mr. Hurst has a brief
statement and then we would like to receive questions from the
committee.

I did want to respond to a question

of Mr. Cline's

relating to licensing but I will wait until he reappears to do
so.

Mr. Don Hurst, President of the California Escrow Association.
MR. DON HURST:

The Escrow Inst i tute is a member of the

california Escrow As.so_ciat:ion.

W~ ar~

not different of OJ:?inion,

we are not two different groups going in different directions.
we are part of the state Association.

one of the things I think that we are concerned

0

with, when we listen to testimony within this session, as
escrow agents, we are criticized for any kind of cost or charges
that are involved in the escrow.

0

Regardless if they are

lender's charges, title charges, or termite expenses, any kind
of anticipated charges the consumer usually refers to in
his escrow expenses we immediately have justification in trying

0

or rationalize in trying to explain them.
Let me give you a little background on the CEA.

We

are composed of 26 regional chapters throughout the state and

0

the members of these regional associations are involved in either
the processing of escrows or the supervision of the escrow
personnel.

We are involved with our employees, or the members

of the association being involved under all five regulatory
agencies.

The primary goal of the association is for the

education of its members and for the general improvement of
escrow services to the public in general.
our 19th Annual Escrow Conference.

we have just completed

For the last two years we

have conducted seminars in various parts of the state in trying
to build a better line of communication between the real estate
salespeople and the escrow personnel.

We have attempted very stenu-

ously not to get involved in regulation of any fees.

We were

concerned a number of years ago that there could be anti-trust
violations or accusations raised be an effort to standardize fees
within the industry.

For this reason, we have completely

ignored that or tried to avoid it.

We feel that the variation of

fees within the state actually benefits the general public because
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usually the fees are determined by the competition within the
area.

We certainly believe that the citizens of this state

have benefited by our system of escrow procedure, since it has
become apparent that even the legal professions accepted the
quality of the escrow expertise to the point that generally they
have not felt it necessary to be represented in each transaction
when their clients were involved, in either a buy or sell.
are not ,going to say the attorneys are not welcome.

We

It has

become an accepted standard in most parts of the nation.

We

trust that we have created enough line of communication with
the legal profession that our method of escrow or processing is
a substantial improvement over what has t a ken place in other
parts of the country.

I would like to quote, if I could,

from an article in a national realtor's newsletter in 1972.
article was entitled "A growing Number of Attorneys Refuse to
Handle Closing on Single Family Houses."
"A senior partner of a well-known real estate law
firm indicated it is becoming harder and harder to
find lawyers who are willing to handle closings on
single family houses. The reason, he explained, is
that most buyers and sellers are unwilling to pay
an attorney for all the time he has to devote to
a closing if it has to be done right. In our
firm, as in most other law firms, we keep a record
of the time spent by each member of our staff on
each project because time is all we have to sell
and we want to be sure we are using it to the best
advantage. We recently completed a study of the
time it takes to handle closing on a single family
house and discovered it takes an average of 14 hours.
Now, we have to charge each client according to the
time any member of our staff spends on his case.
our minimum fee of putting the most inexperienced lawyer in our firm on an assignment is $50 an hour.
This means that when we assign such a man to a house
-70-

The

closing the buyer or seller he represents will be
expected to pay us approximately $700, whether the
property is worth $50,000 or $10,000. Since the
average buyer or seller feels that this is too much
to pay we no longer accept this type of legal work."

0

It is a very interesting quote and it is from 1972

0

and it may be that the cost has gone up and we know that when
we have looked at the practice of handling real estate in other
parts of the nation that the cost is far greater than $700

0

in connection with the closing.
Chuck conner
of involvement.

pretty well covered some of the other areas

Knowing the scope of the hearing, and knowing

that the committee wants to try and provide as much dialogue
as possible rather than get into any other areas, I think
I would like to welcome any questions from the committee.

If

we are not prepared to answer them today we certainly can come
back with some answers, either in writing or to other sessions
of the committee hearing.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I am just reading this chart.

Who

prepared that chart, the committee?
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That is a source from the HUD/VA report .
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You are under B, as I understand it.
"Escrow B. Closing Fee Document Preparation and Other Closing
Costs."

I do not know what that is.

Is that a fair statement

of what you do?
MR. HURST: Yes, it is a fair statement under "Escrow Fee
and Fee Closing Fee.

I can explain escrow fee or document

preparation, if it were necessary.
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: The escrow fee is for handling the
money, making sure that the documents are exchanged and that
the appropriate people get the check or checks, right?
MR. HURST: The escrow fee is basically the fee that
we charge for the processing from one end to the other.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you prepare any documents beyond
a simple grant deed or a closing statement?
MR. HURST: Yes, it is necessary at times to prepare
deeds of trust notes, and there could be some other forms.

We

prefer to indicate that we are completing the form because the
forms we are involved with are prepared documents that are
necessary in order to insert the language of the parties
involved; possibly the legal description or clarification
of the terms.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: But you would prepare a deed which, for
example, might be a deed from one person to fifty tenants in
common.
MR. HURST: Yes, sir.
DR. HEWITT: If I could also comment.

They would be

responsible for seeing that the instructions, both buyer's and
seller's instructions, clearly reflected the understanding of
both parties.

Then it falls upon them, the responsibility to

see that each of those items on each

instruction sheet are met

before the check can be transferred and the property can be
transferred.

This puts them in a very responsible fiduciary

relationship .
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Are the fees for escrow broken down?
0

For example, you have got the escrow fee for handling the money
and handling the documents.

Do you charge a specific fee for

the preparation of dcx::u.m ents?
0

MR. HURST: In many cases, yes.

A company has usually

established their own basis of fees for preparation of documents.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: In other words, you charge so much for
a simple grant deed.

You might charge more for a more

compli~

cated deed of trust or something of that nature?
MR. HURST: usually a deed of trust there is a charge on it.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Is this pursuant to a treaty with the
State Bar1
MR. HURST: Yes, sir.

The treaty with the State Bar is

involved with the Escrow Institute, as I said and is a member
of the CEA.

We have established a treaty as to documents that

can be prepared.

Also documents that cannot be prepared.

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Your organization does not have a treaty
with the State Bar?
MR. HURST: No, sir.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you think you should?
MR. HURST: We have just gone into negotiations with
them, or conversation with them.

Actually, whatever has been

established with the Institute basically applies to members
of the industry.

There are many documents we do not prepare.

There are agreements that we will not, whether it means
refusing an escrow or refusing to prepare a document.
done on a regular basis.
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This is

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you prepare a contract of sale?
MR. HURST: No, sir.

There are times when contracts

very possibly have been prepared but for the most part we do
not; we will be involved in the consumation of the contract.
There is controversy on this now because we know of a company
that is deeply involved in the preparation of contracts.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You base your fees so much per docu rnent?
MR . HURST: We base our escrow fee on the consideration,
p l us ••••
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: On the price •••
MR . HURST: a charge for additional documents that may be
prepared.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You base your fee, your basic fee
upon the amount of money in the transaction?
MR. HURST: Yes.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER.

There an: additional charges for

certain specific documents?
MR. HURST: correct.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: It is not based upon amount of time
involved as in the example you gave by an attorney?
MR. HURST: No.

It could be based on the amount of time,

depending upon the arrangement.
consideration involved.
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Normally, it is based upon the

0
.·

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Yesterday we were given some figures

0

about the cost of escrow fees from different parts of
the country: indicating that L. A. county was not broken down
terribly well.

0

It was my understanding from our discussion

yesterday that it was stated that escrow fees were higher in
Los Angeles county than anywhere else.
MR. HURST: I believe that he did indicate that the
percentage went up from 1.58 in the state to 2.19 in Los Angeles.
I believe that if the other figures were correct it would
indicate that the escrow fee in Los Angeles is approximately
$32 more than it is on a statewide basis, from the chart
that was shown.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Yes, the HUD study apparently was
part of my consultant's papers for this hearing.

He has

included a table indicating costs in Denver, which shows that
Denver was much lower than california.

It is interesting, it

shows Denver as zero in escrow fees, seattle is $135, and L. A.
county is $148.

I wonder, are you familiar with how they could

come up with zero for Denver?
MR. HURST: I am not familiar with how, or what the
procedure is in Denver.

We could attempt to find out and get

back to you with some information, but I am not really familiar
with the Denver area.
DR. HEWITT: I would like to reflect the procedure that I
know of in the East coast: in Maryland and washington where
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there are no separate escrow transaction.

Two attorneys

simply meet around a desk with the two parties to transact
business.
ney's fee.

I think that is probably just absorbed any attorHe writes the instruction and when his feeling is

that the instructions have been met, the checks are
exchanged.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: What was the source of the letter
from the law firm, what community.
MR. HURST: The National Realtors• Newsletter.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Where was the attorney located?
MR. HURST: I am sorry, I cannot tell you.

It was a

sensitive situation.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: What was the point of your
presenting that as evidence?
MR. HURST: Just to indicate the fact that the way things
are going, the only procedure that is going to be handled with
the cost of it is by an escrow company; the amount of hours
that may be involved in the processing and the cost of some
other areas in processing escrow.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: I take it you are unable, based on
your own experience, to tell us how many hours it takes your
company.
MR. HURST: You cannot look at a number of files and
take 5, 6, 10 escrows and come up with a standardization.

We

certainly cannot come to a conclusion if you keep doing a time
study on what is involved.
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0

ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You find you are unable to measure
0

your work product and price it out according to your payroll.
You find difficulty in doing that?
MR. HURST: We have not attempted to make that type

0

of research on a state basis.
ASSEMBLYMAN

CULLEN:

To give you an example.

Legislators work 40 hours, some work more hours or less in a
0

week.

We are paid about $10 an hour.

I take it that a 14

hour task would come out just about what you charge, $148 or
$140.

I believe, because I was involved in this area as a

lawyer briefly, that if it is taking 14 hours for a transaction
in your office you would be well advised to look around for a
smart high school graduate or a new college graduate you
would not have to pay $10 an hour.
But I want to make that point and if you are thinking of
using that letter again,

I would give it a lot of thought.

MR. HURST: I was not using it to make any point other
than in a conversation.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

The other thing you mention are

the various escrow laws regulated by different units of
government.

Now, in your escrow office or a typical escrow

office that belongs to your Association, are you subject to
one or more of these laws?
-77-

MR. HURST: If you are asking· whether members of the
Association are subject to them, yes, they are.

Whether I am

subject to it personally, we are talking about two different
situations.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: No, I would l ike to take a growing
escrow office that advertises its availability for escrow.
Would that office be subject to regulation by a number of
units of state government?
MR. HURST: Only if they are involved as a licensed
escrow operator under the Department of Corporations
would they be subject to those rules and regulations.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

Now that is one act.

What if they

are conducting other types of escrows?
MR. HURST: What do you mean "other types of escrows?"
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: I understand that the escrow officers
in banking transactions involving personal property are
subject to some laws, real property is

subject to others.

MR. HURST: The personnel who are involved with a title
company, for instance, are subject to whatever rules and regulations established by the Department of Insurance.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You mention title Company.

Do you

mean in escrow transactions?
MR. HURST: Yes.

If the escrow is being processed through

a savi .1 gs and loan, the involvement is through the Savings and
Loan Commissioner.
If it happened to be a realtor who was operating his own
escrow, it is subject to the Department of Real Estate.
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0

0

ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN:

If we come back into your office, and

a realtor or various people want to use the services of
your office, it is necessary for you to apply and gain a certi-

0

ficate of convenience from the Department of Banking, the
Department of Corporations, the Department of Savings and
Loan and so forth?
MR. HURST: I personally operate my business under the
Department of Corporations.

I have an escrow license.

The

personnel in my office and in management must meet the quali-

0

fication that have been established by the Department of corporations.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Does that mean that it is possible
you have to turn away business because the transaction is
governed by an act administered by the Department of Banking
or the Department of Insurance?
MR. HURST: No, sir.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is there reciprocity if you are
certified by the Department of corporations, are you also
declared eligible to conduct these other escrows?
MR. HURST: The type of escrow has no bearing on the
license that I hold, or the regulations that I am under.

The

point being a buyer and seller can come in off the street
and whether I handle the escrow or whether it is handled
through the savings and loan, it is only subject to the rules
of our operation.

The escrow is not subject to those rules .
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DR. HEWITT: The institution in which the escrow officer
is functioning is what causes it to fall under the jurisdiction
of one of the five agencies, and the thing that is fascinating,
is the fact that some of the agencies have much tougher regulations on escrow in terms of supervision, training, audits
bonds, financial statements and others, so they are quite
different.
license.

There is no license, there is no escrow officer's
There is a license for various settings and performance.

ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: That is the whole point of my ques tioning.

As the president of a professional association would

you prefer to have escrow licensing under a single unit of
government rather than five or six units of government.
MR. HURST: The rules and regulations that are established
are quite different at the moment.

We felt that there should be

some standardization in the industry.

We have attempted this on

a nunber of occasions with the other regulatory agencies and
have not been successful.

It was for this reason that the

California Escrow Association a couple of years ago attempted
to have the bill on licensing only as a standardization of the
personnel within the industry.
it.

We were not successful in doing

I think we raised the issue of some of the inequities and

the differences but we were not successful in having it passed.
The personnel of the state, I think, really are interested
in having a standardization.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: No, did you just say that your
Association does not endorse the idea oflicensing being regulated by a single unit of government.
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0

MR. HURST: No, I believe the Association wou l d.

0

DR. HEWITT: We introduced a bill, or they introduced
a bill prior to my representation of the Association two
years ago, which was carried by clare Burgener.

0

It happened to

be put together in haste and be poorly drafted but it did set
up a level of training and competency and certification for
people doing escrow in any setting.

It did not, however, address

itself to the financial responsibility of the institution in
which this person was to function.

It was purely and simply a

licensing act.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: As I understand it, unless you are
part of a regular independent escrow company you do not have
particular standards that you have to meet by law to do escrow
work.

Is that right?
DR. HEWITT: That is right.

Because of this, this

Association has been very active in setting up a certification
program as a voluntary association and their activity has
been met with so much approval that many of the junior colleges
now include this as an AA program and will offer the certificate
or training toward the certificate.
MR. HURST: I do believe that you will find that the other
regulatory agencies do feel that they have rules.

They are not

all in the same level of performance but there are rules that
are established in one man or another within those agencies.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is anyone involved in escrow work in
California eligible for membership in your Association?
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MR. HURST: Yes, I would imagine so.

The only thing, if

they can qualify in a regional association they are eligible
to join a state association.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: In your estimation, how many belong
versus those who do not?
MR. HURST: I do not know how many personnel within the
State.

We have approximately 2800 within the State Association.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Does that fall into the category

that you would recognize as escrow agents?
MR. HURST: Right.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You have no idea how many are outside
the Association?
MR. HURST: There is no forced requirement in order to be
a part of the industry that they belong to the Association, it
is strictly a voluntary thing.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is there any more than one type that
belongs to the Association?
MR. HURST: I am not sure what you mean by one type?
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You laid out the different people
who do escrow work.
MR. HURST: The regulatory agency?
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Yes.
MR. HURST: No, we have no basis really for that conclusion.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: In other words, it would be hard to
say that you represented the majority of the people who do
escrow work.

Is that right?
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0

MR. HURST: Well, I do not know how many totals--since
there is no license, and I do not know how many people are involved
in escrow per se'.

0

There is no other association it represents

other than those within the California Escrow Association.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Do you have many real estate
agents who belong to your Association?
MR. HURST: We have some.

I do not know how many.

When

the records come to the central or the state organization, we
are not asking at the time for determination of who they may

0

work for.

Now the regionals would have to tell us that.

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You do not really have to be regulated
by anyone. Right? Unless you are incorporated.

could I go out

and perform escrows excluding the fact that I am a member of
the Bar?
MR. HURST: And hold yourself out as an escrow agent?
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Yes.
MR. HURST: No.
probably stop you.

The Department of corporations would

If you were involved with one or another of

the regulatory agencies and met the rules, finb.

If you just

held yourself out in handling escrows to the public the
Department of Corporations, I am sure, would stop you.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX:

You could handle any kind of an escrow

business and things of that sort.

If Mr. McAlister and I had

a dispute as to an athletic contest between Mr. Ali and Mr.
Foreman, to decide which was the better athlete in the opinion
of the referee, could yo11 hold that escrow?

-83-

MR. HURST: I undoubtedly would not.
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Could you under the law?
MR. HURST: That would depend upon the terms of the
contract.

If it was a money bet of some nature, we would

indicate no.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: The thing about these exotic escrows,
there may be some rare opportunities •••
MR. HURST: We have had some exotic escrows and as I
say, there have been reasons why we have turned escrows down
from time to time.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

All your

escrows are not for real

property sales, I mean most of them are but •••
MR. HURST:

That is true.

Some of them even with

attorneys.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you.

Mr. Richard Ratcliff

of the California Bankers Association.
MR. RICHARD RATCLIFF:
~ichard

name is

E. R3tcliff.

*

Mr. Chairman and members.

My

I represent the California

Bankers Association, and I have a bit of a problem here today
tbat I think you will recognize.

Dr. Pratt, in our view, gave an

excellent presentation of many of the outside parameters, but
the one we have to deal with, is when he is involved in the
real estate financing field.

*

My presentation was drawn up

EDITOR'S NOTE: Mr. Ratcliff's written statement is
attached hereto as Appendix c
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0

on the basis that I would try and cover some of that material.
I think, obviously, Dr.

~att

did a better job than I can do

and what I will try to do is to cover the material that I think

0

we should cover and refer to his comments the best that I can.
Unfortunately, it will probably result in a kind of holding
presentation, but let me try and go through it anyway.
Basically, the california Bankers Association, as some
of you know, has been active in the past in dealing with some of
the particular points that are involved in this hearing.

For

instance, AB 105 by Assemblyman Deddeh in 1973, got
all the way to a conference committee between the two Houses.
At that point, there was a proposed Conference Report
where AB 105 was talking about a 10% limitation on late charges.
The conference Report at that point was blessed with the appearance on the scene of the Garrett case.

You have heard some

discussion as to what Garrett does today.

We disagree with some

of the discussion you have heard, but I think the point is the
Garrett case has caused some new factors to be considered.
The 10% at that point was unacceptable to the people involved.
At that stage, various people were arguing for various things.
Because of that discussion, AB 105 got hung up and died.
AB 2114 (Hayden) set out to limit prepayment penalties
to six months interest on the unpaid balance less 20%.

This

was to be effective for a period of 7 years after which prepayment penalties could not be charged.
the Senate.

This bill was killed in

It was killed in the process of amending the pro-

visions of SB 200 with which you are familiar into the bill
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and it became unacceptable to those of us that supported AB 2114
at that point in time.
Another bill, AB 1514 (Deddeh) was passed as
Chaptered 925 in the 1973 session, which I think answers the point
that was made earlier in the hearing yesterday.
do with impound

accounts.

That has to

The bill says the lender cannot

require impound accounts as a condition of making the loan.
Those of you who were involved in the discussion of the committee
when the bill was considered will recall a very careful
discussion by everybody indicating that when there is a marginal
loan application, if the lender can require an impound account,
it puts him in a better position to grant the loan.

If he cannot

require an impound account, and the customer is not willing to
voluntarily accept an impound account, at that point we said and we
will

repeat, at that point the lender should refuse to make the

loan.
AB 1514 sets up a structure where the consumer himself
will make the choice.

If he wants an impound account, fine.

At

that point, he accepts it with a notice that indicates to him
that interest will not be paid on those funds.

However, if he

does not want the impound account, he does not have to have it.
I think it indicates that the CBA has been involved in this thing
on a constructive basis for some time.

You may not regard the

prepayment penalties provisions of AB 2114 as being particularly
what you people have in mind.

You may not regard the 10% late

-86-

0

0

charge when AB 105 is what you have in mind.

I think we should

all understand that at the present time, there are no limitations
upon these charges.

0

The Garrett case has indicated that there

is a limitation of actual cost.
of that case.

I disagree with the discussion

I think what happened was the court was presented

with a rather difficult provision to uphold in the light of the
discussion before the court.

The court decided that it was a

penalty that was illegal under california law and the Legislature
had not granted the power to lenders to impose the penalty.

0

At that point they said that you have to fall back on liquidated damages laws.

These laws talk about a reasonable attempt

to anticipate what kind of damages and costs you will come up

0

against in the even of a breach.
I think this is a different kind of a situation.

Today,

what I would like to do is to sketch generally the sources
and flow of funds because we feel it is extremely important.
I think it was indicated this morning in the

s &

L presentation.

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. Ratcliff, in your case you are
going to have to determine what the actual damages are.

You are

not just going to be able to •••
MR. RATCLIFF: Under the Garrett case, they ruled that
provision illegal.
.....

Having ruled that provision illegal, the

only thing that the parties could do was to talk about liquidated
damages.

I think it is totally within the Legislature's power

to look at this situation and set the limit which is reasonable,
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workable, and would provide both parties with some equity.
I think frankly this is what we would like to see done.
There has been some discussion of the difficulty of
finding costs for some of these activities, late charges, prepayment penalties, and other such things.

Speaking for the

banking industry, and I thinkmr some of the others, we do not
have any kind of a unit cost accounting process in the banking
industry, which would result in figures which actually reflect
what the costs of any particular activity is.

The problem we

have is that you do that when it amounts to an extreme
amount of money which would have no benefits or beneficial
results to us other than perhaps some guidelines in helping
the individual institutions to economize and increase their
efficiency.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Your recollections to me of the
Garrett case are entirely different than I know.

Yesterday

in the information provided for us by the committee consultant ' s
report, it said actual damages that set off actual damages
suffered by the lessor.

You are suggesting today that in

that decision they said liquidated damages.
clear enough.

I think it is

Is it actual damages or liquidated damages?

MR. RATCLIFF: My comment was misleading.
to convey was

What I intended

my recollection, I do not have that case and

I have not read it for a while but in that case they said that
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0

the attempt of the parties to set those charges was illegal
because it constituted a penalty.
it was thus unenforceable.

0

Having been a penalty illegal,

At that point, what do you do with

regard to the rights of the parties involved?

I think

you start talking actual damages; I think that is all you can
do.

But with regard to a lender and a borrower, who enter

into an agreement, they can set a late charge provision, as a
liquidated damage.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: That is your suggestion?
MR. RATCLIFF: No.
ASS 1M BLYMAN CULLEN:
uses the term

11

I think that is what the court has said.
our brief here in three paragraphs

for actual damage, .. and it has a lot to be resolved

before the committee

starts thinking in terms of. liquidated

damages.

I suppose most of the committee present here today are

lawyers.

Where it is difficult to ascertain actual damages, we

all know the party may agree upon liquidated damages, but this
court in this case may not have said that because they may not
have been convinced that it is difficult for a lending institution to measure their work product and tell you what it actually
costs them to process the late charges.

That has never been

demonstrated to this committee yet your client and the other
lending institutions have found it difficult to ascertain the
actual costs of processing late charges on a client's account.
If it is impossible, if it is difficult,perhaps we should get
into the area of liquidated damages.
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That is how I see it.

MR. RATCLIFF:

There is a third alternative.

the liquidated damges is one way to go.

I think

I think actual costs is

one way to go in which you force the lenders into a situation
where they have to come up with a cost figure, which we think is
absurd, frankly.
The Legislature should look at what a late charge is, what
its function is, what its impact is, and come up with some kind
of a decision rendering equity.
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: That is the thrust of your presentation.

I merely want to call to your attention that we

verified the Garrett decision set actual damages and did not
allude to liquidated damages .

You came before us today and said

that you did not bel i eve that the court contemplated liquidated
damages, and I think there is a difference of opinion in your
presentation and that of others, and our committee's brief.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Page 38 of our brief states that the
amount could be thoroughly measured by the period of time the
money was wrongfully withheld, plus administrative costs that was
reasonably related to collecting and accounting for a late
payment.

I do not think that means that the Legislature would not

have any role in it.

We could determine what we find to be a

reasonable administrative cost.

What about this business of

measuring the period of time the money was wrongfully withheld:
we could have some kind of a scale for that assuming we make some
kind of reasonable judgment.
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MR. RATCLIFF: one of the points that I was trying to

0

make.

I do not think that the Legislature is bound by the fac-

tors set forth by the court.

I think that what the court was

trying to say to all of us out in the world at large is

0

that you are going to have a late charge provision, than being
aware of it being declared a penalty.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

0

It would appear we would have to

avoid impunity aspects.
MR. RATCLIFF: I do not think so.

I think the

Legislature, if it saw fit, could provide a penalty.

0

The

Legislature ha~ permitted counties to charge a penalty for
somebody who misses his property tax.

The only difference is

that if one of the private institutions is opposed to a public
body, the function of that penalty could well be the same as
the function of the late charge if the Legislature saw fit
to define it in the same fashion.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I guess the prohibition against
the penalty is written into the constitution.
I

ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: It is like sayirig if you don't feel
like paying a traffic fine, you might land in jail.

The banks

could have a facility there to confine somebody for a while, a
public institution can do it, why not a private institution?
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: We are talking in effect about a civil
penalty.

I guess it is not going to rise to the level of crime.

MR. RATCLIFF: What I would like to do is to sketch the
sources of the flow of funds because of the importance to them.
I would also like to discuss the importance of the secondary
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market.

It is one of the forces that has to be considered

by the committee.
As part of that, I would like to discuss the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan
corporation.
not discuss.

Govexnment National Mortgage Act (GNMA) I will
I am trying to confine my discussion to conventional

mortgages as opposed to various governmental programs.
go through, however, I will mention FHA and VA.

As I

Further, I

would like to indicate how banks would generally operate in
these areas.

Also, I would like to reserve some time during

November 22 for us to present some specific suggestions for
legislation to the committee.
With regard to the sources and flow of funds, I think it
is important to understand that banks have basically two in-bank
sources of funds.

These are commercial or checking deposits,

and the savings deposits.

By nature these are short-term because

the depositor can retrieve them really on a very short notice
period.

The problem is conversion, as was indicated this morn-

ing, short-term investments into

long~erm

funds, which are

necessary for real estate lending.
The secondary market historically has been insurance
companie~

eastern savings banks and others who have amounts of

money, which they are willing and anxious to place in long-term
investments.

The secondary market is one that fluctuates and
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0
and flows and has cycles as any money market does.

The in-bank

sources of funds, as indicated as short-term, have unfortunately

0

been diminishing.

The problems that you all have heard about,

the out-flow of savings due to federal competition, etc. have
hit the banking industry also.

0

As these funds diminish, the

ability and the resources that we need to make real estate loans
also diminish.
Basically, I think there are some rules of the game,
and those that need funds are hard put to negotiate entirely
favorable terms in the contract against those that have the
funds especially in a comparative market.

0

This is true whether

you are talking about a California lender attempting to get
funds or whether you are talking about a California borrower,
who is attempting to get funds from a California lender.

0

I

think it is obvious that if the person has need and the other
person has funds, the need very often will outweigh the
ability of the person to negotiate something that is entirely
favorable to him.

The secondary market, in this case, your

california lenders are the borrowers and we have that same
problem.

The market as I indicated is one that has cycles and

twists to it that do not reflect the housing need that we have
in California.

Because of this there have been several devices

developed to provide an easy entry into that market, an easy
entry where you can get long-term funds out of what are basically
short-term investments.
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The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) is
a public

corporation, and was created to accomplish this

purpose.

The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC)

basically was designed to do the same thing.

It is a private

corporation, set up basically by the savings and loan industry.
The importance of these two devices to the committee are that
both of them have standard provisions covering some fees and
some provisions which are being discussed by this committee.
The lender if utilizing these sources of funds need not
use those

standards unless he sells the mortgage obligation to

either FNMA or FHLMC.

At this point the terms of the agree-

ment with the borrower becomes those required by FNMA or FHLMC.
In addition, FHLMC has standard forms which must be used if
sale of the mortgage to FHLMC is planned.
generally also acceptable to FNMA.

These forms are

The lender uses these by

going to, for instance, FNMA paying a commitment fee of 1/2 of
1%, or half a point.

The commitment agreement makes the funds

available for purchas·e of that mortgage by FNMA, when that is
made by the lender.

FHLMC works much in the same fashion.

When

banks pay FHLMC they pay a 1/2 point nonmember fee rather than
a commitment fee as under FNMA.
FHA and VA programs are programs which guarantee the
mortgage.

They are not a source of funds, so that when you are

dealing with FHA and VA loans, the lender in these cases can
get a commitment from FNMA or FHLMC, go out and place the funds
- .; 94- -

0
llnder a FHA or VA program and subsequently sell that mortgage
to these marketing agencies, and use the funds he realizes from

0

the sale to make another loan.
is being carried on now.
we have now, of

0

This basically is how the market

It is increasingly so in periods like

tight money, because we do not have the money

to make the loans for our own portfolio and to hold the loans
themselves.

To be active in the market, you have to rely on

these marketing devices as an approach into the market.

0

Basicallywhat they do is they sell bonds in the bond market
taking those investment funds and convert those into funds
whkh they can then place on a long-term basis on the mortgages.

0

Let us go briefly through how FNMA and FHLMC approach
the various provisions that we are talking about here today.
To give you an idea of how they treat late charges, prepayment

0

provisions and such things: Late charges is one thing we have
not talked about, that is the difficulty that the lender faces.
The code of civil Procedure, Sec. 580 (b) sets forth the antideficiency legislation in california, which was enacted back
in the '30's.

It says in effect that since the lender has two

contractural relationships with the borrower, he has to
choose between them.

He can sue on the note or a late pay-

ment, but if he does so, he has to waive his right to sue on
the security.

or he can ignore his rights under the note

and sue on the security.

As a practical matter for the lender

there really is not a choice.

The security for the loan in

all of these cases is the house itself.
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To sue for a payment

that is late and due, is one where it would be absurd to give
up your right to subsequently sue on that security.

This presents a problem.

We have got a great big

mallet to enforce our rights against the other party to the
contract.

That great big mallet is foreclosure.

It

is expensive: it is time-consuming, and it is rather frightening
in all of its aspects to everybody involved.

We do not like

to use foreclosure: it is kind of a last resort.

The problem

we have is that there is no effective way that we can collect
from the delinquent borrower on his delinquencies without
going to a foreclosure proceeding which is ridiculous.

In

our view, late charge is something that should reach the
threshold of pain, if you can use that term, which gets into
the penalty concept of a late charge.

It is something which

the borrower should be aware that he has this obligation and
he has to meet it.

I think that Mr. McKenna this morning

indicated another reason why late charges are important to
the Jender and that is the problem of the mortgage being
poisoned, if you will, when a person defaults on a payment
when the lender tries to sell that mortgage in the secondary
market and gets additional funds to lend here in California.
Basically, FHA which as you know is a federal program,
has a provision on late charges that 2% of the payment due,
including impound accounts which are required under federal
law, is the measure of the late charge.

VA loans is 4%.

FNMA, the provision is 4%, but there/it is only on the payment due, but only on the principal and interest excluding
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0
any impound accounts.

0

FHLMC is the same as FNMA.

In the con-

ventional secondary market, apart from FNMA and FHLMC--for
instance, if the bank should attempt to sell mortgages to an
insurance company.

0

At that point, they are going to look

at and see what the general market is.

They review the

bank's practices with regard to some of these provisions.
If they are satisfactory, they will then enter into negotiations
to buy the mortgage.

If they are not satisfactory, then those

funds do not become available.
lender generally has.

This is the problem that the

We have to somehow have these provisions

in such a form that they will be familiar and acceptable to
that secondary mortgage.
With regard to late charges, we have gone through this
argument on late charges for some period of time.

Four or

five years ago, we used to oppose people who wanted to impose
a limitation on late charges of 10%.

Then we came in with a

bill and suggested that 10% was equitable.
who opposed that.

There were others

The bill has obviously never passed through

or we would not be talking about it as we are today.
With AB 105 in Joint Conference Committee, we agreed to
a late charge limitation and I understand all these are limitations maximums.

We agreed to 6%, and we would like to say that

we think that this makes sense.

The county provision with

regard to a missed payment of county property taxes is really
very close in terms of what it is trying to accomplish.
give you a personal example.

I can

I missed my property payment a few

years ago; because I do not have an impound account, and in the
process, the penalty that I had to pay was 6%.
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If you take that

penalty of 6%, if it is a December payment and you annualize
it, it comes out about 11%.
24%.

A December payment is something like

There is a new redemption situation in the law, which after

those periods you go to a lien being imposed and you are talking
about a 1% per month or 12% a year penalty on these funds.

It

seems to me that 6% makes some sense.
The purpose of the prepayment was pretty well discussed
this morning.

Let me just go into the FHA, VA regulations, and

say there shall be no prepayment provision.

But in this siuta-

tion the seller is going to have to pay points, so that you have
in effect almost an automatic assumption process.

But the seller,

when he goes to sell the property is going to have to pay points,
which we will get into in a few moments, but basically reflect
the difference between the market rate and the rate limitation
imposed by the federal agency.
FNMA equally says no prepayment provisions, but they
also say that if the loan is on a FHLMC form acceptable to them,
at that point the prepayment provision of FHLMC comes unenforceable as long as FNMA holds that mortgage.

If they should turn

around and sell that mortgage themselves, a secondary mortgage,
to raise funds for them to use in the housing finance field, at
that point it would become enforceable.

This means that if

FNMA feels that for their purpose, they do not need a
prepayment provision.

But they fully recognize that they have

to go out and sell it on a secondary market.

They are going to

have some kind -of a prepayment provision to make _t_b!!t
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0

The FHLMC prepayment provision is one which I think is

0

worthy of looking at.

Basically, as you will recall in SB 200,

Senator Gregorio's bill, the basic structure was, in all of these
we deduct 20% on the balance, an automatic reduction of the

0

penalty every year of 20% over a period set up in such a way that
after 5 years there is no prepayment provision.
little differently.

0

tion.

FHLMC does it a

They, too, have a 5 year period of opera-

They say a prepayment occurs in the first 3 years, the

borrower must pay an amount which shall not be less than the
maximum amount allowed by the FHLBB regulations or such lesser

0

percentage as is the maximum permissible under applicable law.
There you

g~t

into the problem of the ruling with regard to

the Federal Savings and Loans being able to charge six months

0

interest on the excess of the 20% of the original balance
of the loan.

But if you are talking about a 10% loan, this six

months' interest on the first three years talks about a 5%

0

charge.

If the prepayment occurs during the fourth and fifth

years of obligation, the charge shall then be 3%.
fifth year, there is no charge.
by the holder of the note.

After the

This only applies if refinanced

We feel that for purposes of trying

to meet the general demand, to make sure that we do not disturb
the flow of funds, the FHLMC pattern makes some sense.

I think

that this comes about because in the tight money market now,
increasingly FNMA and FHLMC become the vehicles for what lending
is going on.

We feel that utilizing these things protects

access to the secondary market that we feel is vital.
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Beyond that

you are finding increasingly, certainly among banks, that the
lenders are making their loans on the FHLMC form preparing
to sell those.

That being the case, we think that the FHLMC

provisions, perhaps with some adjustments, makes some sense in
terms of the committee review of the things that we have been
talking about.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: In essence as I understand that,
on the FHLMC pattern there is no prepayment penalty except where
the mortgage or deed of trust is sold to another lender.
MR. RATCLIFF: It is effective, if it is refinanced
by someone other than the holder of the note; if it is another
entity doing the refinancing, then the prepayment charge
becomes effective.

I think that for present purposes, it may be

a little narrow, that restriction.

But I think that the FHLMC

approach of 5 and 3 is something that incorporates the 5-year
period of SB 200, and also the declining tendency, although
states it rather than have a straight line decline.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER.

This gets around the problem that the

savings and loan people ·were talking about this morning, saying
they need this ability to sell if they get out-of-state money,
an equity kind of a problem?
MR. RATCLIFF: I hesitate to answer that in the guise of
what the savings and loan industry needs.
viewpoint, we think so, yes.

on the banking industry's

There is some differences of opinion

in approach between the banks and the savings and loans.
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0

CHAIRMAN McALISTER:

0

Your money is not all going out in

terms of long-term loans like •••
MR. RATCLIFF: That is absolutely correct.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: If that solution addresses itself

0

to that problem, it would be essentially a solution to
either industry •••
MR. RATCLIFF: The purpose we have in suggesting that the
committee look at this provision, is that in our minds by adopting
something along the lines of the marketing device designed to
get to the secondary market for lenders here that you are not
jeopardizing the acceptance of these mortgages when the time
comes to sell them in that secondary market.
This one further point

presen~a

problem that this

committee is going to have to wrestle with if they decide to
do anything in this area.

That is the mortgage loan brokers,

for instance, have the provisions of AB 2114, which was the bill
we were proposing for us, which the Legislature said, "No,
we are n·o t going to give to you, " and they turned around and
gave it to the mortgage loan brokers.
We think that anybody in the business of real estate
lending should be working under the same kind of overall limitations.

I think it should be true whether it is a mortgage loan

broker, or any other type of lender.

This would include

individuals because we think that the attempt and things that
the committee is looking at is to protect the consumer from some
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of these provisions that some people feel are onerous.

That

being the case, I do not think it makes any difference who
imposes the provision.
The due-on-sale clauses was an excellent discussion in
terms of what it is and how it works and why it is there from
this morning's discussions.
provision.

FHA and VA have no due-on-sale

FNMA has no due-on-sale provision,

FHLMC, 4 is usedJ

again

It is suspended during the time that FNMA

holds that mortgage.
is reactivated.

~ut

If they subsequently sell it, then it

FHLMC has a uniform note, in which it contains

the following provision, which we think makes a lot of sense.
"If all, or any part of the property or any interest therein,
is sold or transferred by the borrower without the lender's prior
written consent excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance
subordinate to this deed of trust, (b) the creation of the purchase money secured interest for household appliances, (c) a
transfer by devise, descent, or by operation of law upon the
death of a joint tenant, or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest
of three years or less, not containing an option to purchase, ..
presents again a familiar provision to the secondary market.
It presents a provision which is currently being used, and we
think that the subdivision (c) talks about any transfer by devise
or descent, that it takes care a lot of the problems that
Senator Gregorio was talking about in terms of exercising a dueon-sale clause against a poor widow etc.

I think a lot of those

problems diminish or disappear under this kind of a provision.
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Again, under the conventional secondary market, it
depends on the market's review of the institution's policies.

0

If they are acceptable, they will buy the mortgages; if they
are not acceptable, they will put their money elsewhere.
FHLMC has an interesting statement in their Services

0

Guide.

They believe that the right of acceleration upon transfer

of ownership an invaluable tool of any mortgage investor and
insuring that only credit worthy mortgages are responsible for
making payments.

The lender makes the loan, sells the loan

to FHLMC or FNMA and then the key services the loan.

In

their manual to the service, they tell him to use his best efforts
to determine the sale or transfer mortgage property; or any other
event giving rise to the right / of acceleration.

They go on

to indicate that they treat assumpti ons a little bit differently
than other people.
Tucker v. Lassen is one that ends up possibly promoting
the use of a contract of sale, as opposed to an outright conveyance of your interest, as the means to handle property transactions.
we have not completed our analysis of this.

We see a lot of

problems with that device as applied to the consumer.
just give you one .

I will

If a loan on a piece of property which

subsequently is sold under a contract of sale, possession is
transferred.

The borrower under the loan no longer has possession.

He is under the contract of sale to sell it to a subsequent
buyer.

If he defaults, the lender's only right is to foreclose.
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We foreclose, and the relatively innocent subsequent purchaser
loses his house.

His only rights at that point are against the

person he brought it from who may or may not be able to make him
whole. I think this kind of thing presents many problems.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Why do you call this last person
relatively innocent? You are assuming that the person who sold
to him misrepresented the status.
MR. RATCLIFF: No, I think he can be either innocent or
less than innocent.

I do not think it really makes any difference

because the rights that he has are against the person that sold
him the property whereas the person who sold him the property is
in effect saying when your contract of sale is fulfilled, I will
be able to convey the title of that property.

But when that time

comes, that title may not be any longer under his power.

It may

have been reclaimed by the lender in the foreclosure proceedings.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: But that only happens if default occurs.
MR. RATCLIFF: That is right.

If our lender, the seller

under this situation, makes the payments everything is fine.

If

the institution and the subsequent purchaser agree on an
assumption of some sort with the substitution of parties, then
there are no problems.

It is the ones in between that could

cause the problems, which in our view could make the contract of
sale work under some circumstances and cause terrible problems
under others.

We are just indicating there are some problems with

it.
Assumption clauses and fees are part of the hearing notice,
__ and FHA_ a_pc'!_ V'/\

h~ve

no due-on-sale, thus you almost automatically
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0

fall into the assumption situation.

0

FNMA is much the same.

FHLMC, however, is different, and FHLMC basically permits the
lender, the servicer, to use his judgment as to whether to
approve an assumption or not.

0

As you recall, they do have a

due-on-sale provision, so it is up to the lender servicer.

The

lender servicer can approve an assumption under the following
conditions:

1.

If there is a cash equity of at least 5% of the

new purchase price;

0

2.

theproperty is to be owner-occupied;

3.

the monthly first, plus junior mortgage payment, if

any, p l us escrow impound accounts do not exceed 25% of the base
pay of the primary wage earner;
4. the provision I just read to you, plus all other
monthly payments on all installments debts having remaining terms
of more than

7 months do not exceed 33 1/3% of the monthly

base pay of the primary wage earner.
The next one is not really appl icable, and the final one
is that there are no other changes in the terms of the loan.
The reason for mentioning this will appear when you look
at SB 200 in the Tucker case.

we should go back to the La Salla

case, talking about the junior encumbrance situation.

The court

said because there was no substantial impairment of the lender's
security, the lender could not accelerate when a junior encumbrance appeared on the title.
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The La Salla case talked about impairment to the security,
and the next time I saw that concept was i n SB 200.

Subsequently,

again it was talked about in the californi a supreme court in the
Tucker case.
We take strong exception to the discussion of impairment
of security in the lender's situation, as if the lender's only
concern is with the condition of his security.

The lender has

extended financing to a particular borrower based on his promise
to pay as agreed; and the evaluation of his ability and willingness to pay the payments that he has agreed to do under the
contract.

If you will recall the conditions that FHLMC has

for assumptions, you will recall that they are talking about
basically creditworthiness and the ability of the lender--the
borrower--to make the payments under the assumption.

In addition,

both FNMA and FHLMC talk about credit reports, and they talk
about the obligation of the lender servicer to pass on any
credit reports.

The basic point is that both of these institutions

understand what goes on in the making of a loan, and there are
several factors obviously.

But one of them that we feel is

extremely important is the evaluation of the borrowers• ability
and willingness to pay.

We feel that the security is there, when

you are talking about foreclosure.

But in the meantime, of far

more importance to the borrower, is his ability and willingness
to make the payments, he is obligated to make under the note.
We feel that the FHLMC approach is one that is far superior
to the approach of SB 200.

The FHLMC has a 1% assumption fee, and

we feel that this also makes some sense.
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In my attempt to prepare for this meeting. there was a

0

great deal of confusion in my mind as to what was intended and
what was meant by points.

As I understand it. there are two

basic areas where points that come into the conversation when

0

you talk about real estate financing.
points with regard to FHA and VA loans.

one is the discussion of
This is where the

subsequent person gets an FHA or VA loan. subsequently he goes
to sell the property.

At that point. as the seller. he has to

pay the difference between the going market rate and the FHA
rate in that particular loan.

This is true on a brand new loan

obligation also, say in the tract situation the seller in that
case. is paying the difference between the interest rates on those
funds.
The problem arises because FHA and VA both are designed
to get the buyer into the house, to help him through the maze
and the difficulties of the market in his particular situation.
Once he is in the house and goes to sell it. apparently the
assumption is, that at that point he has some money and then
he should pay the difference to the lender who has used market
rate funds in advancing the house.

He should compensate the

difference between the limited amount of the loan and the
market rate, which presently exists.
Basically other than FHA and VA. the use of points is
with reference to charges, which are computed on the basis of
percentage of some amount. whether it is the unpaid balance,
the original balance, or what have you.
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These also are regarded

as points.

Banks generally do talk about points and the FHA

and VA loans and do Charge the seller those points.

However,

when you get to the situation in terms of loan fees, for instance ,
which is loan origination fees, those points which are most often
used in addition, the banks look at it as if the loan
origination fee is the fee that covers the lender's cost of
obtaining the block of funds from a secondary market, and its
cost of processing the loan.

Thus, in terms of your hearing

notice, it would cover appraisal fees, photo fees, and many
of those miscellaneous fees, in our view.
Now FHA and VA loans fees, loan origination fees, are
limi t ed to 1% of the amount of the loan.

The report I have on

that is that depending on the lender, they think that cover
their costs, or they think it is below a figure, which covers
their costs.

The FNMA, FHLMC, and the secondary market leave

these fees to the lenders, and our feeling is the loan fee of
2% would be a proper one, in other words, a charge of two points.
If you take FNMA and FHLMC, if the lender is utilizing these, if
you figure that the FHA/VA 10% loan fee covers our costs, then
when the lender utilizes

FNMA or FHLMC, the 1/2% commitment fee

or nonmember fee is taking up an addition 1/2% leaving in some
cases a 1/2%, which would go presumably into the lender's profit.
When he sells to these people, he then becomes a servicer on
the loan.

He is no longer participating in the profit other

than the charges that he is permitted to charge to FNMA or
FHLMC for the servicing of that loan, which varies between 1/4
and 3/8 of a point.
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0

You have the 1% cost factor in terms of the commitment fee,
plus the

1%

of our costs.

It is for these reasons we suggest

that a very minimum really, a 2% loan fee, assuming you want to
limit this fee, the idea being that this seems to be what we
can live with.

It seems to be what covers the costs

undergoing the conventional secondary market, which is probab l y
the most expensive process for the lender to do.
This loan fee would include such things as appraisals,
photo fees, and miscellaneous fees.

Title fees, real estate

broker fees, escrow charges, etc, are not normally fees charged
by the bank.

The extent that these costs incurred by the bank, we

feel we should pass them on to the borrower on an out-of-pocket
basis.

When escrow services of a bank are utilized, we think

that at that point the bank escrow operation should be regarded
within the realm of the independent escrows; what they need to
make a profit, what they need to carry out their business, are
something that other people should be able to live with.
Let me just very briefly indicate that under late charges
banks are presently charging somewhere between 4 and 6%.
Prepayment penalties again vary greatly, but probably a 6 month
interest on the original balance, less 20% seems to be not unusual.
Many banks at the present time are going to a shorter period of
time.

There are several banks for instance that have currently

adopted either the FHLMC approach of the five, three, five-year
period, or taking a 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 approach, but generally this
seems to be the way to which things are going.
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one item of
prepayment charge.

intere~is

that one statewide bank has no

They instituted a prepayment charge and

subsequently they raised it to the FHLMC or something similar
to the FHLMC provision.

The reason they did that is because they

found they were unable to compete in the secondary market for
theobtaining of funds, and thus they had to impose a prepayment
charge just in order to make those funds flow from other
sources.

This was mentioned to a degree this morning, and some-

thing that I have been trying to emphasize.
Due-on-sale provisions, I think, are generally uniform
and are almost always included in the notes.

The unusual situa-

tion is where the note does not include such in the

provision~

although there are notes which do not have due-on-sale provisions.
Assumptions, the fees vary from a flat charge of--and I do not
know what the minimum figure would be, but I would guess it to
be somewhere in the neighborhood of $11, perhaps a little less, to
1% of the unpa i d balance.

We think that 1% of the unpaid balance

is a figure that makes some sense.

It is not in our view unrea-

sonable, and it seems to be something that FHLMC provides thus
again protecting the secondary market and the flow of those
funds.

It is something the committee might want to consider.

Loan fees also vary, but again 2% makes some sense.

Finders•

fees, incidentally, are not utilized by banks at all.
The bank•s attempt to deal with the secondary market
generally predated FNMA and FHLMC, and those provisions that we
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0
that we do have currently enable us to operate in that secondary

0

market.

The FNMA and FHLMC provisions are providing a trend

within the industry to go to lesser charges and lesser fees,
which is happening just because they found they do not have to
charge these higher rates.

The FNMA and FHLMC entry to the

secondary markets especially at the present time is about the only
source of funds that seem to be workable and flowing with any

0

kind of degree of continuance.
One item that this whole discussion should include is
the attempt by us to take a normal money situation, which there

0

may not be such a thing, but to try and give you an indication of
one of the problems that we have in terms of raising funds for
real estate lending if you assume that you can take $100,000.
Take

half of it from the two basic sources that banks have, com-

mercial or checking accounts, and savings accounts, the Federal
Reserves requires that we establish reserves.

For commercial

accounts, 15%; for savings accounts, 20%; thus, right off the bat ,
$17,500 has to be deducted from that $100,000 in order to get
down to the lendable fund, which at that point would be $82,500
But assume for a minute forgetting that FNMA and FHLMC have
limitations that have been raised to $550,000, in terms of the
size of any one mortgage.

Forgetting that aspect for a moment,

assume a 10.5% annual rate of interest on this loan.

Roughly,

8% of that is going to go to pay interest in deposits, including
FDIC insurance and other costs, servicing the loan, etc., which
leaves the bank something in the neighborhood of

2~~,

or if you

take 2~~ of $82,500, it is something like $2,062.50 annual return
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before taxes that the lender has to play with.

Now, these figures

represent nothing more really than an attempt to show you the
general breakdown of what kind of economics we are talking
about. A

2~~

return on the capital is one that would cause the

normal investor to think about it a little bit, but this is
the kind of structure that we are looking at in the real estate
lending business.

Again, this assumes the normal lending situa-

tion, and it also assumes the charges, fees, etc.

It returns

nothing more than the incidental revenue to the bank, and I wou l d
like to explain that our feeling is that the late charges, prepayment provisions, assumption fees, and the rest of it should be
regarded as covering the lender's cost, covering the
lender's expense of doing business, etc. as allocated, but they
should not be looked at as items of revenue.
We feel that this kind of a structure causes all kinds
of problems.

Assume for a moment rather than a "normal 11 money

situation, a tight money situation.

The Federal Reserve--one

of the things that they can do in fighting inflation is to increase
reserve requirements for banks.
requirement and boost them.

Take the 15 of the 20% reserve

Now, we have to spend money to buy

government bonds in which those reserve funds are invested.
Any expenditure comes out of that 2.5% return, but again when the
federal policies of selling bonds in lots of a thousand dollars
drains away potential savings, as has happened in the past, then
funds do not go into the savings aspect of banks or savings
and loans.

At that stage the reserve requirements become even more

difficult because you do not have the basic funds to pull out.
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The discussion was intended to illustrate a couple of

0

points~

(1) the importance of the secondary market, both conven-

tional and that part of the market which has been captured by
the market agencies, FNMA and

0

FHLMC~

(2) any legislative action

that the committee might anticipate really must not restrict the
flow of these funds, because the whole housing economy is dependent
upon that flow.

We feel there are some ways to accomplish what

I consider to be the ends of the commfttee in terms of revising
some of the laws surrounding some of these provisions, to permit
that flow of funds be retained: at the same time to accomplish

0

something to prevent the application of unreasonable provisions
and one of the things for instance in the Garrett case, and other
cases that have come up involving some of these charges, are
that the court marvel unfortunately from the consumer's view
perhaps fortunately tends to take a fact situation which is
difficult to justify, one that the results unduly argue large
late charge provisions.

Then in the process of attempting

to justify it, the institution involved loses.

In other words

the court comes to the right result in the process, comes up with
some reasoning, and some reasoning and rules of thought that we
think are unduly and hinges on other provisions.
The california Bankers Association would like to see some
legislation based upon an analysis and an evaluation of some of
the testimony that you heard today and some that you are going
to hear tomorrow, and come up with legislation, which will put
a lot of these things to rest based upon an intelligent, reasonable approach to it, which above all protects the flow of
funds to the secondary market.
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At this point, I would like to offer to attempt to
answer any questions that anybody has.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Regarding your 2 or 2~fo profit, would
you calculate profits on net worth rather than on deposits? As
you came up to 2 and 2~fo on the basis of these $100,000 deposits,
you are making money on other people's money.
MR. RATCLIFF: Yes, that is probably true.

The point I

was trying to make is that the costs that we have are such that
when somebody charges you a
~agine

lO~fo

interest rate on a loan, I

your reaction would be to think that is high.

What we are

trying to show is that with the cost of money, and with the costs
of the various other aspects of the business, that in our view
the return to the lender is not that great, that there are other
places where that money can be placed where the return would
be greater.

So we feel that we are part of the market, and

there is a lot of discussion about the savings and loan, the
banks and who is bigger and better, and who does it in the greatest
fashion.

I think both of us are part of the market and should

remain a part of the market.

The problem that we all face

is increasing pressures, increasing concern by many people and
an apparent inability over the past years to convince the
Legislature that there are ways to accomplish some limitations
which really should have the effect in our view of relieving some
of the pressures anyway.
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CHAIRMAN- McALISTER: our next

witness is Mr. Jack Hempel

of the Department of Real Estate.

*

MR. JACK HEMPEL: Mr. chairman, my name is Jack Hempel.

I am chief Deputy Director of the Department of Real Estate, and
commissioner McCarthy has asked me to thank the committee for
giving the Department the opportunity to be present and to respond
to any questions that you may have concerning the jurisdiction
or the expertise of this Department.
The topics listed in the meeting notice are not regulated
by the Department of Real Estate, except for some of the charges
in connection with hard money loans under what is customarily
referred to as the Necessitous Borrowers Act.

These matters

were most recently addressed by the Legislature in connection
with SB 304 and SB 310 of the 1973 Session.
Both bills were supported by the Department of Real Estate.
These amendments tightened up the activities of some of the larger
mortgage brokers via Article 7 of the Real Estate Law with
respect to regulatory provisions applying to real estate licensees
in certain mortgage loan transactions.
We assume the above informat i on has been catalogued by
the committee, and that your current interest lies primarily in
the

~ea

of settlement costs directl y related to the purchasing

and selling of residential properties in today's real estate
market.
In that regard we understand several of the matters which
the committee might feel are within our area of expertise, although

*

See exhibit D
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not in our regulatory jurisdiction, have to do with the
following:
First, the effect of real estate brokerage commissions
on real estate transactions and the question of these fees in
relation to services rendered.
Now, commissions are a matter of negotiation between
agent and principal.

Although there are rates, 6%, typical in the

trade, many licensees deviate from this figure.

In Sacramento,

for example, I have seen TV commercials within the last three
or four months from a pxnminent firm of real estate brokers
advertising that their full service commissions on house sales
are $800 plus 1% of the selling price.

I do not know whether

there have been any surveys as to how many licensees deviate
from the norm, but it has long been customary for large
transactions to typically result in a negotiated commission at
somewhat less than that figure.

Representatives from the

industry could comment on this, I am sure, and I believe they
will be testifying before your committee tomorrow.
The state antitrust laws prohibit the fixing of commissions
for services, and the california Association of Realtors many
years ago entered into a consent decree, which resulted in the
withdrawal fromcirculation of any recommended rates.

It would

be our observation that the fact that most licensees charge 6%
on residential sales is more a standard of reasonableness than
of design.

It is true in most fields that activities below a

certain rate are not economically feasible.

This is probably

why my TV repair - experience has been- relatively similar as 'Ee
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0

the cost per visit from the three different repairmen who visited

0

my own home during the last several years.

It probably also

explains why the markups for the sale of consumer goods based
on inventory, turnover and the like are relatively stable.

we

understand big ticket appliances customarily sell at a 40 to 50%
markup, whereas small appliances sell at the 25 to 30% level.
Similarly, the discount new car auto sales are usually at $200
to $300 over invoice.

I know of none who deal for $50 to $100.

The net-net under that sort of situation just would not be there
for them to stay in business.
In the typical real estate transaction, to get back on
target, the commission is shared by four real estate licensees.
The listing is secured by a salesman who is probably an employee
in a real estate firm.

The property is sold by another office

with whom the listing office cooperates or through the multiple
listing service.

The same sort of division of the selling agent's

share of the commission takes place in that office between the
salesman and his broker.

Without this network of communications,

there would probably be fewer real estate transactions.

Mulitple

listing services have thrived because they help get the broadest
possible exposure for properties which are available for sale,
and it is true that concept where the multiple broker and
salesmen involvement usually comes into play.

If one considers

the vast majority of every real estate licensee's time which is
spent in work other than getting a signature on a dotted line,
the actual remuneration to each licensee involved in the transaction would be best understood.
-117-

Now to get into some specifics on that, I would like to
mention that a portion of all licensee's fees is set aside for
education and research in real estate at the institutions of higher
learning in California.

We have found three of these research

projects which contain segments relating to the income of
licensees.

A copy of each of these has been delivered to the

committee for such analysis as might seem appropriate.

Although

each of these was directed originally to something only collateral
to the pure question of income, the factors which were reviewed
seem to point toward an average income for a full-time licensee
in the real estate business at somewhere between the $10,000
and $20,000 per annum level.

Even a 1974 survey by the organized

real estate industry, within whose ranks the most active licensees are probably found and who, therefore, might be expected
to have a substantially higher income level, 69% of those surveyed,
and this was a 1974 survey, who were salesmen responded that their
earnings were $20,000 or less, 23% of that group were under
$10,000, 25% reported they earned from ten to $15,000, 21%
from 15 to 20, and 31% checked over the $20,000 spot.
We were told also that the question which might arise,
from the committee, would deal with the question of whether or
not a large number of licensees in the state is not a factor
which runs counter to the possiblity for reductions in real estate
commission rates.

We hardly think so.

If there is an over

population of real estate licensees, every competitive economic
test we

haV§. _~v.~-~

§~_E:g1; .l?~PPOJ;"ts

the

Sl:lgg~st:J.on

that _the

great~_r__

the competition the more price cutting might be expected.
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To give you an idea of numbers, as of July 1, 1974,
the department had 291,381 real estate licensees.

0

146,435 were real estate salesmen.
active and over 56,000 inactive.

Of these,

Of this group 90,000 were
There were 73,000 real estate

broker licensees on that date, 62,000 of whom were active and

0

10,000 inactive.

These numbers are large, but I think it is

interesting that a percentage has varied only nominally for the
past 35 years.

A review of the department record shows that the

ratio of licensee to population has run something from 90 to 125
since the late 193o•s.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You indicated 219,000 real estate
agents.

What was the figure on brokers?
MR. HEMPEL: 72,000 brokers and 146,000 salesmen.

219,000 was the total figure.

67 0 000 of those are inactive.

we have an inactive status under the law that provides for a
separate fee and they are identifiable.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That means there are over 2/3 of
219,000 that are active?
MR. HEMPEL: Yes, sir.

This inactive status has been

statutorily provided just for the past 17 or 18 years out
of our more than 50 years of license law enforcement history,
and it shows as you have just observed that 2/3 of these numbers
are participating on the economic scene.

The other third are

active.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I had no idea that there were that
many people in this industry.

With the total, counting active

and inactive, it would be just over one out of every 100
people in the state.
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MR. HEMPEL: I have been with the Department for 20
years, but prior to 1940, I was in the real
for a number of years.

estate business

When I first got my license in 1940

there were six million people in the state, and they had
60,000 licensees, so you see the ratio

has not changed much.

The one interesting observation is that in 1950 when
the first requirement that separated salesmen from brokers
was adopted by the Legislature, in order to get a broker's
license you had to show two years• experience as a real estate
salesman, as well as taking a more comprehensive examination.
From that time to this, the ratio of brokers to salesmen has
gradually changed.

At that time there were more brokers than

salesmen for the simple reason it was relatively the same
type of hurdles to get over to get into the business.
Today, if you notice from the figures that I just gave
that there are two salesmen for every broker.

Another reason

for that is that we have educational requirements for real
estate broker licenses, which have been growing.

Beginning

January 1, 1975, a real estate broker applicant will have had
to complete six college level, 3-unit courses in or collateral
to real estate.

It is presently four courses and this is getting

to be a meaningful educational requirement for a real estate
brokerage which attempts to recognize the trend toward
professionalization out in the industry and the needs of the
consumer in the vastly more complicated real estate situation
that exists -today than it: a1.a -"40 or---so- years ago.
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we heard the last gentleman refer to FNMA, GNMC and
FHLMC and those terms did not even exist in the real estate
field 30 years ago.

We have delivered copies of the

Department's long-range professionalization plan to the consultant to the committee, so that can give you a picture of the
road that has been travelled to date.

In trying to upgrade

the standards for real estate broker's license, and also to
show where the legislature may continue to see an interest
in raising these standards.
we believe that a limitation is one which says that
the entrance level jobs should be generally available to the
person who can show a general level of competence: and that
the real estate broker, who is under the law

0

responsible for ·

his real estate salesmen, is responsible for the funds his
firm handles, should be required to know a good deal about
real estate.

Those courses, by the way, include real estate

law, real estate practice, real estate appraisal, real estate
finance, either accounting, or real estate economics, which
is course number 5 and any of the group of electives for course
number 6.

I mention that, too, because I heard some of the

testimony earlier today about escrow handling.

I might add

a word or two in supplement as I complete this little sheet
here.
We believe that if there is to be a limitation on
participation in the real estate field, getting back to the

D

question of big numbers, and to what extent that has on the
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relationship of commission charges.

We believe that the only

type of limitation that would be appropriate would be the type
that exists today.

There should be a competency requirement

for entrance into the field, and there should be a substantial
requirement for knowledge and experience before you are allowed
to employ others in the field and be responsible for entrepreneur.

That exists today, and we would like to carry it

even further in the years to come.
We do not believe that entry into the real estate
business or in any other field, should be artifically restricted.
our citizens should have a right to a job and we are quite
satisfied that we have the finest real estate examination in
the united states.

I have just returned from a real estate

license law official's meeting where some nice things were
said to us by the real estate administrators and commission
members from other states.

Half a dozen states utilize our

examination for that matter and give them to their licensees,
and it is developed into limited reciprocity for us with them.
It is the commissioner's desire that I attempt to respond
on his behalf to any questions that you might have formulated.
If I do not have the answer at hand, we will try to get it
back to you before you have the final meeting of this
committee that it has scheduled at this time.
In that regard, based on some comments about escrow
handling, I heard earlier today there are a number of jurisdictions invoived.

I want you to know that the Department of

Real Estate has surveyed all of its realtors in the process.
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It began two years ago; we have four-year licenses.

0

so

all real estate broker licenses were renewed for the last two
years, we have included a questionnaire to determine how many
of them were handling escrows, and to this date we have had
a return of 23,000 of these questionnaires.

Of that group,

250 of them handled 12 or more escrows per year.

We assume

that anything less than that is purely a casual operation,
and I am sure a 12 escrow office could not survive on that
basis.

Somewhere between 1% and 2% of real estate licenses

handle escrows as a

regula~

function.

They are allowed to do so under an exemption from the
Financial code, which allows them to handle escrows
coincidental with their own transations.
kind they do handle.

Those are the only

we have separate regulations to deal

with the handling of trust funds which go into considerable
detail as to who can handle these.

They can be handled only

by a real estate broker, or salesman on his behalf, or if a
nonlicensee is handling him on behalf of the broker, is required
to secure a fidelity bond.

Also, every broker, who handles

these 12 or more is subject to an audit.

We automatically

schedule them for an audit and we have audited all 250 of
those, and we have run into just two cases that resulted in a
need for some discipline.

One was a commingling case that is

the type of thing that an audit would

hope~ully

guard against,

and the other had to do with records that were just so

poor

that they did not meet the other requirements of the regulations.
But, it seems that real estate brokers to what limited extent
they are in the escrow field, appear to be functioning adequately.
-123-

CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Should the Department of Real
Estate take a more active role or posture on various issues
relating to the real estate industry, such as the due-onsale clause, late charges, and the other things we have been
talking about here.
MR. HEMPEL:

That is almost a philosophical question.

We are funded, and the Real Estate commissioner has the statutory responsibility to do certain things.

When we go beyond

that, for instance, take surveys, we run surveys on situations
and when a question arises on an appropriate item to be
budgeted for whatever costs there might be to do something
outside the jurisdiction.

The experience that is available

within the Department of Real Estate, as a result of observing
the real estate scene rather closely, and having hundreds of
people involved in one or the other phase of that suggests
that the Department of Real Estate should be involved in
commenting on various aspects that are directly related to
real estate transactions.
But that expertise has its limits, too, and unless we
maintain careful records as they are related to these other
aspects, such as late charges, due-on-sale clauses, and the like,
at whatever expense is involved, the question arises how
intelligently we could comment on their impact on the real
estate scene.
CHAI~

McALISTER: You mentioned the thrust towards

greater professionalizat~Qn Q~ hig~ stand~rds th~t your Department has been attempting to maintain.

I believe in 1971 or

1972 Assemblyman Ralph had a bill that challenged that concept.
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0
MR. HEMPEL: It did when it was introduced, but
subsequently with an amendment, the bill was an educational

0
advancement bill, part of this package.

I think that was the

one that made course numbers 3 and 4 mandatory.
a gradual step.

This has been

I refer to 6 now, it is now 4 and a few years

0
before that, it was 2.

By accepting an amendment which I

think was wise that Mr. Ralph suggested that private schools
that would give courses that measured up to the quality and
level of the college courses that were given at that time
should be included.

He suggested that amendment, we accepted

it, and he supported the bill, and it was signed by the
'

Governor.
That concept has been continued into our course number 5
and 6.

This plan for professionalization does not suggest

that just an endless array of courses should be added.

we feel

that if you review the plan, we feel that it constitutes the
basic package of real estate subjects would be a major, if
in fact, general education were plugged under.
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Hempel.
This completes our formal agenda for today.

We will

adjourn, and we will reconvene tomorrow in San Diego at 9:30 am
at the San Diego Gas and Electric _company auditorium.
The meeting is adjourned until tomorrow morning.

#

D
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-lHTRODUCTlON

i.he Tesidential mortgage, in California as well. as the rest of the
nation, has remained essentially·unchanged since the-major Tevisions.which
.
~l~wed

0

.

.

.

.

the depression of the 1930's. The present completely amortising

mortgage has served society well since then.

Now, however, the.viability

of the mortgage instrument is again coming intQ question, but the problems
~f

today seem to be centered in two new

area~:

1) the difficulties

-..,._--..-.....___...._,_tf-·~·-- '

.

..

. associate~

.

with
making long-tenn .fi_;~~ - r~:t~.
- .. -- . -·---. ------·:--·------...---:• ·-·.

_in,..... •periods
of extended
·---·· -.-····---·--·-· --·----.-·

_

inflation
and.. - escalating
,... .
....
, ..
. - ..interest ·rates, and, 2) the increas·e in legalattacks
and legislative ~jmitations on the mortgage instrument
which reduce
.,_. .
~-

0

Jo~ra~ .

'

its

comp~t~tive .s~anding

amQng -financial instruments. Although substantial

attention has been given to the problems of financial intermediaries in
-~neral

(much of the President's Commission on Financial Structure and . .

· R...~ulati on de a1t with short-term borrowing and ·1ong-te~ 1e.ndi rig.), th~se.
.

.

thei~ consequen~es

new problems have for the most part been neglected.

Yet

for the mortgage instrument as it has functioned for

ne~rly

four decades

·could be far-reaching; and a balanced, thoughtful rethinking of issues
associated with
mtional

:the-·~gage

l~islators,.who

;nstr.Ument·-.will 'be .,-equired

~f

state and

111Ust '1ieal-·with 'the ·:questions..'concerning. tne.1110rtgage

'4nstrument, courts ·-which must rule on -rights ·of various ·parties, and, ·finally,
the· consumer who must
.
f~

.

.

~ltimately

obtain mortgage. credit. .A similar response,
.

from past inertia, will be ·required.of the nation's mortgage lenders.
!Jt · ,tt.is vital -process of--reevaluation, :several important -points should
.

lie -.t ept in mind:

-

. ,) Lenders, legislators :and --the ·.courts .should .clearly differentiate
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.,_
, .
···.

0

.:between legal and economic issues. ·t-tany of the present .legal .attacks are
;based on financial issues ..masquerading as issues in ·-property law . . and

0

~nsume r

•

protection. In .many cases -mortgage lending institutions

- clauses~ased ~n legal

·:-def ended various

~ave

and property ·rights, when·the real

· ~mportance of such clauses is in _mainta-ining t he competitive viability of
t he mortgage instrument in attracting capital. Lenders ·need not be

asham~d

of provisions in mortgage contracts which are designed to provide economic
~unerat1on"to

.·

.-

the lender or lessen his financial risk. _Many of these

"-provisions tend to assess the cost of special services to those requiring
·such services and allow an -overall lower mortgage rate to the

~ulk

of

h arrowers. The price of eliminating contract provisions of this type must
-411tfmately be a ·higher price for ·-mortgage f.unds. ·
~)

Legislators,

a~dest

portion of

qoortgage lender's
tho mortgage
1n0rtgage and
~venue

~ourts

credit is accounted for by the

~he ~ost of~ortgage

oper~ting costs~nd

instr~ent

ha~e

and consumer groups should understand that only

have

look~d

arrived at the

profits. Too often ~hose attac king

at the gross rate of interest on such a
idea that this amount represents net

m~staken

to the mortgage lender. ·On the

contrary~

mortgage lenders operate on

exceptionally thin profit mrgins. -During the period from 1963 to 1972,
~ngs

- ~~fits

and loan associati1)ns had nnly :one ·y ear in
amounted to as much as one -percent

1rhe 4verage net profit after taxes ·during

:wh'ic~ "th~ir

of~heir

~his

after-tax

mortgages outstanding.

period amounted ·to seven-

unths of one percent of mortgages ,1)utstanding~ or $0.701 -per year fo_r -each
· .tmndred dollars of 1210rtgage -balances. 'Moreover., -s avings ~nd .,loan associations
.,lMortg·a·ge 1oans a'tyea:r end :divided by net income -after ·taxes for ·a1.1
and loan ~ssociations. Savinas and Loan Fact Book l974,p.95,104.
-lJnited States .League of ...Savings Associations, 1974
_.
~ ngs

..J..2 9 .--

.

. ·.

•
~.Jaaye .also

been successful in amtroll ing 'their operating costs, ,an :additional

...JICODiponent .1)f the cost of ..mortgage credit. Total -annual operating cost.s of
-~ciations

have varied from

..::past decade..

1~

:to 1-31; of mortgage loans ·held 4Juring the

In comparison the ·amsumer ..price index ·rose from 94.5 .to .148.3

4)Ver an essentially similar

~eriod.

Association~

record of cost control over

-·• -.decade of inflation indicates the increased efficiency with
funds have been supplied.

wh~ch

mortgage

In total, the mortgage lender requires less than

21 for his services of assembling -funds, servicing mortgages and assuming

1the risks of financial loss.
3)
~~duce
~le

.~estrictions

imposed on the mortgage instrument

~Y

any state will

the ability of local lenders to obtain mortgage credit through the

of .loans iri the national secondary market. The secondary mortgage

snarket funnels capital iTom areas of surplus to ·areas requiring

mo~tgage

·funds. The private secondary market is composed of private loan originators
-selling whole loans or participations to private investors, often in geo·graphical areas remote from the origination of the loan. The federal second~y

market is composed ·of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the

-Federal

~orne

Loan Mortgage Corporation.

~hese

agencies purchase mortgages

\ .-ith funds obtained -from 'the sale 'Of :federal :agenc;y obligations ~nd from

iDther sources.
lhe --state·· of ·california, and -the Western United ·s tates in general, .
~pe~d heavily on secor:ada~y markets...to 13rovide mortgage funds to . home buy~rs. Of--the -.estimated 3.8 mill ion -single f.amily -homeowner .mortgages existing in
'the ·. West, 1.4-million, 1)r"J6% of . the ·.: total, were held by lenders ·. outside
"ttte -region.1 With over .·1)ne-third ··of ::the single family .mortgage .credit
~pplied_ io _ the

West COJDing from outside ·that

area ~

it is

tmpo~ant

that

2•Mortgage Bankern, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Nov.~

1974~p.52.

.
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..

. ...

~o

-....

0

- ·restrictions be placed on
0

~he~rtgage

instrument which would. impair its
•

7salabil ity.

...

~he

•

secondary loan purchaser, whether public or private, has certain
.
Amderstandings concerning the investment which he is p·urchasing.~-:..._Loans .
·-----

.

~re

normally purchased .based on an assumed life of 12 years.

- ----- -----.-·-·--··- -...~·---------·-·--··-,

If maturities

of California loans are lengthened as a result of a legally imposed

chang~

in the due on sale clause, the California loan will become an inferior product
~f
.•

questionable salability on national markets. The loan purchaser expects

~mely

payment of principal and

inter~st.

A weakening of late charge

may jeopardize
. . such timeliness and impair the . market acceptance

~quirements

mortgage. A private sale of loans may be made on a basis which

~of-the

-41lticipates the sharing nf prepayment charges, but a loan

n~t

providing for

prepayment charges may be unattractive in the secondary market. Any
·1DOdification of -the mortgage which

c9mpr~mises

its salability in national

reduce$ the availability of mortgage credit to the citizens of

~rkets

California.
4) Legal prohibitions of various clauses found in the mortgage contract
-~ce

the

.
borrower•s~

~otiations.

.

as -well

~s

the lender•s, options in mortgage credit

· Historically,. 'the ~-borrower has been free

~o

negotiate al_l the

~rms

of the

4!te~

eliminating any of~hese elements removes a possible option which the

mortgage--interest~rates,

origination fees, prepayment charges,

-~Jbortower

might have preferred. Because savings association mortgage lending·

--~erates

1r1ith thin :profit margins .and a high le_vel of

operat~ng

efficiency,

--ldbanges ·in ine mortgage instrument which appear to reduce the cost of borrowing

-·-·. ·st .be made up in .an -offsetting ·cost increase in some other aspect of the

· . .%J~Dr tgage. - If -non-interest Tate items are e1imi nated, -a hi-gher-contra-ct rate
·~
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.. .

..

.· .. . .~:. . .
~n

:the mortgage .will result.. A large number of borrowers -might prefer a

_.;lower i nterest rate with provision for .a ·due _on sale clause, ·or a 'Prepayment
·4:barge or a late charge to an .alternative contract, qmitting one or -more
·,~f

these but bearing a higher ·.c ontract -:interest rate.
~E

PROBLEM OF

~ORROWING

SHORT Arm LENDING LONG

California savings and loan associations (the state's largest mortgage
-~enders) ~btain ~heir
~long-tenn

funds from short-term sources and invest them in

real -estate loans. Their funds are·.acquired from three primary

sources. The first is passbook savings, which as· of March 31, 1974, repre~ed 31~3 of the liabilities of state ~hartered California associations.

lnhese passbook balances are subject to immediate withdrawal and are, therefore,
~ry

:sensitive to t:hanging interest rates. The second source of funds for

..associations is savings t:ertificates -earning interest higher than the nonnal
1JiSSbook rate. These -certificates provided 49~4 of total liabilities as of
··-'March 31, 1974·• .Although savings certificates are of a fixed maturity,
;this period is _relatively short in relationship to the
-·l oans.

~aturity

of mortgage

Nearly all certificate accounts range in maturity from three months
.

~ · four

.

years, ·with -the -la11Jest iClJDOUrlt-of""two years 111aturity or less.

~

-=tiJird ~-f-i-cant --seur.ce~ ~!. ·1Jutsi de ~!~1_f9r-~~o~i_~}~~- j_~ -~~r::r9wing
.

·-~-·---··-·..

~:the

·~era]

Federal Home Loan Bank system, a
GQvernment to provide back-up

·:-.as·s ociations.

system -established by 1:he

cre~it

fi_~ancing

for -savings

an~

loan

For state -chartered California Associations., advances were ·

-=:'8..91 -of 1 iabilities as of March '31.., ·19742 .Some· Federal Home Loari .Bank
~ces

-

are available in .11Jaturities ·-of-fi.ve years or "Ql"'eater., .. but .approximately

- -~lifonna ·saVings and Loan tommiss:ioner· "~id.
·%bid..
-L32-

.

.

.

.

4Jalf of the·advances ..to .California ...associations .were less than one year
.
.
~411aturity as of March 31., 1974. lhe.-short-tery~ nature of savings .and loan
··4lSSOciations• liabilities ;s -not ·inadvertent:

•

•.. -

· ~nterest

rates have been lower

than · l~ng-term

historically, short-tenn
rates, making the process of

-.:;.borrowing short and lending long profitable •
•

Although associations are funded by liabilities with very short
~turities, thei~

assets .have greater maturities than those of any other

-financial ··institution. As -of 'June, 1974, the national average contract
.·

.....111aturity on mortgages fo.r newly .built homes was 27.7 years, while average
•aaturity for ·existing homes was 25 years.

Contract maturities have
~nsistently been above 25 years in recent years. 6 In a period when interest
.

.

"Tates remain unchanged, ·borrowing short and lending long provides a sub-·
-~ntial

service to·the

~ublic

4nd is also ·profitable to associations, since

.·'Sftort-tenn rates have =usually been :.below long-term rates.

But the upward

~vement ~f in~erest

rates over 'time ·causes s·evere earning problems for
savings and loan associations and other financial institutions which borrow
and lend long. And in fact, interest rates associated with savings and·

~hart

loan associations have generally been increasing in the postwar period.
-~le

hel~

1 traces the ·mortgage -portfolio

in 1965 through '1973.

-·As 'the ·:table ·shows, -the interest income :per $100 of mortgages in 1965. was
~~~7.

Inasmuch as the interest-Tate is fixed for the mortgage loan, the

.
. .
~6.~7 per year figure continues throughout the life of the loan.

During

~is

same period

~d

flexible) market--rate for:f.unds..and~st -:meet its operating expenses.·

·Of~ime~ · however~ '~he .association

..

.

must pay the current
.

-

'7Jhe.-second line of the.-table .shows -the average cost of funds plus. expenses
.
~ral +lome loan ..·Bank Board .Journal., October, 1974~ p. 37.
'.•

.. ..
~
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•

,

....--

··.:EFFECT

·:nBLE 1

'FROM BORRO~llNG SHORT AND LENDING LONG
. (Based on loan ~ortfo1io held 1965)

Or~ INCOt~E

t'

/

·1965
:lnterest Incomea
Per .$100 of
-Mortgages .

-Avera~e Cost of b
-Funds plus
·-operating
Expenses of 1.2~
.'Wet Income per
··$100 of
· ~ttortgag~s

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

.$6.37 .$6.37 .$6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37

5.93

6.~3

6.39

~44

-14

·-.1)2

6.43

6.82

6.80

-6.76

-6.93

.fJJ. -.06

-.45

-.43

-.;'39

-.-56

6.30

.

..

~ Interest income represents interest earned on mortgages _held in ~he
..portfo1i o during 1965 as a percent of those mortgages, based ·on figures for
.associations in the 11th Federal Home loan Bank Board District. Source~Federal
Home loan Bank Board Journal, December, 1973, p. 34, ~nd September, l97~,p. 36.

b Operating expenses as a percent of mortgages· nationally for all associations
·~ve varied between 1-22~ ·and 1-3~ _ in the period 1969-1973. See 1974 Savinqs
~~nd loan Fact Book, p.104 and p.95. The lower figure of 1.2% is consistent with
:~ Brigham and Petit results for the los Angeles area, corrected for non~-mortgage assets. See: Study of the Savinqs and loan Industry, Irwin Friend, p.l018.
-Average cost of funds is based on figures for the llth Federal Home .loan Bank
.,JSoard District. See FHLBB Jo~mal, .Dec, 1973, p.-33.

-·
. -··

.. . .
,

. .. .
··.

'
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0
.
--~ :1..~.

The :net

of :.these~

: . . ..,
~:

·:-

-figures ·is the.net income per $100 of mortgage

-=--ade in 1965. Thus :in ·the ·first _year ·the

po~folio generated $0.44 of net

--;zincome per $100 of mortgage. lhe original =income level is eroded because
.%he .cost of funds- increases-while.-the.r.ate of ·return on the mortgage remains
'->f.ixed.

0

~he

Indeed, by the year

1973~

the .mortgage was imposing a net drain on

association of $0.56 per $100 of mortgage.
•

•

Over longer periods of time,

0

•

trf ~ours·e, this pro~lem of lending long and .borrowing short could be

increased.·
ibis -borrow short-lend long-problem has ·forced mortgage lenders to

-·

'incorporate provisions in -their contracts \'thich 1 imit their risk exposure.
-ISSUES lN THE .. MORTGAGE lOAN
7lle ~mortgage
,~f :-several

agreement between the .lender and the borrower consists

major provisions .which :detennine :the :financial responsibility

·:the .:borrower .undertakes in return for 1:he loan. These are: 1) payment of.
··:the stated interest rate on the mortgage loan, 2) payment of closing costs
~d

fees~

origination

3) timely.payment of principal and interest on the

_ .-:.mortgage until maturity, or .until -an ..act occurs -which, by mutual agreement,
::~lerates
-- ~.)'IIJents,

the loan, 4) payment :of late :charges i·n the event of late

'5) the .l)ayment-of· :prepayment .charges in 1:ne event of early

"'ftt)ayment of the loan, .6) the -.paY111ent ilf a ~pro rata share of the property
insura~ce

%ax .and property

on a-monthly basis. These elemeQts

w~rk

together

-- ~.=constitute a viable instr4JIIlent .allowing the 'Ordinary cftizen to borrow
~urns 't)f~ money

·for c·ver:y -1-ong ·:time·,enods.. .A :brief .synopsis of each of the

·-·important aspects .of the -'IJJOr~age ~~n -is -gi-ven in .T-able· 2.
"~l:though

the provisions of .a::mor.tgage -loan -:are """ell established in

·-. ·-- -..

~

"

-

• ':

· ~ABLE

2

::IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF .THE
.~RTGAGE ..lOAN

...

--:PROVISION IN MORTGAGE
" INSTRU~1ENT

"EFFECT
-·· ·.

Due on Sale Clause

·:fJrepayment Charge

Provides a means of adjusting loan
rates upon a borrower•s transf~r of
~roperty, thereby enabling new
:borrowers to obtain loans without
~•holly subsidizing nolders of old
-loans. Allows long term fixed rate
· :mortgages.
·Provides sharing of the costs
with falling interest
between borrower and lender.

-~ssociated
-~tes

·.. · ;.Provides basic return to lender .
-~epresents a return for lending risk.
~eflects local and national economic .·
x:onditions.

....lnterest ·-Rate

"C-overs out-of-.pocket costs of mortgage
lender for appraisal, etc.

:~rigination F~es

tate Payment Charge

Assesses cost of delinquent accounts
to those generating costs. Provides
-an incentive to the borrower to .
- ~1ntain his loan in current status.
'. ::·~uiring

·· :-Impound of Tax ·and
.;Insurance ·Funds

of impounds for ·most·111ortgage
·loans is no longer allowed.under
~lifornia law.

...

.·

-136-

<(

-

0.

. ..:tr-adition cand pr.actice, ·.:they ~ve .recently O>me under "close scrutiny by
0

.-consumer ·-groups~ .courts and ·state legislators.

Probably al-l the elements

.-' Of """the :mortgage loan have, -at-.one time -or -another, been at issue in various

•

o

.:.am.sumer -.suits-against mortgage lending .i nstitutions.

Each aspect of the

.4DOrtgage loan will be examined in some detail in the following pages, with
an attempt to show how they operate, what their-economic impact is on the
..bor rower :and lender, and some ·.of the implications of modifying each aspect
"'Of -the mortgage contract.

'THE I NTEREST RATE
The stated interest ·rate is normally ·not a legal issue
~-ending,

i~

mortgage

although it may .occasionally be a matter of litigation in in_stances

·- * here the .borrower alleges that -the lender has charged an interest rate in ·
-violation of the -state's usury laws • .But -on a broader scale, the nominal
·=.!Interest rate on mortgages Temains .a .matter of continuing concern.

There

..ar e "'tlumerous state usury 1aws 1 imiti ng mortgage rates . Th~se 1aws reflect
"the belief that a restricti_ve usury law will result in the availability of
..low-cost mortgage funds.

Unduly -restrictive usury laws actually tend to

~'1illeny: mortgage ~di:t 1:o·:the -state's citizens..
~vels

.set ·by local :usury

laws~ · "local

When market rates rise a~ove

,availability of funds tends to dry up

· -.-as :institutions -find it·'1110re :profitable to invest outside the area;

lAot

a ·~or

item of consumer litigation .at

~his

~hile

time, public interest can be
..

ibest served by removing usury laws .and relying on market competition and
·....-lgid ·disclosure
-~

Tegulations- .to~ure

-:both .nortgage ·availability and the

possible .credit costs.•

~able

·3 ·shows ·how ;nterest -rates n d -maturities combine to detennine

~ :1110nthl y -payment .requi red -per. $1,'000 ~f ·mortg~ge balance.
' ·. '

I!

.

...

•.·
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Two aspects of
..

":

4

·::rnsLE ..:3

. .

:mfE UFECT OF 1NTEREST .RATE AND
· ·

~-t!ATURID

PAYMENT

~Assumes a $1~000 Loan)

. .. , -

...

~10NTHLY

ON

.
-;;MTURID

, :INTEREST
RATE

5 YEARS

10 YEARS 15 YEARS 20 YEARS 25 YEARS "30 YEARS

:61·

.$1.9.33

.$11..10

$8.44

$7.16

$6.44

$6.00

71

19.80

11.61

8.99

7.75

7.07

~.65

Bl

:2.0.29

12.13

9.. 56

8.36

7.72

7.34

1JI

":20.76

,..2.67

10.14

9.00

8.39

8.05

101

--21.25

13.22·

10.75

9.;65

·g.o9

8.79

111 -

"21.74

13.79

'1 1.37

10.32

9.80

9.52

.'l21

22..24

14.35

'12.. 00

11 .. 01

10.53 .

10.29

"131

22.75.

14..-93

12..65

11 ..72

11 .. 28

11 .. 06

141

'2.3."21

. 15.53

13.32

12.-44

12.04

11.85

151

.23.79

i6.13

14.00

13.17

12.81 .

12.64

.

·.

/

~-

.

·· ~

..

.

.

..

,.

-

..
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0

_::tilis: re.lationship ··should be .given ,careful consideration -~fo~
0

•

·4

greater

~rtion ·of the ·total .cost of the 1110rtgage loan ·is lumped into the... ·c ontract
.

:tnterest rates. -first, -as ·mortgage interest -rates are -pushed higher_, -each
;equal increment ·:;n the interest -rate -causes

4

~he . monthly

an

payment

re~uired.

For

example~

:.more -:than .equal increase in
incr~ase

in rates f r om _6% to

·7s on a 30 year loan increases the monthly payment $0.65~ An · increase from
.9% to 10% increases the .payment .$0.69. .Second, at higher interest rates an

-;aextension ·. _of. loan ·l itaturity lowers the .monthly payment less than a similar
.•

·l llaturity change at lower rates. A 7'1, loan tlf 30 years maturity has a monthly
;:payment .$0.42 lower than a .25 year loan. At an i nterest rate of lO'J, "the
- ~ifference

is reduced to $0.30.

_£lOSING tOSTS AND.ORIGINATION fEES
· .l'he 1J10rtgage borrower is -normally t:barged certain ·fees at ·the time tlf
.:tile origination of "the loan. These fees .normally range from 1% to 1.5% .and

- - ·--·-.. -

-~y

·- - ··----------... --· -

be either deducted from the ·face amount of

.

-· ··-

-- ·

tbe -loan- ~r.added . as

a

c~sh

~eost.

A $20,000 loan with orjgination .and closing costs of 1.5 ~oints would
·--·-------- ---- ·- ~_.._,. _ _ , . , _ , . . .. _...... -.. ·- -··- --- . . ..
~ul~ ~~ a djsb~rsement of funds in the .amount of $19~700 to the borrower .
... - - ....... - ..
- - - . _ _ _, _____ .... -····,.,..__..=co-__.._.-- .... 4"1T" ....,__,.._

~.

-

--- ---~
- ~------

;:.During :the :year 1973, .loan -4rigination fee ·income for ·state 1:hartered
·.~1 1fomia

savings· ..and loan .:associatipns ·.amounted 1:o 3 .-6% of "'the ·tota1

~venue. 7 The amunt of loan ·nrigination fee :income is largely -depende~t

·«JPPn loan

volume during the period in -question.

-;£onceptually, closing costs and :orl·g ination fees can be 4ivided into
-~,;two~eparate
~

categories: l) :dla'"9es for:!Otrl:-.of-l)ocket .expenses incurred by

lending ·institution in the actual1>rigination nf :the mrtgage~ .and

.2) :Payments to the lender for "the lJUrpose ·of increasing the mortgage yield
'

-·~tement of -tonditi~ .: talifomia .:DePartment ,of 'Savings .:and .loans.
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~:The

0

portion of -origination fees which are associated with hard costs of

- "the mortgage origination are charged for s_uch items as title insurance, ·
~llppraisals

and other functions which help consumate the transaction. These

··:charges essentially represent user-imposed costs on the association and so
be properly charged to the buyer for the services performed.

.~hould

- Table 4 shows the effect of origination fee, maturity, interest rate
..;and prepayment on the effective yi e1d of a mortgage 1oan.
~re ~viderit from~he
~lized

Several factors

table: 1) origination fees have a greater effect on

interest ·rates at nigher contract interest rates? 2) the effect of

~rigination

fees is higher on loans of shorter maturity, 3) the effect of

-~rigination

fees is higher on a loan that is prepaid relatively early.

_·ne present
~quire

·re_g!IJ~tlons of ~the-Fedmrltte~ve-soard

h:eg_u 1a~ ion Z)

that the actual percentage rate on a loan be shown, thus the effect

--of ~rigination fees is not hidden ..fr.om the consumer in· the .loan origination

-

4Process. Given the existence of rigid disclosure regulations, there is no

~eason

to prohibit or limit such fees on mortgage

-consumer is unambiguously informed of
·;end the ·true cost ·of
:~e-various
- ~·their

.credi~

t~e

As long as the

true rate of interest on his loan,

1110rtgage lenders should. be

allowe~

to offer

mixes ·of ;nter.est Tates and origination ·fees. which seem to best

-

market.

_,.REPAntENT CHARGES

.

.

,

lo~ns.

.

-14ost Tes-i dential 1DOrtgage loans include a .charge for early prepayment

. ~~he -loan .balance. The :most .common pattern for prepayment charges
·Gationally is ·that provided by the regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank
-:~Soard:

.a Federally_char.tered .association may _i mpose -'-a ·prepayment charge

::.equal 'to ·6 months interest on 'the amount of pri.ncipal prepaid less 20% of
..

~ ·

.
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.Loan of 25 Years fgtiJritl
Prepaid jn
.'-Contract
-Rate On
Loan
6."25~

6.50
6.75
"7.00
7 .. 25
7.50
7 .. 75
13.. 00
. 8.25
-8.50
.-8.75
~ .. 00
'9."25
.·'9 .:so
·:9 ..75
lO.t>O
10.25
10.50
10.75
11.:00
11.25
11.50
11..75
12.00'
.:12.25

5
Years

- ..

:tfFECT OF ORIGINATION
~ AND LOAN PREPAYMENT
.af EFFECTlVE HORTGAGE-LOAN
···INTEREST RATE*
-~~Origination Fee of 1~}

10
Years

6.5M
6.40%
6.75
6.65
6.91
7 ...00
7.16
7.25
7.50
7.41
7.75
7.66
7.91
8.01
8.26
8.16
8.51
8.41
8 .. 76
8.66
8.92
9.01
. 9.17
9.26
9.51
9.42
9.76
9.67
10.D2
9.92
10.27
10.17
10.52 . 10.42
10.77
10.68
11.02
10.93
11.27 . 11.18
11.43
11-52
.11 ..77
11.68
12...03
11.93
12.28
12.18
:12...53
"12.44

15
Years

<

'··

.. .

.-: ... :

~

No Pre-

5
Years

Payment

6.38%
6.-36%
6.63
6.61
6.88
6.86
7.13
7 .. 12
7.38
7.37
7.fi3
7 ... 62
7.88
7 .. 87
8.13
8.12
8.'39
8.37
8.64
8.62
·8.89
s.aa
'9 .. 14.
9.13
9."'39
9.38
9.64
9 .. 63
9.89
9.88 .
10.13
10.15
10.40
10.39
10.65
10.64
10.89
10.90
11.14
11.15
11.40
11.39
11.66
11.64
11 ... 91
11.90
l2.16
12.15
· 12.~1
12.40

10
Years

15
Years

No PrePayment

6.50%
6.40%
6.37%
·6.65
6.62
6.75
7.00
6.90
6.87
7.25
7 .. 15
7.12
. 7.40
7 .. 50
7.37
7.65
.
7.63
7 .. 75
. 7.88
8.00
7.91
.8.25
8.16
8.13
9.51
8.41
8.38
. 8.66
8.. 76
8.63
9.01
8.91
8.88
9.26
9.16
9.13
9.51
. 9.41
9.39
9.76
9.67
9.64
10.01
9.89
9.9~
10.26
10.17
10.14·
10.42
10.39
10.52
10.67"
10.77
10.64
11.02 . 10.92
10.90
11.27
11.17
11.15
11.52
11.43
11.40
11.77
11.68
11.65
12.02
11.93 . 11.90
12.27. 12.18
12.15
12..53
12.43
12.41

6.35%
6.60
6.85
7.10
.7 .36
7.61
7.86
8.11
8.36
8.61
8.87
9.12
9.37
9.62
9.87
10.12
10.38
10.63
10.88
11.13
11.38 .
11.64
11.89
12.14
12.39

-~As a general rule of thumb, origination fees have the following impact on
loan interest rates. Assuming a loan of 25 to 30 years maturity.

· ,_ .Each 1CX: of ·origination-fees ·increases the -effective interest cost
--;appt'Oximately 25 basis points ~ssuming ::total prepayment at the end of 5 years.
Each 1% of origination fee increases the effective interest cost
15 ~sis .points assuming total prepayment at the end of _10 years.

- ~proximately

.

.

.

3. £ach 1% of oriqination fee increases the effective interest cost
.:approximately 12 to 15 basis lJOints assuming payoff after the tenth year.
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loan of 30 Years Maturitl
Prepaid in

~~rtgage

2.

.

0
~1the

original balance of

-~te

0

While no such regulation exists for

the~rtgag~

California .associatinns~

chartered

.

.

·the Federal pattern has_gained

:·iSUbstantial local .acceptance.

-

.

~he . economic~ationale

for imposing

prepa~ent

charges is to protect

-the mortgage lender from refinancing in periods of declining interest rates.
0

-During periods of rising interest rates, the mortgage lender can neither
i. ncrease the interest
ra.te nor call the mortgage loan
and reinvest at more
-·
.
~vorable·rates;

but during periods of declining interest rates, the

·borrower is free to prepay ·the-mortgage loan and refi.nance at a lower rate
,.except as constrained by the prepayment· charge. Thus prepayment charges help
.
.
~ -equalize interest rate Tisk. The ~ctual impact of the prepayment charge
is shown in Table 5. 'The ·table ·provides information on the prepayment of a
25 ~ear loan {)f ·9S .interest -and original balance of $10,000.

For exar_nple,

-i f :the loan is .prepaid -after five years, the amount prepaid is $9,327 .00,
:~ne~repayment

charge. is $330, the effective cost 6f the loan to the borrower

..over the five year period is 9.53%., and the borrower would. find it profitable
~o

Tefinance if he ·can

--~repayment

~btain

mortgage credit at

ln~n,

·.or ·'COnversely, the benefit to be gained by

·1the .borrower fromTefinancing is

~DnlY

or·below. A

penalty -provides ·only -minimal protection to the mortgage lender

··.in :the -early years ·of -the

~f .the

8.~6%

~ot

severely compromised by the existence

prepayment penalty. At_thefive year date, interest rates need drop

34 basis points to make it

profita~le

for the

borrow~r

l oan, pay the prepayment :penalty, -and Dbtain new financing.

to repay the
If the loan is

··-'1Jn!paid at a later.-point., -the~llar prepayment charge is smaller and the
-,'effective cost ·of credit ':to · the borrower is lower; however, the· incentive to
~inance

is also lower.
..
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·.:~tABLE

5

~PREPAYMENT CHARGE*

...

25 Year Loan
Interest Rate on $10,000 Loan

-~~

,/-

,•

REFINANCING
RATE AT \miCH
COST OF
BORROWER HAS AN
LOAN OVER
ADVANTAGE FROM
PERIOD HELD PREPAYMENT

YEAR OF
PREPAYMENT

At10UNT PREPAID

:s

$ 9327.00

$330.00

9.532:

8.66%

10

.$ .8274.-QO

··$282.00

9.19%

8.43%

PREPAYf~ENT

CHARGE

15

$ .6625.00 .

'$208.00

. 9.08%

8.28%

20

$ .ll043.00

$ .92.00

9.022:

~.04%

"* Assumes maximum prepayment charge a11owed by Federally chartered
··sav;ngs and loan associations. Prepayment charge is 6 months interest
-~n·the amount prepaid less 20% of the original loan balance.

·..
.'

..

-.. ..

.

- . --
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0

-UTE .CHARGES

·;.'Mortgage lenders impose a charge for 1110nthly . :installment payments

0

. -~hich are overdue. Qften

~he

·institution allows a grace period, in some

:.< ases up .to 1.5 .days., .before .a .Jate cllarge ;s "imposed. There are
~everal

reasons for the imposition· of a

~harge

on delinquent payments.

First, the handling of delinquent payments imposes a cost on ·the lending
-institution. Oelinquent .accounts take the specialized attention of staff
-~d~enerate

increased costs of servicing. Second, it encourages the

4lorrower to remain .llUnctual in .his loan payments. la.xness on the part of
· :the lending institution --encourages delinquency on the part of the borrower

.

--.and ·may ultimately result in "the borrower losing his property through
f oreclosure. ri·nally, 1ate chaTges are -important in -maintaining the cash
''flow of ·the lending institution_.and 'this provides additional -mort9age funds.
·r-rhe largest single ·source

~f

lendable funds for California savings and loan

-:.:associations comes from the repayment of existing loans.
· ~appropriate

late charge should be sufficient to fully recover the

-ildditional cost imposed by the late account.

In addition, the late charge

should be sufficient to -motivate 'the .borrower to maintain his loan in a
· '1:111

rent :status.

· --rHE 'tMPOUNDING . OF iAX ·-AND lNSURANCE FUNDS
.;ttationally, most mortgage ·l enders ·r equJre the
~rtion

of the borrower•s

yearly~roperty

· ~ ~ertain classes 1>f·'1110rtgage loans.,
~ -state

payme~t

of a pro ·rata

tax and property insurance.

~such

Except

.a -requirement is .not allowed in

of -California. The ·impounding m tax .and insurance funds assures

. ~t -the lender's interest in -the property is protected from tax liens and
..

...
p

" •

'

:

...

.

-

. ; ·-144-
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.

-.-:¢be ·.destruction
-~x-and

through fire ..and .other causes.

insurance accounts is

~ot

Inasmuch as impounding of

permntted in California, this issue is
•

l i kely to disappear as a matter of concern to lenders, borrowers and
.:.J~gi.slators.

lnterestingly 5 however, ...California experience indicates that

.::borrowers generally prefer to include tax and insurance payments \'lith

-

~eir

l"egular installments even where not required.
'THE .DUE ON SALE .CLAUSE
-~e

aspect

~f the~rtgage

loan neserves special attention--the due

.·.on sale clause. It is highly important to
'fixed rate mortgage,

arid ~

th~

viabil 1ty of the long-term

it- has been .an .attractive target for judicial or

. legislative attack. The following sections examine the nature of this clause ·
1and the impact of its removal. 7he
-~quires

that .a mortgage

~~f~he due~n

~ration

be·~paid~pon

sale .clause nas ·been to

of the due On . sale clause

.the sale of the property. The effect

~ffectively

shorten the actual realized·

Jmaturity of mortgage portfolios. A l~nder normally uses

t~e

due on sale

t:lause·· to adjust
. the interest rate to a level nearer that currently pre'lail ing
.
in local mortgage markets. This has

~he ·effect

of maintaining the financial

..-lability of the mortgage -portfoli.o., ·<Which 10ay have been eroded by increasing
- ~:2nterest

·rates. ,.able :.6 ;provides-a ;comparison of two· hypothetical mortgage_s .

·-.me -subject to a .:due· on sale clause, ·'the ·l lther not having the due on sale
~lause. Both are assumed to ~e~losed December 31, 1964,8 and the property
~ bsequently

sold December 31, "1968,

~losed December
.
-~entially the

and· ~gain

31, l964, ..are ~ssumed -to

December 31, 1971. Loans

at an interest rate of. 6%,

.~e

.

national mortgage r.ate

~xisting

at that point in time. Upon

·.

. 8rhe cost of ·funds for association~ lending in the 11th district as of
··-1965 .was 4.73% at the time the property was sold. By ·1968 the cost of lendable
~~ds had increased to 5.10:, by 1971 ~o 5.6%.
The exercise of the due on sale
~lause al1mo,~s the lender to ·keep ·pace with the rising cost of funds.
See
.:.Federal Home .loan Bank Boar.cLJoumal., January, 1974, p.49.
,

A C:

0

0

1'ABLE 6
..· ~OTIIETICAL
EFF..ECT-:.OF
.DU£ ON ~ALE .CLAUS£
.

0

~OAN

l.OAN -ltllTHOUT DUE ON SAL£ CLAUS£

WITH DUE ON SALE. t:LAUS£

.:Loan Closed December .3 1, 1964

...:Loan Closed December 31 , 1964

~Amount

-~unt

of loan $10,000

of loan.$10,000

.l nterest Rate 6% Mat. 25-years

Jnterest Rate 6% Mat. 25 years

l nit1al Monthly Payment $64.43

..Initial Monthly Payment $64.43

] 964-1968

1964-1968

-~·-Monthly Payments @ $64.43
~perty
JDue -~n

-,48 -Monthly Payments

Sold December 31, 1968

Sale Invoked

Property So 1d December 31 , 1968
_lfo .Due -·{)n Sale Clause

~~ew loan Amt. $9,219~34 Rate-7%

·01 d loan Remains

-1 969-1971

1969-1971

:36 ·Monthly Payments of $69.93

36

·:f»mperty So1d December .31, 1971

_,:a,e-.on Sale Invoked

~nthly

Payments of $64.43

lT.operty Sold December 31, 1971
·:;f.llo.IDue •on Sa1e .Clause

-1iew .loan ,Amt. $8,474' Rate 7.75%

-:Dld J.oan Remains

"!1972-1989

.-197.2-1989

··'216 Monthly Payments of $73.74
~AL

@ $64.43

Payments Received $21,538

~1 6

.

-

· ·:rorAL .:Payments Recei ved

-_ :toss from rermval of due tm 'Sale- ..$2,209 .
;
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.

Monthly Payments of $64.43

.

..$19~329

"!$ale of -the property, ..December..3l, ."1968,.::the loan...hav.ing :the ..due :On sale
::c:lause is called, and the interest rate ·raised to the .current rate. of 7'1,
- ~isting
-~

in 1968. This results in

a~ew ·monthly

payment of $69.93. When

property is sold December 31., 1:9n., :the :.due on .sale ..clause is .again

~nvoked, and the interest rate . raised to

7.75%., again .the current lending

Tate. By invoking the due on sale clause, the total payments received frem
~his

.

~yments
~

.

.

.

loan over the 25 year period amount _to $21,538, whereas the total
received from ·the loan not having the due on sale clause amount

$19,329. The loss from removal

~2,109,

of~he ~ue

on sale. clause amounts _to

approximately 22% of ·the original amount

.In the absence of -the due -on -sale

cla~se,

~f the~rtgage

loan •

the 1110rtgage lender -would

had to ·charge a ·rate to the original borrower of approximately 7%,

~ave

·

:instead 1lf the actual .£% rate .charged. The due on sale clause., .while allowing
,.the association .to mai_ntain its mortgage .p ortfolio ·nearer current mortgage
_-yields,

~lso

allows

~t

;to .maintain lower li!l"!ding Tates at -each -point in

·tfme. ·
Jn :~he
~

absence of this clause, ·the lender would have to be-prepared

llCcept a .maturity as long .as :tilir.ty _years on a -majority ·of its loans.

.
-~he-due

on .sale clause

.

-plus ~nther

-prepayments -of -mortgage loans nave··resulted

4n-i!n ·average life of 1DOTtgage cloans ·-of 8 to 12 years~ Secondary ·mortgage
-warket operations generally assume .,cln .average mortgage life of 12 years.
miE .CONSEQUENCES OF EUMINATlNG "THE DUE ON SALE CLAUSE
•

·':A$ ""tile --previous

. 11ft~ective
~oans

and

section -demonstrated,

:the ·:.due~n

sale .:clause provides

mechanism for ~hor.tening -of '"tbe -~ver~ge ·maturity

sh~ring

the

~rket .-orintere~

o~

l110rtgage

rate risk between the association

.end· its ..customers. abe due ~on -sale ·clause, by shortening.
-maturities
and
.
.

· -14?- . ...

. .41a'fnt aining portfo1Jo yields • .helps :to·-maintain .t he :supply of mortgage
~dit

at a reasonable interest

~ .:.potential

~ate.

lJimination of the clause

~Y

not .aid

purchaser and . will i nCTease ..the :cost of all ·mortgage _credit.
-:£f fect on the Borrower

1n fmfnat ion of the
due·on sale clause would appear
.
-~otential

~o

favor
the
.

home purchaser. But increasing home prices nullify the benefits of

4tssuming an

e~isting

·mortgage. Table 7 shows the price behavior of a

Mest ern home originally purchased in 1967. -As the table .shows, the price
bas increased from $26,000 to

$37~200

over the

peri~d

1967 to 1973. The

...annual rate of price ·increase over this .period has been

6~08%

per

year~

with

·.d r.amatic increases in 1972 and 1973. A 75% loan originally negotiated in
:l 967 ~would provide only a 46% 1oan-to-price ratio by 1973. :Thus the potential

:purchaser

~ould

have to eome up with

~sh

covering 54% of the purchase price.

l n t he absence of such a cash down payment, the purchaser must buy on contract,
~obtain

a purchase money mortgage from the se1ler, ·or

~btain.a

second mortgage

-from an outside party. Table 8 illustrates the -problem faced by the

h~me

buyer ·

.....wishing to assume an existing mortgage. A buyer 1'Urchasing (in Dec.- 1973)

.:.a 'typical house
-lii!Ore

constructed~

-sold, .and fl11anced in 1967 could afford to .:pay no

t han 9.46% interest--on -a 'Second111or.tgage 1tf "25 years -term if he

~ishes

to

~leep

his total monthly payment at or · be1ow~he pa~e~t on ·a new loan (Dec.,
1973). 9 But a 9.5~ rate· is well ·be1ow~he -rate normally charged by a second

.~gage

lender--second mortgage rates are often ·in the range of 15% to 18%.

1rhe .unwary buyer ·may mistakenly think it .advantageous to assume the current
~'~gage

and negotiate a second ·mor.tqage-4!t. a ·rate :substantially higher than

D

-:9It -"is unli ke1y -that the borroWer w111 be able to obtain a .- maturjty of
·25 years with a junior instrument. t1uch of the secondary financing will
- ~corporate substantial balloon payments which were partially responsible for
·;the mortgage crises existing in the depression.
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- ~"7ABLE 7
AVERAGE SALE PRICE OF
.-A iYPICAL 1967 HOf-1E IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES1
,/.-

-1f£AR1.y

1967

I

-ANNUAL%

-s

-pRICE

YEAR

"'

-cHANGE

·CHANGE FROM
1967

-.26,100

1968

-27.,000

.3.45

-3.45

.1969

.::29,100

7.78

5.59

'1970

-3o,·ooo

3.09

'4.75

1971

30,-fiOO

2.00

4.06

,972

..32,800

7.19

:4.-68

1]973

-:17~200

13.41

:6.08

.

1 lypical house is defined as the average house sold in 1967. Western
-4 Jnited States includes Mountain States and Pacific Coast area.
- ~ource:
Construction Reports -'•Price. Index of _New One-family Houses ·
·.sold 11 • June, 197411 Department of Commerce~

·,

,/

-14~-

. .
<

-

0

-mmu:...a
.mEFINANCING VERSUS A SECOND ·-MORTGAGE

0

,--

··Original Cost
0

.,.Original Loan1

. .· .3967

~.:$26,1 00.'00

l967

- ~ 9;575.00

cMonthly Payment2 at 6.5% and
25 years maturity

$

.Loan Balance-end of-1973

1973

.$17.,281.00

-·-loan cRequired -end -of 1973 ·for
75% -loan
·

•:$27 ,900.00

"Payment required of ::$27 ;900 1oan
~f 25 years at 8.5%3
.

~

-+.Additional Financing required for
7.5S loan if purchase money mortgage
-.1lr -second .mortgage is .used
~~hest

rate

~rtgage 25

payabl~ ~n

year tenm4

132.17

=244.66

··.:$]0,-619. 00

second

1 -75% loan-to-~rice ratio -based on national average loan-to-price
---ntios of 73.6~. FHLBB -Journal, March~ 19!0., Pg. 29.
-·-:z .;.;Based on ·national :average -~ffective -:rates of 6.. 46% ..
"'3 -'National average 'effective -rate "'n ·new loans made at savings and loan
-4ssociations December, 1973. FHLEB -Journal, Oct. 1974.
~

This is the highest interest ~ate ~ayable by the borrow~r on a
to keep his total monthly payment at $224.66 or less.

~rtgage

-.
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~econd

.""··. . . _

Jlis break-even -r ate. Elimination
~

~of ·:the :due

proliferation of second mortgage

-·~elatively
~purc~aser.
~r

.nn ··s ale clause could result in

instrumen~s

providing

.

•

credi~

at a

.

high rate, with little or .no -net .benefit 'to the potential home·

.-

It may also result in a large ·number of purchase money mortgages

real estate contracts which tend to tie up the liquidity of the home

seller. These real estate contracts or

purch~se

money mortgages are

·Telatively high risk, low liquidity investments. The proliferation of such
jnstrumenis

~oes

not seem to serve the public interest.

·:Effect :on Mortgage lending and The Mortgage Instrument
ln~valuating
-~f

1 1)
I

'the -due on sale

the possible
clause~

~ffects

on the lender of-the elimination

at li!ast three possibilities should be examined;

savings and loan associations will -absorb the reduction in net

in~ome

. arithout effects .on other -parties, 2) mortgage. lenders will switch to variable
~dnterest

rate mortgages·
as a substitute for. ·the due on sale clause, and
.

3)lmortgage lenders will continue to offer.fixed rate ~ortgages, but at
substantially higher. interest rates.
\:ilhsorption uf ..losses .By .Sav.il'lgs and ·.Loan ·Associations

·.

:savings -and ·loan 'associations -:are·:extremely ~fficient in the handling

-~f'the

public's funds --and receive a 'Sma11 -margin ·per dollar of funds handled.

:Table 9 shows the relationship between -the --major income and expense items

.

.

-for savings and loan associations in the, 11th Federal Home Loan Bank Qistrict,
.;comprised of .California, .Arlzona .and -Nev.ada. Out .of -each $100 of .mortgages
..field, :the association receives :-only ..about .·$1.46 to cover all operating
- ~enses

and provide
adequate ·net-;ncome. to the association.. The entire cost
.

--Df.~perating .a savings anc( loan association ;s only about Si .25 per year per
---151- .

. .

:

:'UBLE 9
~OST

.

.

.

OF FUNDS Arm INTEREST RETURN

:.Ott MORTGAGES FOR SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
.
...... ;.--

·JNTEREST PER
$100 OF
1-tORTGAG ES~
YEAR

AVERAGE COST AVAILABLE FOR OPERATING
PER $100 OF
OPERATING
EXPENSES
FUNDSb
PER $100 OF
EXPENSES
r~ORTGAGESc
AND INCOr~E ·

NET MARGINd

1965

$6.37

. .$4.73

$1.64

$1.24

$0.40

1966

.$6.34

:$5.03

.$1 ...31

$1.24

·$0.07

1967

$6.. 39

$5.19

.$1 ..""20

$1.21

-$0.01

1968

•$6.52

.$5..10

:$1.42

$1 .. 22

$0.20

, .969

$6.71

·.$5.23

.$1..48

:$1.."26

•$0.22

l-970

$6."92

•$5.·62

$1-30

$1 .. 31

-$0.01

1971

$7 .. 13

. .$5.1>0

$1 ..33

$1.25

"$0~28

.;:')972

$7.21

15.56

. $1..-1)5

$1.22

$0.43

7=1973

$7 .. 34

'$5.73

$1..61.

$1.32

$0.28

~-?AVERAGE

NET MARGIN 1965 - 1973

= $0.21

.aBased on fi.gures for the ·11th Federa1 -flome loan Bank District, FHLBB
1974,. p.33,34 •

~ournal~ October~

. ~lbid.
-~Based :on figures for all savings and loan associations. All ·operating
are implicitly assigned to -mortgage lending by this technique.
].974 Savings and Loan Fact Book, p.95 and 104.

~sts

~Net Margin will difrer from ~et income mainly because the association

-~as

equity funds

~hich

are cost free in .an accounting sense.
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"

-

-=$100 of mortgages held. ln the ·l)eriod -shown .by 'the
~rgin
~r

.table~

the average

available for the-association's net income ,amounted to only $0.21

.

$100 of mortgages held •

. ]n ~e hypothetical exampl~s presented .in the previous section,. the

l oss of the due on sale clause would have cost nearly one dollar per year
per $100 of .association mortgage loans outstanding. This is nearly five
~mes

the $0.21 net margin available for net income. While the hypothetical

~ple pres~nts

circumstances~

only one set of

it is indicative of the

It is -un1i-ke 1y tha:t the due on sa 1e c1ause

··impact of the due on sa1e c1ause.

flas an overall impact as low .as one half of

1~.

However, even this figure

·1represents nearly twice the spread between the yield on mortgages and the
400St

of funds plus operating

~ciations

could not easily absorb the losses generated by the elimination

.1Df·the due on sale ·clause. If it
· ~f

It is clear that savings and loan

~xpenses.

to be eliminated, either the method

~ere

granting mortgage credit must change, or mortgage interest rates must rise.

~he · Substitution

of Variable

In~erest

Rate Mortgages For the Due on Sale Clause

been shown, the due on sale clause operates to effectively
.
.
.··:show ten the maturity 1>f .an association's mortgage loan portfolio; alterna~-~s

·~ve1y, ·it -~uld

be .described as

a ·~echanism

to keep ·mortgage

.-.:as close as possible to current mortgage .market Tates.
·.1due ·on sale clause,

i~

portfol~o

.. yields

In the absence of the

is possible that associations would turn to the

· v.triable interest rate mortgage.
1rhe variable interest rate mortgage is
-is .adjusted from time to time based ..on

so~~

~ ·mortgage

whose interest rate

.predetennined market index or

· =4'01mul·a. This mechanism can'11leet "the basic ,needs of the .association in
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:" ·

0

..

· '1be -o nly financially rational :reason -f'or borrowers -objecting ·to 1:he
~ue

0

on sale clause is that it eliminates :the -subsidy of a ·low-;nterest Tate

-~ich

...

can be shared between the or iginal

borro~er

and the subsequent purchaser

M -t he -property. Under the -variable interest -rate mortgage, the purchaser
.
.
.of a property, having an existing -mortgage loan, would be required to pay
current mortgage rates. This is .exactly the same condition th_a t is _imposed
~~nder

the due on sale contract.

~igher Rates for .Fixed Rate Mortgages
~hould

..

the .due on sale clause be eliminated, the ·fixed

ra~e

mortgage

$.YS'tem will be maintained at least for a .portion of mortgage lending; however, .
~rrent

mortgage rates required at each .point in time-will be higher. The

· ~limination of -the due on -sale ·clause, .by extending the effecti ve -m aturity of
·..ar'tgage loans, would -greatly increase· the market -risk facing the mortgage
:)ender. ihis higher level of market -risk wuld'·require lenders -to raise the
:·-i nterest rate

~n

·mortgages. The Testricted entry into -banking activities,

· including mortgage lending, creates
-"'by

~ilities.

- ·~..,rtgage

~onopoly

.powers sinrtlar to those

e~joyed

'This, -combined .with the ·existence of a substantial body of

loans below -cun-ent··111arket -Tates, in -effect ·:creates a tax and

"3Ubsidy. ln 'Order for ·past'iloTTOWers··to ·-continue -to ·1mjoy the low interest
--:-. ontes, .current .borrowers must :be .:charged rates sufficient to meet "the cost
~ funds

for their own mortgage plus an amount necessary to overcome the
.
.
-ldeficiency cr~ated by the below-market ·rate mortgages. A tax on ·new borrm'lers
··;:is ·:created
- ~·-no

in nrder -:to -f.und the :.Subsidy :to existing borrowers. ihere seems to

social purpose served by -such .a n income --transfer., and the ~unfavorab1e

--effects 'lDaY be substantial. ·An -; -ncrea.se in"1110rtgage ·interest rates would act
- .-.s ·.a -depressant on the ilousing .industry ·by

·wew housing.
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decrea~ing

·effective--demand -for

~..due

.on sale · provision~ -then,

-serve~

:several purposes:

1) ·Precludes the generation of a subsidy from current borrowers to

.

.."'"lJast borrowers by reducing the ~number of below-market interest rate

,__._,rtgages.
:2) ·Increases the availability
~ortfolios
- ~r.tgage

of~ortgage funds~

Keeping mortgage

at current competitive yields allows the attraction of additional

funds in the market.

3) 1leduces the llrol iferation -of second mortgages and purchase money
·iiDOrtgages. These 1110rtgages .are high -r isk assets to the lender;, .and

~xpensive

u the borro\'ler. In sonie - cases the borrower -may ultimately be worse off
-~th -~

£Ombination assumption ·and second mortgage than if he had _obtained a

-~ first

mortgage at current interest -rates.

~) :J\llows the ~continued . lending of mortgage funds on a long-term

·fixed interest rate basis, thus s hi_e lding the

borro~er

:from the risk of

4nterest ·rate changes.
3) ·nimination of the ilue .:an sal~ clause may -requjre mortgage lenders

..:to .use variable interest rate mortgages or short term mortgages with a large
~lloon ~aymen~.

;-.:. Mortgage law and Tegulation should assure that mortgage lending
c~sti tutions
~ve

do not have to live with mortgage

~ortfolios

whose maturities

been unreasonably extended.
·:Statute -and ·regulation -should ·recognize 'the right of lnOrtgage lenders

~

call or terminate :the mortgage .upon -:the.:.Sale -of the property.

'4:0Diiii ~nt

No implied

to future purchasers- :should be .incorporated in ·the ·execution of

, ,.... ...IOrlgage.
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~HIBIT B
!!:CRL.;SED CO!·:PE.TI'Jl8~l IS ADV:)CA'l'ED TO INCf'.EASE AVAILABILITY OF
CCJ':-'SU!·~.n !..CIP.!\S rOR ?J:.DUCLD l!~':'ER:CST RATES. by Stanley Zimmerman

EXCi'RPTS FROM:

At P. 109

CONSUhi:R CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES
Report of The National Commission on Consumer Finunce
December 1972.

Availability and market rate are so . related tnat
legally determined rates may adversely affect availability and that of course would constrict the use of
re:.te ceilings as ea poliC}' tool benefiting all consumers."
11

"A highly competitive market exists when the number
of sellers is so large and entry is so easy that no
seller has power over price (in this study, annual
percentage rate).
Price is determined by the intera-:ting forces of supply and demand."
At P. 110

B. t•:hen a few firms possess market power in a particular
market, they may charge higher than . competitive market
prices if it is more profitable for them to do so. 11

At P .. 112

"Competitive conditions are a major determinant of rates
and availability in the many state markets in which lega l
ceilings are sufficiently high to leave the market rate
unaffected ...

11

11

Empirical evidence indicates that rate ceilings that
impinge on market rates are also associated with substantial reductions in credit supply."
At P. 113

"In general, any kind of market imperfection-any restriction which tends to inhibit the free interactions
of potential borrowers and suppliers of credit-can have a
potential effect on credit availability. Such market.
imperfections include legal constraints, regardless of
intent, as well as noncompetitive behavior of suppliers.
L~gal factors of most potential significance are rate
ceilings, restrictions on other credit terms such as lo~n
size and maturity, limitations on creditors' remedies,
and legal constraints on the entry of new firms.
"The restrictive effect on availability can occur in two
basic forms: a price effect and a nonprice rationing
e=fect. 11

At: P. !14

.. Barriers to entry. Because the principles of free co:-:-.petition are based in part on ease of entry for new
suppliers, any barriers to entry can lessen competition.
:Oarrier'=> are not limited to th·~ commercial bank, credit
union and =inance company seccors studied by the Corn:n!. S S: i011. u
"AJlother E' ignifican t leqal barrier in consumer credit
markets is that of convenience and advantage (C&A)
licensing for finance c ompanies under many state laws.
By limiting licenses under strict construction of the
law to offices that serve the .. convenience" and "advantaq,
of the comnunity, states
inhibit comfetition from new firl
, cc

"Althou~h the intent of C&A licensinq is purportedly
to encouraqe the qrowth of the size of loan offices to
attain cconor.ics of scale, misdirected application of
the rule can lead to substantial lack of competition.
!·1oreover, Cor..mission studies reveal no significant
econorr.ies of scale."

At P. 136

"Legal rate ceilings may reduce the price of personal
loan credit to some borrowers, but when ceilings are
sufficiently low to affect the observed market rate in
a significant way, there is a substantial reduction in
the number of borrowers included in the legal market."
" •••• the only truly effective way of
supplies of personal loan credit for
reasonable rates too, is to increase
simultaneousiy relaxing inordinately
ceilings."

At P. 137

gaining ample
consumers and
competition while
restrictive rate

"With respect to new commercial bank entry, there has
been in the past an excessive concern on the part of
chartering and regulatory authorities for the protection
of the profitability of existing bank in~titutions and
the presumed "needs and convenience" of the public. Too
little emphasis has been given to the vigor of bank competition and relying on such competition to provide
optima~ performance in terms of price and availability.
The economics of entry have been summarized by Donald
Jacobs.
"If the rate of return is low in an area, no new bank will
seek to enter.
Restrictions on entry in these cases are
redundant.
In areas where the rate of return on capital
is high, entry restrictions may impede the free flow of
new capital. At best, the economic effects of entry
restrictions are redundant; at worst, they are harmful.
"The presence of deposit insurance wil•l continue to
protect depositors' funds and current supervisory standards will continue to preserve the safety and soundness
of commercial banks in an environment where there is
liberalized entry chartering and more vigorous competition ...

At P. 138

"i~i th respect to regulations restricting entry of finance
companies in the market, the Commission finds no value in
"Convenience and !>.dvantage 11 limitations on entry. There·
is ample evidence indicating that these and similar restrictions are disadvantageous to the publie and should be
abolished. The Commission recommends that the only
criterion for entry (license) in the finance company segment of the consumer credit market be good character, and
that the right to market entry not be based on any
minimum capital requirements or convenience and advantage
regulations."

At P.l47

.,Rate cei~lings . in many states restrict the supply __ of
_
credit and eliminate creditworthy borrowers from consur..er
credit markets. Some seek out less desirable alternatives,
such as low quality credit sellers and illegal lenders.
Furthermore, many borrm'lers who are not rejected pay rates
of charge higher than they would be charged in workably
competitive ffiarkets." ,1:'...,

"T~·.e Cc:-.:--:!0.:-.:.on· recor.:·!t.:.:-JC=:s t!"'.<::t n~licies C::E=:i~r.e:=: to
promote co~netition · should be qiven the first priority,
with adjust~ent of rate ceilings used as a complement
to expand the availability of credit. As the development of workably competitive markets decreases the need
for rate ceilings to combat market power ·in concentrated
markets, . such ceilings may be rai~ed or removed ...

"Rate ceilings below those indicated in Commission studies
may tend to inhibit the functioning of a competitive market
and restrict the availability of consumer credit. Such
states should also monitor the effect on high risk borrowers since lower rate ceilings tend to eliminate such
borrowers from the legal consumer credit markets."
At P. 162

"Encouragement of competition is imporant to consumers
because it provides the most efficient means of making
credit available to them at reasonable prices. Pu1: anothex
way, competition can eliminate any monopolistic profits
of credit grantors and drive from the market the least
efficient creditors.
If competition can be made to work, • •
" ••• financial responsibility, experience, character, ·and
general fitness."
"If th~ commissioner shall find ••• that allowing such
applicant to engage in business will promote the convenience and advantage of the community ••• "

At. P. 163

" ••• firms with licenses try to prevent the issue of
additional licenses to potential competitors, ••• "
"Restrictions on bank entry have generally been justified
in the name of deposit safety. But it is difficult to see
what public policy objectives are fostered by a "convenience and advantage" test for financ~ companies other
than perhaps preserving a higher than average level of
profits for banks and finance companies •••
"One can perhaps understand the opposition of bankers and
some finance companies to a repeal of convenience and
advantage restrictions on entry. Such an action might
well jeopardize their monopolistic profits ...
''One of the ~ost effective ways competition serves consumer interests is in the development of new products
and services."

At P. 165

" .•. to provide for Federal chartering or l'icensing in an
attempt to override legal impediments to effective competition in the highrisk market. Federally chartered
fina!1ce companies may be able legally to ignore restrictive state laws that inhibit competition in consumer credit.
". ~ ~efJ9.;-1:§__ ~_!1q~ld._p~ ---~-n~d~_;-~a!ceD_ _to _ p§!r~-~~~e _the states
to remove from existing laws and regulations anticornpeti 1:i •,
(and, by extension, anticonsumer) restrictions on entry
and innovation.
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EXHIBIT C
The following presentation was made before the Assembly Finance
and Insurance Committee on November 12, 1974, in Los Angeles.

Mr. Chairman and Members, my name is Richard E.
Ratcliff.

I represent the California Bankers Association.

We

are here today to discuss with you the subject matter of your
hearing which covers the costs associated with the financing of
real property transactions.
In the past, the California Bankers Association has
sponsored more than several bills, dating back some four years,
covering part of the subject matter of your hearing.
of these are:

(1)

The most recent

A.B. 105 by Assemblyman Deddeh, which would

limit the late charges to 10% of the payment due.

This bill was

not passed by the Legislature, rather, it was hung up in joint
conference committee.

Part of the problem was the appearance on

the scene of the Garrett case.
(2)

The second bill was A.B. 2114 by Assemblyman

Hayden, which would have limited prepayment penalties to six
months interest on the unpaid balance less 20%.

This was to be

effective for a period of 7 years from the date of execution of
the deed of trust.

The bill was amended on the floor of the Senate

to be the same as the provision which is cuxrently within S.B. 200,
which is also before you in this interim study.

Because of the

amendment, it was not acceptable to the proponents, and thus, the
bill died in the Senate.

passed and signed by the Governor and is Chapter 925 of the
Statutes of 1973.

This bill prohibits the lender from making an
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impound account a condition of making the loan.
We feel that this indicates that the C.B.A. believes
that reasonable, workable legislation in some areas should be
adopted.

We have tried, but for various reasons these measures

have not been adopted.
In our testimony today, we would like to do the
following:
of funds.

First, sketch generally the present sources and flow
Second, discuss with you the importance of the second-

ary market as one of the forces which must be considered.
discuss the Federal National Mortgage

Ac~or

Third,

Fannie Mae, and the

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac, their treatment
of charges and some other provisions which are contained in standard
notes and security agreements of these organizations.

Fourth,

we would like to indicate how banks generally function in these
areas.

Fifth, we would like to reserve some time during the

November 22 hearing in San Jose to present some specific suggestions
for legislation to be considered by this Committee.
Throughout my testimony, I -will be

talkip~

about
-------·~·-~

conventional real estate loans except where we indicate that the
r-··-··--------·-·-·-··-·····-·--·--·..·-·-·-·····-··----·· ....... -·--··--··---· .. -· .. _________ ..•·-------------·-- ---

information available is with regard to F.H.A. and V.A. loans.
Also, we are talking about residential lending, as it is our understanding that the intention of the Committee is to cover the areas
of conventional, F.H.A. and V.A. lending as it applies to residential
lending for consumers who are in the market for, or who are involved
with, residential real estate loans and financial transactions.

-160-

I.

SOURCES AND FLOW OF FUNDS

The sources and flow of funds in residential lending
and residential transactions are obviously the most important parts
of the entire picture.

From the lender's viewpoint, if the funds

are not available or are available in a restricted fashion, then
his difficulties of making real estate loans are obvious.
For the first source of funds, the lender has the
basic funds

w~thin

the institution involved.

have two 'rin-bank" sources:
.... __ .
savings deposits.

For instance, banks

commercial/checking deposits and

By nature these are short-term funds, i.e., the

depositor can retrieve them either on demand or within a relatively
short period of time.

Real estate lending obviously involves the

placing of funds on a long term basis ••••• twenty to thirty years
normally.
The secondary market is the other source of funds.
The

hist~rical

or

~~~~~~t~onal

secondary market consists of insurance

panks, large savings
banks,.
.. - ......and
-.
. loans,
'. .
or other institutions and even individuals which have the ability
compani~
... -

--

easte.~~~~y!ngs

---- -~- w

_ ___ . ,

and the desire to commit their funds on a long-term basis to a
lender in order that the lender can then place those funds in the
real estate market and sell the mortgage obligation to that investor.
It is this part of the market that we feel is extremely important.

II.

THE SECONDARY MARKET

Historically, California has had housing needs far
beyond our ability to generate sufficient long-term funds to meet
that need.

Because of

thi~,

a~~ ~ende~~ ~n
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Calitornia that have

had any impact in this market have relied on the secondary market
as a supplementary if not a primary source of needed funds.
are certain "rules of the game":

There

those that need the funds are hard

put to negotiate entirely favorable terms against those that have
the funds, especially in a competitive market.

This is true

whether you are the California lender attempting to get eastern
funds or whether you .are a California borrower attempting to get
1

funds from a California lender.
The point of this comment is that the funds are negotiated and the terms tend to be dictated by the one who has control
of those funds.

The person who invests the funds has to

recov~r

his costs, has to make a profit and has to, in some fashion,
control the return of these funds under some kind of contractual agreement.

Again, this is true whether it is a California

lender (who is in the borrower's position when he goes to the
secondary market) or whether it is a California borrower.
Generally, the large investors, wi~ available lon.g- -· -.,_·- ...... --- - ·- --- .. ~-- ----term funds which constitute the secondary market, have been ~-~-·~·- -··

- --

--- -·- ...

-·

--

position to set the terms bY... wbi....c.h__thQ.~~ -:------------·----·------ ·---·--

funds .~ are
.

placed when a
. - - ···

bank
ventures
forth to locate a block of funds that can be used
__ _. ___.....
..... . ... ..... .
- ·· .. __ .
--- ....... -. ------ -by the bank in real estate lending. The in~:~_:t.~-;- _:reviews _!:h~.
---~-- ·-- -~-

lender's policy on ...suoh . things_.as_...t.he __f.Qpn of the note used, the
• •

-

r"

•

-

form qf the mortgage or
..

s~on~,

...

. -

d~gg ~f

~repayment charges,
. --- - . ·-· ---·-

--

~

•

· - . ... .. __ _ ....

-

... - - -

•••

-

•

----

trust including late charge provi•

·0

-

I

-

••

-

•

-

-

due on sale . provisions, assumption
-- ----

policies and other provisions.
to creditworthy borrowers on

Their interest is to ensure loans

t~rm~

that

iqs~re _timely

generally productive investment of their funds.
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payment and a

If their funds

0

can be placed elsewhere under more productive terms, it is
obviously more difficult
housing market.

t~

get those funds into the California

Also, if one type of lender has more freedom

to meet these demands, that particular lender has an advantage
over other lenders who are not permitted to meet these demands on
the same free basis.

It is for this reason that we feel that

lenders in California, regardless of type, whether they are bank,
savings and loan, mortgage banker, or mortgage loan broker, so
long as they are active in the area of supplying funds and supplying lending to those who want to purchase residential real property, all
should be under the general over-all rules of the game as established
by the Legislature.

Credit unions and others that periodically

get involved in this market, including individual sellers, we
feel should be in no better position to extract a more onerous
agreement than any other lender.

III.

FNMA & FHLMC
Recent developments in the area have resulted in

reaction to some of the difficulties in the market.

There are

cycles in the flow of funds that have had little to do with housing
needs.

Rather they are cycles that are determined by the general

economic situation within the United States and, at times, the
world.

Federal legislation and federal activity has resulted in an

easier entry into this market.
One example would be the Federal National Mortgage Act

- - --

or- Fannie Mae, a - public -corporation -which was created to obtain
funds
-·--------·
--- . __
____. , ... ..- -·--··. ------------ -·-...
either from the normal second~~y market or from investment in the

---

~

-

.__..,

__

''-..., , -
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... ...... -........

_,______

_,,.

-··

bond market.

The activity in the bond market converts short

term investments of others into money which can then be used on
a long-term basis.
Another example is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
•
Corporation, or Freddie Mac, which is a private corporation formed by

------- --

the Federal Home Loan Bank system. The program is designed to
. . - . . - -. ---- ..
accomplish
the same ends as Fannie Mae. There is a third progr~,
-- ·- ----· · --··· .. .. --·- -- . . - .. ·- .. . . . . . ·-· ·--. ·- ..
~ .

~--- ~-

the Government
National Mortgage Act, or Ginnie Mae, which is a
.
-- - -- . -. _.. division of H.U.D.

It is another device of the same nature and

i's in the process of development with regard to conventional loans.
They have various subsidized programs but are just beginning their
conventional loan program.

Because of being in a developing state,

GNMA will not receive much further comment in this presentation.
Under present tight money conditions, FNMA and FHLMC have
---------~-----~ -~..:~- -~-- ·~

------.

-- ------------- --- .

become the primary sources of funds for residential real
. - estate
. __ _____ ... _, __

- -·-·l•. .- . . . . .

_...,

...

·~~--pCDL----1'~-------.,.,-

lending activity by both savings

and _~oans

and banks.

The problem is

that:~ e&_o_n~.,ll~ic:>;;~:-_~;~i~;i~Y -~rke~o~s ~~t h~v~ at ~:_1 _:_~es
sufficient
....__________. funds available at a sufficiently reasonable cost to be
able to convert those into a saleable home loan at a price that the
normal borrower is able to pay.

It was because of this that FNMA

and FHLMC were formed and they present to us all an entry point into
the market.

Primarily, their source of funds under present conditions

have come from the bond market, as indicated, rather than from the
secondary market because there they run into the same problems that
lenders from California have if they go direct.

The importance·of

-----

--- -- --

FNMA and FHLMC· to th-is ~-~'?~i~t_e~ _lies . in that
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tl!~~ h~ve stand.a~g

provisions covering some fees and some provisions which are being
- -----..- ---··-- ·-·-·- ------.. -··discussed before the committee during this series of hearings.
-·-· - ---- - The lender, if utilizing these sources of funds, need
--- ~

not use those standards unless he sells the mortgage obligation
either to FNMA or FHLMC.

At this point, the terms of the agreement

with the borrower become those required by FNMA or FHLMC.

In addition,

FHLMC has standard forms which must be used if sale to FHLMC is
contemplated.

These forms generally

~re

acceptable to FNMA.

However,

they have some differences in policies and approach.
The manner in which the lender uses these devices
(FNMA and FHLMC) should also be discussed.

gene_!ally the __l_e~~er_

p~ys

a

With re ard to FNMA,

C<?~ent f~~- ofe lL~~ of.__!~.-9.! __1/2

"point"
based upon the . funds. needed.
..,--. ·--.,.· -·
....
-- .

The commitment agreement which

-

results from this process includes provisions whereby FNMA will buy

----

the mortgage placed by the lender from him at a certain value.
...
.
..... -- ---~--------.
.
FHLMC works in the same manner when banks deal with FHLMC: banks
-

pay a 1/2 point "nonmember fee" rather than the eg\l_a_l
of commitment fee.

_¥~MA_ ~ype

However, the result is really the same.

F.H.A. and V.A. programs are programs which guarantee
the payment of the loan and provide that if a qualified housing
unit and a qualified borrower can be funded through FNMA or FHLMC,
then these market entry devices can also be used to produce funds
for real estate lending which can then be regulated under F.H.A.
or V.A. programs which, of course, are subject to the federally
regulated provisions of F.H.A. or V.A.

These provisions regulate

the mortgage and note form and become the conditions of the loan
.
to the borrower. Included are late payment charges, prepayment
charges and the like.
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FNMA and FHLMC have become the most active and
available fund sources for several reasons:
bond market funds,

(2)

(1)

their access to

the savings outflow and federal competition

for funds problems that banks and savings and loans have shared in
recent months,

(3)

these devices convert short-term funds to

long-term funds which are then available for the real estate
market, and (4) the necessity that lending institutions in California
have to go beyond their own in-house sources of funds.
At this point, I would like to discuss the approach
that FNMA and FHLMC have to the various provisions which are
included in the hearing notice preceding this meeting.
A.

LATE CHARGES

Generally, a late charge is a charge to encourage
the borrower to meet his legal obligations in a timely manner.

It

also serves to compensate the lender for his losses due to nonpayment
by the borrower.
to foreclose.

This is a technical default entitling the lender

However, C.C.P. Section 580b, the anti-deficiency

legislation enacted in the 1930's, forces the lender to bring
foreclosure and to sue on the security for the loan rather than
for the payment due under the note, since if they do the latter,
the lender would waive his rights under a deed of trust.

Therefore,

the lender obviously attempts to get payment without going to
foreclosure because of the expense and because of the emotional
impact of a foreclosure proceeding, if nothing else.

Failing this,

however, the lender is left only with foreclosure as the enforcement
device.
F.H.A. provides for 2% of the payment due charge based
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0
upon a payment including impound account amounts which are required
under federal law.
V.A. loans provide for a 4% charge figured on the
same basis.

0

FNMA

has a 4% on the payment due charge, but in this

case the payment due is computed by only including the principal
and interest and not the impound accounts.

0

FHLMC

has generally the same approach as FNMA.

The conventional secondary market is the remaining
source of funds.

0

These provisions vary.

Generally, what has

happened historically is that the sources of funds have reviewed
individual lenders policies.

If they find they are agreeable to

the source of funds, then they make the funds available to the

0

lender relying on the lender's expertise in evaluating the loan,
placing the loan and enforcing and servicing the loan,
late charge provisions.

including

If the late charge provision of the

individual lender is not acceptable to the conventional secondary
source of funds, then those funds are not made available to that
lender.
I would like to make some comments on late charges.
The F.H.A., V.A. programs indicateoneapproach to late charges.
FNMA and FHLMC present another.

If the lender is lending for his

own portfolio there may be different problems.
The Garrett

case held that a particular late charge

provision was invalid as a penalty which the Legislature had not
au~hor~zed.

At

tha~ -p~ int,

the Court decided that as that

p~nalt~

was invalid the case had to be discussed in terms of actual damages
to the lender because of the failure of the borrower to pay as he
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was obligated under contract.

The case also discussesliquidated

damages as the present provisions of the code which should regulate
the lender's position.

Liquidated damages provisions must be

reasonably related to damages to the lender in the event of nonpayment.
The California Bankers Association feels that a proper
approach by the Legislature would be to enact legislation setting
a maximum charge.

We have advocated 10% in the past.

This has

apparently not been acceptable in view of the Legislature's refusal
to pass such a provision.

We would suggest 6% at this time in view

of the fact that 6% is the penalty charged by the State on late tax
payments and by counties on late property tax payments.
of fact, the county charge is a flat 6%.

As a matter

Assuming a missed

December payment, annualize that payment, it comes to some 12%.

The

same approach taken with the April payment, if that should be missed,
annualizes to a set rate of 24%.

After the late charge portion of

the county tax charges there is available a redemption procedure
which provides, in essence, for 1% per month interest cost on the
funds that are due.

We feel that 6% reaches the "threshold of pain"

level necessary to encourage timely payment, which is vital to all
lenders, especially in view of the fact the lender cannot sue to
force a late payment, he can only foreclose.

Failure to adopt this

approach will result in a continuing 10% late charge policy by some
lenders.
At this point, I would like to refer you to the discussion earlier this morning -by the - savings- and loan

indu~try.

At that time, they indicated that the missing of a payment on a
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0

FHLMC or a FNMA loan results in a disallowance or disqualification

0

of that loan for trade in the FNMA or FHLMC market.

That being the

case, the lender is precluded from turning those funds over and
receiving more funds.

0

This is just one of the indications of the

importance, from our viewpoint, of the late charge provision.
The late charge provision is especially important to us in view
of the fact that,

0

for payment.

practically speaking, the lender cannot sue

He can only foreclose.
B.

PREPAYMENT PROVISIONS

This provision permits the lender to impose a charge
0

on the borrower.
he wants out.

The borrower agreed on a long term contract.

Now

This provision is designed to compensate the lender

for the unilateral change in the contract by the borrower.

I think

it is obvious that the lender in the same situation cannot go
to the borrower and say, "Well, we don't like the contract anymore, and
we would like to have all our money back."

Thus, the prepayment

provision is an attempt to cope with the lack of balance in this
case between the borrower and the lender.
F.H.A. and V.A. regulations provide that no prepayment
provision will be charged, but I think it is important to note the
seller must pay points upon selling that property to someone else.
The impact of the requirement that he pay points provides much the
same kind of readjustment that the normal prepayment charge provides.
FNMA requires no prepayment provision.

However, if

the loan is made on a FHLMC form, which is then acceptabie to FNMA,
the prepayment provision of FHLMC is unenforced during the time the
loan or mortgage obligation is held by FNMA.
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However, if they

subsequently sell it to another on the secondary market, that prepayment penalty becomes enforceable.

I think it is interesting

to note that FNMA uses FHLMC's provision on prepayments on condominiums
and planned unit developments.

There was an article in the Wall

Street Journal just a short time ago that indicated that condominiums
made up some 14.5% of the 1973 new starts.

~

think that this indi-

cates that FNMA, while requiring no prepayment provision while they
hold the loan, does understand and accept the necessity of such a
payment when it comes time to sell that mortgage to a buyer in the
conventional secondary market.
FHLMC presents a different approach than FNMA.

They

have on their standard forms a required prepayment provision.

In

general, what that provision provides is that, if the prepayment
occurs during the first 3 years of the mortgage, the borrower must
pay an amount which "shall not be less than the maximum amount
allowed by Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations or such lesser
percentage as is the maximumpecrnissible under applicable law."
The maximum amount is found in Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Regulations in Section 555.15, Ruling No. 74-121, February 19, 1974.
In general, this provides that with regard to federal savings and
loans, they cannot charge a prepayment penalty that exceeds 6 months
interest on the excess of 20% of the original balance of the loan.
I think it is interesting to note that this provision permits the
provision to be enforceable for the duration of the loan.

Assuming

6 months interest, and a 10% loan, there is a 5% prepayment charge
after deducting 20% from the loan amount. _
The second part of the FHLMCnote provision sets forth that
if prepayment should occur during the fourth or fifth years of the obli-170-

0

gation the charge shall then be 3% of the original balance.

Thus, in

effect what happens is a two-stage, five-year prepayment provision.
The first three years shall be up to six months interest, the
next two will be a 3% charge, both based on the original balance
of the loan.

After the fifth year there is no charge.

.Further,

this prepayment penalty applies only if refinanced by other than
the holder of the note.
The conventional secondary market varies.

But

generally, it is handled in the same manner as discussed under
late charges.

The lenders have been free to do what they wish,

but in order to get funds, must conform to the demands and the
needs of the conventional secondary market.
The California Bankers Association has advocated six months
interest after the deduction of 20% is applied to the unpaid balance
of the loan.

This would prevail for 7 years.

This was included in

A.B. 2114 by Assemblyman Hayden in 1973, which I earlier indicated
died in the Senate.

It is interesting to note, however, that this

particular provision was inserted over the objection of the mortgage
loan brokers in S.B. 304 of 1973 and currently is in the law.

This

can be contrasted with the provision of S.B. 200 by Senator Gregorio,
where there would be a five year provision which would diminish by
20% each year so that after 5 years there would be no more charge.
The C.B.A. feels that the FHLMC provision would be
proper and workable and still provide a provision familiar to the
secondary market.

The provision of S.B. 200is a provision which is

unfamiliar to ±hat market and again, we feel that the secondary
market is what we have to aim at in order to ensure the flow of funds.
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FNMA and FHLMC have both recognized that necessity should they
have to sell mortgages in that market.

Further, it provides the

benefits, generally speaking, of S.B. 200 by recognizing the
5-year period of existence and the declining tendency of the
payments over the period of that 5 years.

One further point,

I earlier indicated that we feel that all lenders should be under
I

the same limitation.

The federal S & L's have their regulation

which presents a problem in this regard.

The same is true of

the mortgage loan brokers where the provisions of our A.B. 2114 were
incorporated in S.B. 304.

We feel that this Committee should

reconsider S.B. 304 as applied to mortgage loan brokers and should
somehow attempt to deal with the federal savings and loan provision.
Since the federal provision is an over-all limit as to what they
can do which would be higher than the FHLMC provision which we are
suggesting, competition would ope·r ate to bring federal savings and
loans down to provisions of FHLMC, should it be adopted, so that
they would then under the market restrictions be competitive with
other lenders.
C.

DUE ON SALE CLAUSES.

This provision gives the lender the right to accelerate
the debt in the event the borrower sells all or part of the property.
The reason for this provision is that the agreement is for a
long period of time.
not impossible.

Anticipating changes is very difficult if

If one party, the borrower, chooses to change one

important provision of the
else the security for the

contract, the term, to convey to someone
lo~n,

_then the lender

shou~d

be able to

call a halt and on theevent of the change of ownership, enter into
a new loan relationship.

This is often confused with acceleration
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0·

upon default because both are the right of acceleration for the
benefit of the lender.
F.H.A. and V.A. loans permit no due on sale provisions.
FNMA has no due on sale provision but again, if they
0

are utilizing FHLMC forms in making the loan, they don't enforce it.
However, a subsequent purchaser of the mortgage may enforce that
provision.
I think it is important to note at this point that if
there is no due on sale provision, there is no ability of the lender
to accelerate the loan obligation and that obligation continues.
One situation which can result is assumption.

If· there is no

assumption, however, that borrower remains liable in addition to
a new borrower who agrees to pick up the obligation for those payments.
From the lender's viewpoint, this presents a difficult problem.
protection of

c.c.P.

S~c.

The

580b still exists, but to collect from

the original borrower would force a waiver of the security in addition
to the fact that he has sold that security to another.
At the present time, lenders view the making of a
twenty or thirty year mortgage as one which probably will be prepaid
within a twelve year period, thus they regard the twelve year period
as one they should consider in setting interest rates and the rest.
If, however, the loan is one which is subject to some kind of
automatic assumption and the rate of that loan is, compared to
the present market, relatively low, obviously prepayment and refinancing will not occur.
loan

~h~_!: -~s

In those circumstances, the lender has a

__ g.Q~~g__1;Q _g.Q___~b~. fJ,tll __tem, ___ _wn_~_t._her__ it _is _twenty,. t!wenty-

five or thirty years.

This presents a difficult problem for the

lender if he has anticipated the twelve year period which is
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presently being used by most lenders.
FHLMC presents a different approach
due on sale.

~g~in

to the

-- 11

FHLMC has a uniform note which must be used if the

mortgage is to be resold to FHLMC.

It provides, and I would like to

quote this at the present time,
"If all or any part of the property or an interest therein
is sold or transferred by the borrower without· the lender's
prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a
lien or encumbrance subordinate to this deed of trust;
(b) the creation of a purchased money security interest
for household appliances; (c) a transfer by devise,
descent or operation of law upon the death of a joint
tenant; or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of
3 years or less, not containing an option to purchase,
the lender may at the lender's option declare all sums
secured by this deed of trust to be · immediately due and
payable."
The conventional secondary market is a structure within
which the lenders are left to compete in trying to meet the demands ·
of the secondary sources of funds.

As a result, they have developed

due on sale clauses in much the same manner as late charges and
prepayment provisions.
We would like to note at this time that subdivision (c)
of the FHLMC uniform note where it excludes from the due on sale
clause a transfer by devise, descent or operation of law on joint
tenancy is a provision we feel takes care of many of the problems
that have been indicated in testimony supporting S.B. 200.

Such

situations as the enforcement of due on sale clauses in the event
of death of the borrower and the transfer of the property by either
devise or descent to the widow.

Under the FHLMC approach, there

would be no enforceable due on sale clause in this case.
-

In

-

commenting on due on sale provisions, we feel that- this provision
is extremely important in view of the length of the term of the
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contract and also the difficulty inherent in anticipating important
changes in the underlying circumstances.
These changes may have profound affects on the
borrower, his creditworthiness, and the security •••.• the security
being the only source of funds available to the lender under the

0

anti-deficiency legislation (C.C.P. §580b).

Further, its importance

is recognized by the FHLMC's Services Guide, page 516:
"FHLMC believes that the right of acceleration upon transfer
of ownership is an invaluable tool of any mortgage investor
in ensuring that only creditworthy mortgagors are responsible
for making payments where the right of acceleration upon
transfer of ownership exists. Servicer shall use its best
effort to determine the sale or transfer of mortgaged
property or any other event giving rise to the right of
acceleration."

The case of Tucker v. Lassen, a recent decision by
the California Supreme Court, considered due on sale clauses in '
the context of the legislative provision against unreasonable
restraints against alienation of property.

The Court held that \

such a clause could not be enforced where the sale was in the fo~
of an installment contract of sale of real property.

It very

carefully did not consider a true sale situation.
The California Bankers Association feels that the
FHLMC provision offers a reasonable suggestion for California
legislation, especially in view of subdivision (c) which covers
all transfers by devise or descent, and excludes them from the
due on sale provision.
D.

ASSUMPTION CLAUSES AND FEES

This clause arises where the borrower sells the
property and attempts to have his new buyer assume his benefits
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and obligations under the note and deed of trust.

Most instruments

merge these with the due on sale and permit the lender to exercise
the veto.
F.H.A. and V.A. permit assumption provision due to
the fact that they don't have due on sale clauses.
FNMA likewise has no provision.
FHLMC again presents a little different structure.
You will recall the FHLMC statement on the importance of the due
on sale provision.

They permit the lender servicer to approve

an assumption if (a) cash equity of at least 5% of the new purchase
price; (b) property is to be owner-occupied; (c)

monthly first plus

second of any mortgage payments plus escrow impound accounts do not
exceed 25% of the base pay of the primary wage earner;

(d) ic) above

plus all other monthly payments on all installment debts having
remaining terms of more than 7 months do not exceed 33-1/3% of the
monthly base pay of the primary wage earner;

(e) is not really

applicable to our discussion here today;

(f) that there be no

other changes in the terms of the loan.

If these conditions are

not met, FHLMC will consider an assumption on a case by case basis.
Note: Under this system, if the loan rate changes, the servicerlender cannot permit an assumption.

In those cases, the lender

must repurchase the mortgage from FHLMC at par and make a new loan
with regard to the new party.
Conventional secondary market in this area is much
the same as above.
of the lender.

Assumptions normally are only at the option

There are instruments, however, which do permit

assumptions but these are normally for the lender's own portfolio
and, again, it is the secondary market which dictates the nature
of the provision.
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In commenting on the whole area of assumptions,
le~~~p~~~~~~ith extreme caution.

Each lender has

an experience factor which reflects the turnover rate of their loans.
This factor is considered in the light of inflation, risk, and the
cost of money in setting the interest rate of the loans.

Incidentally,

under the FNMA and FHLMC programs, the turnover rate is generally
regarded as 12 years.

Thus, the loan is analyzed as if it is going

to last only for twelve years.

If the lender did not have the

veto right, then each loan would ·have to be regarded on the term
of the note, in other words, twenty or thirty years.

Inflation

i

alone would dictate higher interest rates than presently exist.
S.B. 200 and Tucker discuss the lender-borrower
relationship as if the only concern of the lender is with the
condition of the security.

We take strong exception to this point.

The lender has agreed to financing that particular borrower based
upon his promise to pay as agreed and on an evaluation of his
ability and willingness to pay.
Let me for a minute go back and reread some of the
conditions · for assumptions:
new purchase price;
(c)

(b)

(a)

FHLMC·~

cash equity of at least 5% of the

property is to be owner-occupied;

monthly first plus second mortgage payments plus escrow-impound

accounts do not exceed 25% of the base pay of the primary wage
earner;

(d)

(c) above plus all other monthly payments on all

other installment debts having remaining terms of more than 7 months
do not exceed 33-1/3% of the monthly base pay of the primary wage

D

earner.

These provisions, plus the fact that both FNMA and FHLMC

anticipate credit reports clearly indicate
more than merely the security.
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that they consider

A further point is the "unreasonable impairment of
security" 1est of S. B. 200, which apparently was borrowed from the
court's discussion in the LaSala case which also appeared in the
Tucker case.

This is a situation where the lender, under their

theory, is solely concerned with the condition of his security.
We feel, from the lender's
unworkable.

viewp~int,

that this concept is plainly

By the terms of S.B. 200, the only application of this

test would arise in a foreclosure action.

If a standard is to be

enacted by the Legislature, it must be an objective one, not a subjective test.

The latter would lead to constant expensive and

time-consuming litigation and be against the best interests of
everyone involved.

The problem arises since the unreasonable

impairment of security test is a test which is dependent upon a
subjective view of the particular situation.

What is necessary is

a standard which is objective and can be determined by the parties
involved with a minimum of possible disagreements leading to
litigation.
The California Bankers Association feels that the
FHLMC approach is one that is far superior to the approach of
S.B. 200.

FHLMC, incidentally, permits a 1% fee upon assumption,

and we feel that this is an agreeable provision.
E.

"POINTS II

The next concept I would like to discuss is that of
"points".

This discussion differs from other areas because points,

as we understand them, arise only with regard to F.H.A. and V.A.
loans.

F.H.A. and V.A. are not sources of funds - they are

guarantee programs.

They are designed to

r~duce

the risk factor

for the lender and to get funds to borrowers who are otherwise
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unable to get mortgage funds in the prevailing market.
they have an interest rate limitation.
now 9-1/2%.

Thus,

For instance, F.H.A. is

Having gotten the loan at the artificially low rate,

when the borrower sells his property, the new buyer assumes, in the
normal situation, and he then gets that same benefit.
having gotten the funds

The lender,

from the normal market,then is permitted

to charge the seller points.

This is the difference between the

F.H.A. or V.A. rate and the prevailing market rate expressed in a
percentage of points.
F.

LOAN FEES OR LOAN ORIGINATION FEES

Loan fees are very often expressed as points also,
which creates some confusion with the F.H.A.-V.A. situation.

In

our minds, the loan fee is that which covers the lender's cost of
obtaining a block of funds from the secondary market and his cost
of processing the loan.

Thus, it would cover appraisal fees,

photo fees and all normal closing costs which would cover work
done by the lender on the loan application.

Credit reports are

among the included costs.
F.H.A. and V.A. limit loan fees to 1% of the amount
of the loan.
FNMA, FHLMC and the secondary market leave these fees
to the lender.

We feel that loan fees properly charged and used

properly cover processing costs and commitment costs necessary to
bring a loan to fruition.

We feel that a loan fee of 2% of the loan

is proper, that is, a chrage of two points.

F.H.A. and V.A. is

limited- to 1% which barely covers administrative anq

proq~s ~~ng _ 9 ost~.

When using FNMA and FHLMC the breakdown is as follows:

1% for our

costs plus 1/2% commitment fees or nonmember fees, resulting in a
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small profit of 1/2 point which is not unreasonable since loan
payments then go to others.
for a small fee.

.

The lender becomes only the servicer

The servicing fee ranges betwen 1/4% and 3/B% of

the interest collected on the payment as it is made through the
life of the loan.
is as follows:

The conventional secondary market breakdown

there is the 1% cost factor, plus the 1% commitment

fees normally charged by sources of funds in the conventional
secondary market.

Under a 2% loan fee

l~itation,

this would

result in a wash for the lender.
Since each of these sources of funds should be protected, the 2% fee should be the minimum level at which any statutory
max~um

can be set.
Title insurance fees, real estate broker fees,

escrow charges are not normally fees charged by the bank.

To the

extent that these costs may be incurred by the bank, we should be
able to pass them on to the borrower at cost.

When bank services are

utilized other than as part of a loan application (e.g. escrow services)
any limitation which is set should consider the private escrow
services, permitting them to recover their costs plus a reasonable
profit.

If such a limitation is needed, then this approach should

be followed in our view.

IV.

NORMAL BANK PROCEDURES

These should be reviewed in order to give the Committee
an idea of what is presently going on with regard to bank policies
in real estate len9ing.

To

so~~ d~~ree th~s

has already been

covered, but I think it should be discussed directly.
to set these

For banks

charges on a uniform basis would obviously cause anti-180-
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trust problems.

However, it is no secret within the industry

what various banks do.

There are differences between banks that

reflect varying degrees of involvement in the real estatellending
field.
0

Other differences reflect different policies as to qualified

borrowers, geographical locations, and whether they primarily lend
for their own portfolio or need outside funds in order to operate.
Late charges are normally from 4% to 6%.

Prepayment

charges . ~~ry greatly, but six months interest on the original balance
plus 20% seems to be not unusual.

One statewide bank recently

raised their charge to better compete with other lenders for outside
funds.

They raised their charge to something similar to the FHLMC

provisions.

It should be noted that within this area there are

some banks that have a 5 year limitation on their prepayment charge,
others do not.

Due on sale provisions are generally uniform and are

included in the note.

The unusual situation is the note which does

not include such a provision.

Assumption fees vary from a flat charge

of $100 to slightly higher than 1% of the unpaid balance.
Acceleration and assumption fees are judged on individual cases.
The factors considered are loan rates, creditworthiness and loan
officer judgment factors.

Loan fees

from 2% to something slightly higher.
by banks.

also vary but they range
Finders fees are not used

Again, many of these provisions have been formulated

to compete effectively on the conventional secondary market.
At this point, perhaps it would be worthwhile to
discuss a major problem a real estate lender has which affects
all Qf_ tne

thi.rrg~

we _hay_~

. l>~e~ __Q_!_~q~~-~~r.!g.

This is the

of profit and the problem of obtaining funds.
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p:z:~blem

Assume that a bank wants to use in-bank sources to
make a real estate loan.

Assume further that you take $100,000,

one-half from each of the two basic sources.

In other words,

$50,000 from commercial/checking account source and $50,000

from the savings account source.

Under the Federal Reserve require-

ments, reserves must be established covering the deposit sources of
the funds.

With rega"g __t.o..J;;he __commercial aspect, it would be 15%,
-

-

-

-

... 4 -

-·--- -

_.,

-

---

·

-

--

.

.

...

which results in $7,500 that must be set aside and

·-

•

-·

--

-

fQl:" _ j;h_~_
_ savings

------. ..

asp~t.__thent_ __i_l! -~ - -2Q%_.

reserve...:r;equiremgp~ or a reserve of $10,000.
--- . -- Thus, you have $17,500 which must be taken from the $100,000 and
---- · - - -·· -- -- ..... -----·- ------ - --------···- . ... -· ----·
placed -~~---~overnmen-t: __~~-~t.Q provide reserves for the deposits
~-

from whence these funds came.
This reduces the lendable funds from $100,000 to $82,500.
Assume that there is a 10.5% annual rate of interest that is charged
on the loan.
$8,662.50.

This results in an interest payment for the year of
Of the 10.5% rate of interest, some 8% goes to pay

interest to the depositors of the $100,000, including the depositor's
interest payment, F.D.I.C. insurance and other costs to the bank
including servicing of the loan under discussion.
comes to roughly $6,600 during the year.

This figure

This leaves 2.5% out

of the 10.5% or $2,062.50 as an annual return to the lender before
taxes.
The foregoing assumes a "normal" lending situation.
It also assumes that charges, fees, etc. return nothing more than
incidental revenue to the bank.
This then

p_r~s~nts

a

gene~al

p!cture

wh~ch _ is ~ot

intended to reflect any particular bank or any particular transaction, but rather to reflect a problem common to bank lenders.
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To place capital in the real estate lending market is
very expensive to the lender because his return is not as high as
people would assume.
a 2. 5%

It is obvious that you can get better than

return on many other types of investment.

This is one of

the real problems involved in real estate financing.
If the loan was prepared on FHLMC forms, .etc., and if
we f~rget the .~imitation . of FHLMC .and ~~~. ~~--~55,~0~ . lo~~~ in the
individua~ .~i~~~~~-~-~~~ -!~~~5~0 ~ortgage c~~~~- ~e sold on the

FHLMC
or FNMA market.
o;-------- ·----- · - .... - - ---· -- ·
make another loan.

-. -

The funds realized

can then be utilized to

This is how to get loan funds into the California

market •

.....__

If there is a tight money situation, then the Federal
Reserve may increase the reserve requirement.
ment bond prices to

incr~ase,

This causes govern-

plus the fact that out of that 2.5%

return, we must go out and purchase further government bonds as the
only means we have of meeting the increased reserve requirements.
Further, federal policies of selling bonds in lots of, $1,000 drains
away potential savings or commercial deposits because of limited
rates banks can pay on savings.

This further operates to raise

the cost levels of the market -- another complicating factor.

V.

CONCLUSION

This presentation is intended to illustrate two
points:

(1)

the importance of the secondary market, both conven-

tional and FNMA and FHLMC;

(2)

that any legislative action must

not restrict the flow of funds upon which the entire California
.............
housing economy is dependent.

The provisions and practices
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discussed can have

i~portant

effects on that flow of funds.

This generally concludes the California Bankers
Association presentation and I will be available and willing to
attempt to answer any of your questions.
Thank you.
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EXHIBIT D
S'l'ATEME.NT ON Bm-Ir.LF OF REAL ESTATE COMr-tlSSlONER
ROBERT W. YJ\RPE TO ASSEMBI...Y FINANCE l\ND INSUHi\NCE COMMITTF.E
INTERI~l STUDY ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE

November 12, 1974
Los Angeles, California
My name is Jack Hempel. I am Chief Deputy Director of the
Department of Real Estate.
Real Estate Co1nmissioner Robert W.
Karpe has asked me to thank the committee for giving the
Department of Real Estate the opportunity to be present and
to respond to questions which may arise involving either the
jurisdiction or the expertise of the Department.
The meeting notice states the activities of the committee will
encompass costs associated with the consummation and financing
of real property transactions.
The topics listed in the meeting notice are not regulated by
the Department of Real Estate, except for some of the charges
in connection with hard money loans under what is customarily
referred to as the Necessitous Borrowers Act. These matters
were most recently addressed by the Legislature in connection
with S.B. 304 and S.B. 310 of the 1973 Session -- both bills
were supported by the Department of Real Estate. These amend ments tightened up~n ' the activities of some of the larger
mortgage brokers via Article 7 of the Real Estate La'\'T (with
respc:ct to regulatc.r:y· provisions applying t;u l:t::ct:i.. t:S'-.di..~
licensees in certain mortgage loan transactions).
We assume the above information has been catalogued by the
committee, and that your current interest lies primarily in the
area of settlement costs directly related rini.· the purchasing and
selling of residential properties in today • s ··'real estate market.
In that regard, we understand several of the matters which the
committee might feel are within our area of expertise, although
not in our regulatory jurisdiction, have to do with the following:

1.

The effect of real estate brokerage commissions on real
estate transactions and the question of these fees in
relation to services rendered.
Commissions are a matter of negotiation between agent and
principal. Although there are rates (6 percent) typical
in the trade, many licensees deviate from this figure.
In Sacramento, for example, I have seen TV commercials
within the last three or four months from a
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prominent firm of Realtors advertising that their "full
service" commissions on house sales are $800 plus
1 percent of the selling price. I do not know whether
there have been any surveys as to how many licensees
deviate from the norm, but, of course, it has long been
customary for large transactions to typically result in a
negotiated commission at somewhat less than that figure
representatives from the industry could comment on this,
I am sure.
State anti-trust laws prohibit the fixing.of commissions
for services, and I believe the California Association of
Realtors -- many years ago -- entered into a consent decree
which resulted in the withdrawal from circulation of any
recommended rates.
It would be our observation that the
fact that most licensees charge 6 percent on residential
sales is more a standard of reasonableness than of design.
It is true in most fields that activities below a certain
rate are not economically feasible. This is probably why
my TV repa~r experience has been relatively similar as to
the cost per visit from the three different repairmen who
have visitec my own home during the last several years.
This also probably explains why the markups for the sale
of consumer goods, based on inventory, turnover and the
like, are relatively stable. We understand 11 big ticket"
appliances customarily sell at a 40 to 50 percent markup,
whereas small appliances sell at the 25 to 30 percent
level. Similarlv. discount new car auto saleR are m:;unllv ~t
$200 to $300 over invoice. I know of none . who deal for, say, $50 to $100. The net-net just would not be there!
In the typical rea 1 estate tr·a nsaction, the commission is
shared by four real estate licensees. The listing is
secured by a salesman who is probably an employee in a
real estate firm.
The property is sold by another office
with wpom the listing office cooperates or through the
multiple listing service. The same sort of division of
the selling agent's share of the c~mmission takes place in
that office between the salesman and his broker. Without
this network of communications, there would probably be
fewer real estate transactions: multiple listing services
have thrived because they help get the broadest possible
exposure for properties which are available for sale. If
one considers the vast majority of every license~s time
which is spent in work other than getting a signature on a
dotted line, the actual remuneration to each licensee
involved in the transaction would be best understood.
A portion of all licensee's fees is set aside for education
and research in real estate in the l.nstitutions of higher
learning in California.
We haye fQund three of thes~ r.ese~rch _ projects which contain
segments relating to the income of licensees. A copy of
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0
each of these has been delivered to the committee for
such analysis as might seem appropriate. Although each
of these was directed to something collateral to the
pure question of income, the factors which were reviewed
seem to point toward an average income for a full-time
licensee in the real estate business at somewhere between
the $10,000 and $20,000 per annum level. Even a 1974 survey by the organized real estate industry (within whose
ranks the most active licensees are probably found and who,
therefore, might be expected to have a subst~ntially higher
income levels) 69 percent of those surveyed in 1974 who
were salesmen responded that their earnings were $20,000
or less• 23% under $10,000; 25% from $10,000 to $15,000:
21% from $15,000 to $20,000; 31% over $20,000.

0

0

2.

We were told that the question might arise as to whether
the large number of licensees in the state is not a factor
which runs counter to possibility for reductions in real
estate commission rates. We hardly think so. If there is
an over-population of real estate licensees, every competitive economic test we have ever seen supports the
suggestion that the greater the competition the more price
cutting might be expected.
As of July 1, 1974, the Department had 219,381 real estate
licensees. Of these, 146,435 1 (90,026 active and 56,409
inactive) were salesmen and 72,946 (62,464 active and
10,4'32 inacti_ve) '\-ler'3 brokers. These ntmlber:c:: are large,
but the percentage has varied only nominally in the past 35
years. A review of Department records shows that the ratio
of licensee to population has run something from 1 to 90 to
1 to 125 since the late 1930 • s. ·
Further, the inactive status, which has only been
statutorily provided for the past 17 or 18 years, shows
us that only about two-thirds of the overall numbers are
participating on the economic scene as real estate
licensees. The one change which has been apparent during
the last two decades has been a gradual reduction in the
overall number of licensees who enjoy real estate broker
license status as compared to the percentage of the total
licentiate who are real estate salesmen. This, we believe ,
is a direct by-product of the two-year salesman experience
requirement which was placed into the law in 1950,
supplemented by the educational requirements for real
estate brokers which have been added during the last ten
years -- most rece~tly bringing the college level course
requirements for real estate b:rokers to six real estate
and real estate related courses (of three units each) to
be effective January 1, 1975. We have delivered copies of
the Long-Range Professionalization Plan, of which all of
this is a part, to the committee.
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We believe this sort of 11 limitation 11 on participation in
the real estate field is that which is most economically
sound and most particularly in the public interest. That
is, that real estate licensees, especially those employing
other real estate licensees, should be competent and
knowledgeable in dealing with what is often the life
savings of the average California citizen -- his participation in the ownership of his home.
We believe, too, that entry into the real estate business -or any other field -- should not be artificially restricted.
Our citizens should have a right to a job, and as long as
we have a tough real estate examination for determining the
competency of real estate salesman licensees, we do not
believe arbitrary restrictions should be added to them. On
the other hand, the broker is responsible for the activities
of his salesman and as such should be expected to have a
higher level of competence and knowledge in order to
protect best the interests of the consumer.
Since most of the questions which might be developed by the
committee as a result of testimony before it might deal with
matters not apparent to us in preparing such a statement in
advance -- it is the Commissioner's desire that I respond on
his behalf to any questions you might have formulated; if I
do not have the answer at hand, we pledge prompt research
through appropriate members of our staff and a response prior
to the co;:-,cl"..A.3ion of your deliberations.
Thank you for the opportunity to be heard.
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